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ABSTRACT 
 
SPECIES SADNESS: RACE, GENDER, AND ANIMALITY IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
Carolyn Fornoff 
Román de la Campa 
While the nonhuman has generally been disregarded as irrelevant to Mexicanist and Central 
Americanist scholarship on race, sexuality, gender, and politics, this project argues that thinking 
through the animal was a key method through which twentieth-century writers revised what ought 
to be considered “natural” and normative. The hypothesis that this project explores is that the 
animal operates as a figure that contests how the human—or a certain type of human marked by 
sexuality, gender, and race—has been produced and privileged by society. I argue that the turn to 
species intensifies during moments of ideological change. Species Sadness thus provides a 
framework for thinking about three periods of political turmoil in Central America and Mexico in 
relation to each other—rising fascism in the thirties, incipient feminism in the sixties, and the 
Sandinista revolution of the seventies—and argues that during moments of ideological revision, 
the concept of species is central. Interspecies erotics, domestic intimacy with pets, and animal 
vulnerability, are all unusual, yet key narrative tools to push readers to think beyond the human 
and define an ethics that is attentive to alterity. 
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INTRODUCTION: Thinking with Animals in Literature and Theory 
 
 “Te digo que no es un animal... Oye cómo ladra el Palomo... Debe ser algún cristiano…” 
Mariano Azuela, Los de abajo (1915) 
 
“Estaban presos ahí los monos, nada menos que ellos, mona y mono; bien, mono y mono, los dos, en su 
jaula, todavía sin desesperación, sin desesperarse del todo, con sus pasos de extremo a extremo, detenidos 
pero en movimiento, atrapados por la escala zoológica como si alguien, los demás, la humanidad, 
impiadosamente ya no quisiera ocuparse de su asunto, de ese asunto de ser monos, del que por otra parte 
ellos tampoco querían enterarse, monos al fin, o no sabían ni querían, presos en cualquier sentido que se los 
mirara, enjaulados dentro del cajón de altas rejas de dos pisos dentro del traje azul de paño y la escarapela 
brillante encima de la cabeza, dentro de su ir y venir sin amaestramiento, natural, sin embargo fijo, que no 
acertaba a dar el paso que pudiera hacerlos salir de la interespecie donde se movían, caminaban, copulaban, 
crueles y sin memoria, mona y mono dentro del Paraíso[...].  
José Revueltas, El apando (1969) 
 
“No podemos ir a la comisaría, aunque es el tiempo de los Comisarios, porque tú, Lola, no existes. Así lo 
decretaron “las cabezas bien pensantes” que vigilan con celo la libertad de los pueblos. […] La dificultad 
reside en que para gozar de los Derechos hay que ser Hombre. Y ser Hombre es algo así como ser diputado 
por lo menos y como no eres diputado, Lola, no tienes ningún derecho.  
En cambio los demás gozan del legítimo Derecho de insultarte, patearte, echarte a la calle o llevarte a 
cualquier comisaría. “Las cabezas bien pensantes” han legalizado el insulto, las patizas y las comisarías 
para las Minervas […] Tu vida misma, Lola, es un delito.”  
Elena Garro, Andamos huyendo Lola (1980) 
 
 
In the three epigraphs above, each author plays with the distinction between 
human and animal. Mariano Azuela and José Revueltas begin their canonical works Los 
de abajo and El apando with moments of ontological ambiguity that call into question the 
stability of species. In Los de abajo, the opening assertion that what waits unseen outside 
of Demetrio Macías’ house is not animal, but human, is imbued with irony. The 
Federales’ “humanity” is quickly unraveled, their “beastliness” revealed as they 
ruthlessly shoot El Palomo (the dog that announced their arrival), threaten to rape 
Macías’ wife, and set his house on fire. Revueltas’ novel, El apando, similarly draws 
readers in through the drama of ontological opacity. The caged “monkeys,” trapped on a 
lower zoological rung by a humanity disinterested in their fate, appear on first read to be 
metaphors for inmates. Yet in Revueltas’ breathless sentence, this preliminary suggestion 
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is toppled through a second twist. The “monkeys” are not the inmates, but guards. The 
prisoner Polonia is revealed to be the narrator, who watches the jailers through a tiny 
chink in his cell. Through sight, a feature traditionally correlated with the human, Polonia 
observes and taxonomizes his wardens; he situates them as “interespecie,” occupying the 
precarious threshold that demarcates humans from primates. The odious wardens are 
dehumanized by Polonia’s eye: he declares them animal, and as such, feminized, mona 
instead of mono, two male monkeys that copulate, a queer effeminacy that is catalogued 
as inhuman, subhuman, abject. 
If Revueltas uses the discourse of animality in order to dramatize how the 
institution of incarceration dehumanizes, Elena Garro takes up the legal separation of 
human from animal through the lens of feminist critique. In a way that reveals the 
patriarchal logic behind Revueltas’ disparaging collapse of femininity and animality, 
Garro argues that the supposedly universal term of the “human” is in reality a fiction 
consolidated by the Hombre or State, that excludes other subjects from personhood: 
including women, the colonized, and nonhuman animals. Subverting the equation of 
human superiority with sight, reason, and the head, Garro mocks the “cabezas bien 
pensantes”, arguing that this entrenched hierarchy must not be reified, but questioned. All 
the while, the reader of Andamos huyendo Lola wonders who or what Lola is. The text 
plays with our desire to know, classify, or pin down Lola’s identity, and our ultimate 
bewilderment at Garro’s treatment of a cat as a subject that deserves legal consideration.  
This dissertation originated out of my fascination with the proliferation of 
passages such as these that mobilize ontological ambiguity in Latin American literature. I 
wondered what exactly these ruminations about human animality were doing in these 
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texts.1 And why, if the figure of the animal occupies such a visible space in twentieth-
century Mexican and Central American literature, has it been so neglected by 
scholarship? What are animals doing in and for these texts? Does the animal simply 
function as a metaphor, as it appears to do in Revueltas’ novel, or is it accounted for as a 
“real” presence, as in Azuela and Garro? In response to these questions, Species Sadness 
tracks the animal as it appears on the page throughout the twentieth-century in Mexico 
and Central America, from modernismo through the 1980s.  
The working hypothesis that this project explores is that the animal operates as a 
figure that contests how the human—or a certain type of human marked by sexuality, 
gender, and race—has been produced and privileged by society. While the nonhuman has 
generally been disregarded as irrelevant to Mexicanist and Central Americanist 
scholarship on sexuality, gender, and politics, this project argues that thinking through 
the animal was a key method through which twentieth-century writers revised what ought 
to be considered “natural” and normative. The turn to species, I posit, intensifies during 
moments of ideological change. Species Sadness thus provides a framework for thinking 
about three periods of political turmoil in Mexico and Central America in relation to each 
other—rising fascism in the thirties, incipient feminism in the sixties, and the Sandinista 
revolution of the seventies—and argues that during moments of ideological revision, the 
concept of species is central.  
Drawing on recent work in animal studies and ecocritical theory, in broad strokes 
this project analyzes twentieth-century texts that represent kinship across species as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nietzsche argued that for reading to be properly practiced as an art, “one has almost to be a cow and in 
any case not a ‘modern man’: rumination” (9). 
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means to grapple with alterity, intimacy, and ethics. First, I examine understudied 
vanguard texts by Rafael Arévalo Martínez and Hernán Robleto that startlingly figure 
interspecies desire in order to naturalize love across types, and push back against societal 
angst about mestizaje. Then, I demonstrate how intimacy with animals is put to different 
work in women’s writing. Through the trope of the ‘crazy cat lady,’ Julieta Campos 
deconstructs domesticity and models unconventional gender possibilities. Finally, I chart 
how revolutionary texts by Ernesto Cardenal, Omar Cabezas, and Lizandro Chávez 
Alfaro narrate corporeal vulnerability through the problematic discourse of toxicity, but 
also give shape to the ethical potential of becoming-animal. Overall, this project brings 
canonical and noncanonical texts from Mexico and Central America into dialogue to 
inform our understanding of how animality circulates in the twentieth century as a 
mechanism for destabilizing categorical definitions of sexuality, gender, and politics. 
Broadly conceived, animal studies is part of the environmental humanities, an 
umbrella term for interdisciplinary scholarship that is invested in undoing the traditional 
separation of culture and nature, and human and nonhuman. Work in the environmental 
humanities demonstrates that these seemingly distant categories are actually interwoven 
and mutually informing. A subset of this inquiry, animal studies turns our attention to the 
fact that the “human” is predicated on the nonhuman. Since Aristotle, man has been 
deemed the “rational animal,” whose reason forges the limit between the human and his 
others, and differentiates lives that matter from those that don’t. Yet, as critical studies of 
race, feminism, and postcolonialism have demonstrated, this universal “human” is in fact 
not universal at all, but rather a specific type of “human”: the man of the Enlightenment 
linked to the history of Western imperialism. 
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As scholars such as Gabriel Giorgi, Zakiyya Jackson, Neel Ahuja, and Mel Chen 
have pointed out, much of the current work in animal studies has tended to be Eurocentric 
in scope, and sidesteps crucial questions of race and geopolitics. That is, in its ambition to 
move past the human, the nascent posthumanist approach often doesn’t actually 
deconstruct Eurocentric paradigms and subsequently glosses over forms of inequity 
including racism, sexism, and postcolonial power dynamics. Species Sadness joins efforts 
to fill this gap by bringing the animal into conversation with these other traditions of 
critique—specifically, critical studies of race, gender, and revolution as they pertain to 
Latin America—in order to further our understanding of how the separation of the 
“human” from its others is not an intuitive split, but a constantly produced boundary that 
parses life that is protected from life that is deemed expendable.  
 
The nonhuman in theory 
While the vast majority of critical examinations of Mexican and Central 
American literature have focused on the complexity of these cultures, tracking 
intellectual, aesthetic, and political dynamism both within borders and beyond, such 
approaches have often shied away from reflecting upon how these human processes 
interact with, think through, and respond to nonhuman life. The tendency to attend to the 
development of culture and sidestep the environment reflects the humanist inclination to 
take the natural world as a given, assuming that ecological change is so gradual that 
man’s relationship with nature is timeless and thus not subject for study. However, while 
we once thought that geological conditions constituted a stable, unchanging backdrop 
against which human culture was played out, growing awareness since the late 1980s to 
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anthropogenic global warming has increased attention to the ecological parameters that 
circumscribe human existence. Based on mounting evidence indicating that humans have 
become geological actors whose practices are irrevocably altering the Earth—modifying 
the atmosphere’s chemistry and causing sea levels to rise—scientists speculate that the 
current geological Holocene (a warmer climate that began ten thousand years ago and 
permitted the proliferation of human civilization) has given way to a new geological 
epoch, the Anthropocene, in which humans are the main environmental determinant.2  
In “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that the 
advent of the Anthropocene and the concomitant unprecedented awareness that humans 
can act with geological force urges us to rethink the classic humanist separation of culture 
and nature. It impels critics to situate the human histories of capital, empire, and 
globalization in dialogue with the environment and its deep history. Since the changing 
climate complicates the survival of all humans, Chakrabarty claims that the 
Anthropocene is best approached through the concept of species, “a universal that arises 
from a shared sense of catastrophe… a global approach to politics without the myth of a 
global identity” (222). This goal, to think about species without sacrificing difference or 
giving into myths of a universal identity or a level global playing field is challenging.  
 Species, a taxonomic unit that groups together individual organisms by their 
shared biological characteristics, brings to mind the reified image of the Human. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Nobel Laureate Paul J. Crutzen popularized the term “Anthropocene” in 2000 to describe this new 
geological era in which humans activities are modifying fundamental environmental properties. Based on 
analysis of carbon dioxide and methane in air trapped in polar ice, Crutzen argues that the beginning of the 
Anthropocene coincided with the Industrial Revolution, and has rapidly accelerated throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century. Because of the field’s conservative approach to periodization, the 
Anthropocene is not yet an officially accepted geologic period, but the term is gaining traction among 
scientists as a metaphor for human-induced global environmental change (Chakrabarty 210).  
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category of species clusters the complex plurality of human life into a single generality; it 
invokes notions of ontological essence, of a shared, stable, predetermined identity. Of 
course, as we will explore further ahead (and as Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, and 
Donna Haraway have all pointed out), this Human is always articulated in contrast to its 
supposed opposite, the animal. The fundamental dilemma when turning to species, then, 
is how to understand this unity of being while still affirming its internal differentiating 
forces. To my mind, it is precisely this tension—between the desire to zoom out beyond 
the confines of identity or the national, combined with the suspicion (or sadness) that 
such a gesture flattens difference or carries unseen assumptions—that makes looking at 
the discourse of species interesting. Keeping this problem in mind, I am attentive to how 
the authors that I include at times turn to species in a gesture of essentialism, and in other 
instances, as an affirmation of contingency and continuity.3  
In order to explore how the environmental concerns outlined above dovetail with 
cultural inscriptions of animality, Species Sadness places the broad, ecological resonance 
of species (i.e. its constructive possibilities, such as those signaled by Chakrabarty) in 
conversation with the biopolitical dimensions of species discourse. One only has to look 
at the terminology that peppers discussion of illegal immigration in order to see how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For Chakrabarty, thinking through species is a way to shift to a macro-historical view of planetary life. 
Through species, we can recognize the interconnectedness of different life forms, without conceding the 
importance of internal difference that a totalizing universalism might imply. Resonant with Chakrabarty’s 
claim that the present ecological crisis calls for a renewed consideration of species, the texts considered in 
Species Sadness think across (and through) species in order to reflect on the human relation to the planet 
and limitless biological difference as both constituting and undermining the universal.  
For an example of how the concept of species can be invoked in order to flatten difference, one need only 
look to Rubén Darío’s crónica “Menagerie.” In this crónica, Darío invokes animals in order to erase the 
power difference between himself and a French marquis that he meets aboard a transatlantic voyage. Darío 
argues that all of mankind can shape nature to his liking, an aesthetic project of curating biological life that 
Darío chooses not to complicate (through colonialism or geopolitics) but instead invokes to erase the 
differences between himself and the marquis. 
8 
	  
references to animals are used to dehumanize: to parse life that “matters” from that which 
doesn’t. Brokering the porous limit between North and South, coyotes evade regulation as 
they transport pollos across the US-Mexican border, who risk being rounded up by US 
Border Patrol vans, or perreras, when apprehended. The articulation of migrants and 
middlemen who traverse the intermediary space of the border as less-than-human 
exemplifies language’s collapse of animality and race (as well as class, gender, and 
citizenship) in the constitution of a hierarchy of being in which the animal occupies the 
space of precarious, “bare life,” a semiotic marker of bodily classification based on the 
discursive recognition of humanity.  
Acknowledging the role the discourse of species plays in determining lives that 
“matter,” animal studies has increasingly been brought into dialogue with biopolitics. 
Building off the terminology of biopower coined by Michel Foucault to describe how the 
individual and the collective produce each other, Giorgio Agamben elaborates that 
differentiation between humans and animals is the fundamental operating mechanism of 
biopolitics. Man becomes “human” through what Agamben terms the anthropological 
machine of exclusion. The division between the human and the animal is first enacted 
within the human’s biological body as a “mobile border” or “intimate caesura” in which 
the “human” is discursively differentiated from its animality (The Open 15). It is this 
“inclusive exclusion” of the remainder (homo sacer, animal, or wolf-man) that produces 
the “human” subject.  
When we attend to the discourse of animality, the mechanism by which the law 
divides humans from things—separating knowing, reasoning subjects from their 
others/objects—becomes more visible. The anthropological machine of exclusion parses 
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lives that merit protection (that are recognizably “human,” or bios) from the easily 
sacrificed (the merely biological, bare animal life, or zoe). The intersection between 
biopower and species discourse opens up avenues for understanding how modes of 
domination and governance pass through biological life. As Cary Wolfe puts it, “To live 
under biopolitics is to live in a situation in which we are all always already (potential) 
“animals” before the law—not just nonhuman animals according to zoological 
classification, but any group of living beings that is so framed. Here, the distinction 
“human/animal”—as the history of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism well shows—is 
a discursive resource, not a zoological designation” (Before the Law 10). 
It is important here to pause to note the obvious: the discourse of animality is 
different from representations of “actual” animals or of the embodied nonhuman world. 
Colleen Boggs provides a useful differentiation between these two terms: ““Animality” is 
not a single construct but operates on a spectrum where “the animal” is one position” (8). 
As a field, animal studies has been keen to push back against the tendency in scholarship 
to interpret animals in literature as mere metaphors. The aim is to recenter the lived 
experience and legitimacy of the animal perspective; to consider the animal as worthy of 
ethical or philosophical consideration, not just as an abstract concept or mirror for human 
thoughts and feelings. In Species Sadness, I include both representations of “real” 
animals as well as discourses of animality in the analytical scope, often endeavoring to 
think about the intersection between these two modes. The inclusion of both “animals” 
and “animality” evidences my dual ambition to understand how Latin American literature 
works through the ethical and political implications of nonhuman life, as well as attend to 
the discourse of animality as a biopolitical tool of oppression. I think that there is a great 
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deal of continuity and intersection between the discourse of animality and the figuration 
of animals in texts, both as “real” creatures as well as emblems of alterity.4 
One of the difficulties of thinking about animals through literature is the question 
of representation: can the act of representation constitute an engagement with a real (not 
figured) other? For Derrida the shift from representation to a consideration of the “actual” 
animal is key. Whereas Agamben and Deleuze and Guattari primarily take up the animal 
as an abstracted concept (a space of the “postmodern sublime” or a “liberatory plunge” 
into the abyss of difference, as Kari Weil notes (16)), Derrida challenges the 
anthropogenic figuration of subjects, pushing us to consider the animal as an 
“irreplaceable living being,” “an existence that refuses to be conceptualized,” a subject 
with “the point of view of the absolute other” (379-80). For Derrida, in order to seriously 
account for alterity, it is important to shift from projection to the encounter. Rather than 
anthropomorphize the animal in order to make it humanly legible, or interpolate it by 
assigning it words that it has no need of (i.e. making the subaltern speak)5, Derrida 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I find Akira Lippit’s succinct explanation of the relationship between animal and metaphor to be 
particularly persuasive. “One might posit provisionally that the animal functions not only as an exemplary 
metaphor but, within the scope of rhetorical language, as an originary metaphor. One finds a fantastic 
transversality at work between the animal and the metaphor—the animal is already a metaphor, the 
metaphor an animal. Together they transport to language, breathe into language, the vitality of another life, 
another expression: animal and metaphor, a metaphor made flesh, a living metaphor that is by definition 
not a metaphor, anti metaphor—“animetaphor.” The animetaphor may also be seen as the unconscious of 
language, of logos.” (165). With this in mind, I side with Lippit that discarding the metaphorical in favor of 
the “real” is short sided. It overlooks how the animal has been built up as a site of meaning (both 
metaphorical and literal) over time.   
5 Gayatri Spivak’s seminal essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” argues that the colonizer’s inability to 
understand the discourse of the colonized means that in order to be heard, the subaltern must articulate 
herself through the colonizer’s language. Spivak’s problematization of the subaltern’s ability to speak and 
be heard particularly resonated with Central Americanists during the Rigoberta Menchú controversy, a 
debate focused around whether Menchú’s testimonio was truthful or manipulated for political reasons. In 
Arturo Arias’s analysis of David Stoll’s critique of Menchú, he points out that Stoll both criticized her for 
being not “authentically” Mayan—too Western—while also criticizing her loose presentation of evidence 
as not Western enough. Animal theorists have similarly drawn attention to the human tendency to project 
human intentions and features onto animals, anthropomorphizing the animal in order to make it legible to 
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argues, “It would not be a matter of ‘giving speech back’ to animals but perhaps 
acceding… [that] the absence of the name [is] something other than a privation” (“The 
Animal” 416). In other words, rather than find animals to be lacking for their externality 
to language, by foregrounding the encounter, or the exchange of gazes across species, we 
can recognize the animal’s ability to look back at us. Building upon this argument, Donna 
Haraway points out that this reciprocal gaze is written in to the word “species,” whose 
Latin root specere means to look (When Species Meet 17). 
Nonetheless, the desire to carve out a site that recognizes nonhuman animal 
difference but doesn’t index back to the human figure is a tricky endeavor, primarily 
because humans are the ones doing the writing and reading. Martha Few and Zeb 
Tortorici address this methodological difficulty in Centering Animals in Latin American 
History, which aims to counteract the absence of nonhuman life in Latin American 
historiography as well as treat the animal not just as the object of study but as a historical 
actor. While Few and Tortorici argue that “centering” animals in history extends our 
account of difference beyond human-centric categories of race and gender, they also 
acknowledge that even less-anthropocentric accounts of history are inevitably based upon 
“documents created by and for humans” (3).  
Few, Tortorici and Wolfe all push toward posthumanism, which we might loosely 
define as the effort to debunk the notion that humans are unique, superior animals, or the 
ultimate endpoint of evolution. Barbara Hernstein Smith explains that the posthumanist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the human viewer. Comparing the animal to the human, animals have been characterized for their 
deficiency of humanity, for the elements they lack: the soul, reason, language, culture, etc. However, it is 
important not to collapse the terms of subaltern with animal, which would replicate the sort of racialized 
dehumanization that this project is interested in problematizing. 
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“telos—aim or endpoint—… [is] not the universal recognition of a single, comprehensive 
order of Nature or Being but, rather, an increasingly rich and operative appreciation of 
our irreducibly multiple and variable, complexly valences, infinitely reconfigurable 
relations with other animals, including each other” (15-16). Against anthropocentric 
philosophies that reflexively correlate the “human” with the universal, thus excluding not 
only animals but also humans who are not recognized as “human,” “posthumanist 
theorists have taken as their critical target the “metaphysics of subjectivity” (or selfhood), 
and have sought to develop a thought of politics and relation that is pre-subjective and 
post metaphysical” (Calarco 10). Posthumanism promises to rupture with humanism by 
embracing a conception of the human that is not defined in opposition to the nonhuman 
but rather in continuity, avowing human animality and shared vulnerability.  
While my work is stimulated by efforts in the field that self-reflexively identify 
with posthumanism, I tend to think that while we can identify literary movement toward 
nonanthropocentric practice and ethics, and benefit from pushing back against the human 
tendency to collapse all nonhuman life into human terms, I hesitate to situate this project 
as posthumanist. As William E. Connolly lucidly articulates, even though humans are 
inherently “organized by a host of nonhuman processes,” there is always “an uncertain 
and indeterminate priority attached to the human estate that almost always comes with 
being human” and “to act as if there is no species identification flowing into our pores 
through the vicissitudes of life is to falsify much of experience” (49). Thus, while I find 
animal studies and posthumanist projects to be incredibly valuable tools, I do not identify 
the aim of this study to be posthumanist, but rather as an attempt to supplement and 
enhance existing scholarship on race, gender, and politics in Mexico and Central 
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America. I believe that looking at textual representations of the nonhuman and the 
discourse of animality broadens our understanding of human imbrication in the 
nonhuman world while also acknowledging that for most of these authors, thinking with 
the nonhuman world is ultimately a way to explore themselves. As Connolly puts it, 
paying attention to the entanglements with nonhuman processes can be undertaken while 
also acknowledging that we are humans in a world in which “humanity matters 
immensely” (50).  
There are two primary nodes that this dissertation explores in tandem with 
animality: race and gender. In terms of the former, I find it crucial to recognize that what 
is at stake in the critique raised by animal studies—the interrogation of Enlightenment 
humanism’s claim of human mastery over the nonhuman—is not just a recent theoretical 
development, but is a conversation that has been long in the making. Theorists of race 
and colonialism have forcefully pointed out that the fiction of the “universal human” is 
deeply embedded in histories of Western colonialism and empire. They have taught us 
that the “figure “man” is not synonymous with “the human,” but rather is a technology of 
slavery and colonialism that imposes its authority over “the universal” through a 
racialized deployment of force” (Jackson 670). Zakkiyah Jackson’s excellent and forceful 
critique of posthumanism for bypassing the contributions of critical race theory points to 
Franz Fanon and Aimé Césaire as key interlocutors. Both of these theorists challenge 
their readers to take up the urgent task of problematizing the imperialist ontology of the 
Enlightenment human. This push, of course, has obvious parallels with the aims of 
posthumanism and animal studies, in their endeavors to question anthropocentrism and 
the logic behind the human/animal dualism.  
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We might add to this panorama the contributions of Etienne Balibar, who 
explicitly invokes the discourse of animality in his essay “Racism and Nationalism.” 
Balibar argues that “the division between subhumans and super-humans is a structural but 
violently unstable one.” The question of who or what qualifies as “human,” Balibar 
continues, “is insistently present in racist thought” (44). “Man’s animality, animality 
within and against man—hence the systematic ‘bestialization’ of individuals and 
racialized human groups—is thus the means specific to theoretical racism for 
conceptualizing human historicity” (57). Theoretical racism endlessly rehearses the idea 
“of a humanity eternally leaving animality behind and eternally threatened with falling 
into the grasp of animality” (57). I explore the possibilities of reading race through 
posthumanist theory in Chapters One and Three in order to better understand the 
discursive entanglement of animality with indigeneity and blackness in Central America. 
While the primate appears to operate as a mere stand in for a racialized other in some of 
these texts, I suggest that it is more complicated than that. 
The second theoretical avenue explored in Species Sadness is the intersection of 
gender with species, until recently also overlooked by animal studies. Chapter Two in 
particular contributes to efforts by feminist theorists such as Donna Haraway, Carol 
Adams, and Rosi Braidotti to expose and reconfigure narrative’s long tradition of 
sentimentalizing women’s relationships with animals. Pejoratively associating 
domestication with feminization—signaling the loss of instinct, essence, and virility for 
thinkers like Alfonso Reyes—pets have been theorized as exemplifying denaturalization, 
anthropomorphism and human narcissism. Deleuze and Guattari’s derisive description of 
the domestic pet as “the little cat or dog owned by an elderly woman who honors and 
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cherishes it” (269) underlines the gendered discourse aligning the feminine with animal 
domestication.6 The flippant affiliation of pets with women who have out-aged or deviate 
from the roles of wife or mother reinforces archetypes like the “crazy cat lady,” in which 
the relationship between woman and feline indicates social isolation, madness, and 
ultimately a failure to conform to heteronormative femininity ⁠.7 
Against this amalgamation of domestication, domesticity and enslavement, Donna 
Haraway reads humans and pets as a “companion species… in obligatory, constitutive, 
historical, protean relationship” (Companion Species 12). For Haraway, the “contact 
zones” between human and pet are “world-making entanglements” that should be 
examined in their own right (When Species Meet 4). Applying this articulation of 
constitutive encounter to narrative, Kari Weil argues that fictions about pets can be read 
as “contact zones in which struggles with otherness are played out and worked through or 
not” (60). Thinking about gender not only as contextualized by human society and 
culture, but also as transformed and transformative in nonhuman entanglements opens up 
new directions for feminist thought. In Becoming Undone, Elizabeth Grosz argues that 
the liberal, Marxist, phenomenological underpinnings of contemporary feminism that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Although I am interested in critiquing the gendered discourse at work in the theorization of pets, this isn’t 
to discount the validity of Deleuze and Guattari’s explanation that the problematic recodification of the 
animal other into a domesticated pet often constitutes a narcissistic attempt to master an unknowable other 
and reinscribe it under a human epistemology by projecting human feelings and features onto other species.  
7 The cat lady is “crazy” precisely because she opts out of nurturing children or erotically engaging men, 
and instead redirects these affects onto a pack of cats. The ‘descent’ produced by contact with pets into 
nature/madness (articulated since Poe) indicates for Boggs that “women, children and animals mediate the 
relation between the object and the subject; they establish the boundaries along which human subject 
formation in distinction from nature becomes possible” (535). This line of critique is furthered in Carol 
Adams’ The Sexual Politics of Meat, who argues that both women and animals constitute an “absent 
referent” in patriarchal culture: the animal must be absent for meat to exist—the cow becomes “beef,” the 
pig, “pork”—and the act of renaming masks the violence of consuming meat. This cycle of objectification, 
fragmentation and consumption is also activated on women (chicks or bitches) leading Adams to conclude, 
“in a patriarchal, meat eating world animals are feminized and sexualized; women are animalized” (Adams 
and Calarco 37). 
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focuses solely on the subject and identity can be productively complicated by thinking 
about processes of becoming, difference, and “animal excess, within and before the 
human” (7). Borrowing on Haraway’s use of “entanglement” to describe the 
inseparability of human and nonhuman worlds and forms of relating that emerge from 
these encounters, I explore the way in which gender enters into the narratives of human-
animal contact and kinship as they are inscribed throughout the twentieth century in Latin 
American literature. 
 
Affect or the “sadness” in Species Sadness 
While this project’s primary methodological framework is informed by animal 
studies, I would also like to signal its secondary engagement with affect theory. As the 
title Species Sadness suggests, this project is attentive to the feelings that crop up around 
animality. When I first began researching this topic, I was surprised by the ubiquity of 
negative feelings that imbue textual inscriptions of animality. I wondered how looking at 
these minor affects might shed light on the circulation of the discourse of animality in the 
twentieth century. “Species sadness,” I suggest, is often stirred up in response to the 
societal mandate to suppress, deny, or reject the human’s evolutionary “past” so that we 
might become fully “civilized” or “modern.” Analogously, feelings of shame, 
melancholy, and vulnerability are produced in reaction to the biopolitical division of life, 
as is the case in Hernán Robleto’s Una mujer de la selva, analyzed in Chapter One.  
The way that animals make us feel, or emotionally move us, is also a key topic of 
concern. Several of the works that I analyze urge their readers to control or negotiate their 
feelings about animals: such as Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera’s critique of women’s excessive 
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sentimentality in Chapter Two, or Lizandro Chávez Alfaro’s appeal for empathy in 
response to animal commodification in Chapter Three. Affect helps us to better grasp the 
nature of relationships across species, because to feel something in response to another 
being “implies movement, a crossing between bodies, subjects, locations—or a failed 
attempt to make that crossing” (Jensen and Wallace 1252). 
Here I invoke affect in a generic sense, borrowing from Anne Cvetkovich’s 
“intentionally imprecise” jumbling of feelings, emotions, and affect in order to retain “the 
ambiguity between feelings as embodied sensations and feelings as psychic or cognitive 
experiences” (4). I find this ambiguity helpful when thinking about animals, because the 
human relationship with the nonhuman world is informed both by the cognitive (the 
mind) and the somatic (the body).8 It is crucial not to overlook or skirt past the role of the 
somatic, precisely because humans and animals do not possess a shared language. Our 
relationships with animals are often propelled by affect: we feel compassion when we see 
animal suffering, or get sentimental about our domestic companions. Rather than solely 
recur to abstract terms in order to describe human responses to animality, affect allows us 
to think about how engagement with the nonhuman is constructed around our capacity to 
move and be moved.  
When thinking about the affects that crop up around animality in Latin American 
literature, I am primarily informed by the work of Sara Ahmed, who has described the 
way in which affect “sticks” to certain bodies. Ahmed persuasively argues that it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nonetheless, I keep Ruth Leys’ critique in mind that it is crucial not to separate affect from cognition or 
meaning, which would reinforce the dualist separation of the body from the mind. This approach carelessly 
forgets that “the “body” is not a pure state of being but rather a pragmatic classification of the operations of 
“pure experience,” just as the “mind” is” (468) 
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helpful to think about emotions as creating “affective economies” through their repeated 
circulation and attachment: getting “stuck” to certain bodies or ideas over time. Within 
these affective economies, “emotions do things, and they align individuals with 
communities—or bodily space with social space—through the very intensity of their 
attachments. Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, we need to 
consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the relationship 
between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the collective” 
(“Affective Economies” 119). While Ahmed does not extend this insight to human 
relationships with animals, we can see the way in which certain animals begin to carry 
affective charges that have circulated and built up over time. For instance, when thinking 
about why the feeling of shame is repeatedly provoked in response to the figure of the 
primate (as in Arévalo Martínez and Robelto’s fantasy novels of the thirties, and again in 
Chávez Alfaro’s short stories of the sixties), we can recognize that shame does not reside 
in that particular sign, but is produced through its circulation in texts and conversations. 
By attending to these sticky affects, we can understand the discourse of animality not just 
as a vehicle of discursive expression, but as possessing corporeal effects that influence 
how we respond to animals or to the suggestion of our own animality. 
Studies of emotion also show that feelings are often culturally scripted. We learn 
how to respond to something through cultural texts or ideological socialization that teach 
us the appropriate or “correct” emotive response to a given scenario. We see this at work 
in Chapter Three. Rubén Darío’s short stories teach young (future letrado) children how 
to respond to weaker, more vulnerable subjects, such as animals and the disabled, with 
care and compassion. For, Darío warns, if they don’t respond with empathy, they might 
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themselves suffer, or even die! This “correct response” to animal suffering is also 
advocated in Chávez Alfaro’s later “Los monos de San Telmo,” as a parable for how the 
revolutionary subject should respond empathically (yet patronizingly) to all vulnerable 
life. It is helpful to think about the circulation of emotive responses to animals in order to 
understand the lessons that culture teaches us about how we ought to respond to animal 
life, and in what scenarios we need to perform the appropriate response, even if we don’t 
really feel it (Jensen and Wallace 1252).   
By pairing species with “sadness,” I also want to push back against the notion that 
positive feelings are the only ones that produce forward movement or are politically 
“useful.” Rather than assume that bad feelings about animality are backward or 
antithetical to political action, we might reconsider the ways in which the experience of 
feeling bad actually gets us somewhere. Recently, queer theory has pushed to 
depathologize negative feelings (such as the shame, failure, melancholia, and depression 
that I consider in this project), in order to argue that concepts such as utopia or hope are 
not in conflict with negative feelings but interlocked with them. As Ahmed argues, it is 
important to “reread melancholic subjects, the ones who refuse to let go of suffering, who 
are even prepared to kill some forms of joy, as an alternative model of the social good” 
(“Happy Objects” 48). Against the tendency in criticism to turn away from bad feelings 
or hurriedly resolve moments of pain, sadness, or withdrawal, we can instead take 
seriously texts that engage with the negative affects that have “stuck” to the idea of 
human animality. Up until recently, queer theory advocated that the painful past should 
be recognized, but then turned to good use. Recent interventions, however, such as that 
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by Heather Love, wonder whether “in its haste to refunction such experiences, [queer 
studies] may not be adequately reckoning with their powerful legacies” (19).  
If we think about what this critique might teach animal studies, by looking at the 
myriad of conflicting responses to human animality or the association of the animal with 
backwardness, the past, irrationality, racialization and feminization, we can explore how 
these sad feelings reveal the painful legacy of humanist thought in Latin America, and 
teach us that affects that we might think of as “unproductive” in reality serve to work 
through difficult legacies in order to move forward. For instance, Chávez Alfaro uses 
pathos—to feel pain imaginatively—to articulate a new ethics around the common 
vulnerability of human and nonhuman life.9 He is interested in questioning how we 
“recognize” animals as subjects, and echoes Jeremy Bentham’s argument that what 
matters is not if animals can reason, but whether they can feel pain. To this end, he 
chooses to erase ontological difference in his short stories to articulate the universality of 
suffering, using “feeling” to undercut the separate categories of human and nonhuman. 
 
The nonhuman in Latin Americanist scholarship 
Over the last decade, Latin American studies has experienced a boom in 
scholarship that revisits the role of the nonhuman in Latin American culture. This 
scholarship crucially diverges from previous analysis of nature conducted in the twentieth 
century, which was primarily invested in critiquing naturalization. Recently, rising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rei Terada argues that “pathos conveys the explicitly representational, vicarious and supplementary 
dimensions of emotion… debates about pathos come to be about the relation between representation and 
intensity… Since discussions of pathos acknowledge mediation they play a large role in poststructuralist 
theories built on the significance of representation” (5). 
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awareness about the enduring impact of human activity on the environment has urged 
scholars, as Idelber Avelar puts it, to move past the “lens of a culturalist critique of 
naturalization” and instead challenge ourselves “to think nature as positivity, that is, to 
account for physis in our thought processes and interventions into culture in ways that are 
not simply reducible to the well-known operations of denaturalization” (8). A quick 
review of this scholarship helps to situate the contribution that Species Sadness makes to 
the robust work already being done in the field. First, I will go over the scholarship that is 
primarily interested in the environment—which we might describe as “ecocritical” if we 
take Cheryll Glotfelty’s broad definition that these studies share “the fundamental 
premise that culture is connected to the physical world, affecting it and affected by it” 
(xix)—and then I zoom in on scholarship that has focused on the figure of the animal.  
A pioneering volume in ecological literary criticism in the Latin American 
context is Gabriela Nouzeilles’ edited collection La naturaleza en disputa (2002). In the 
volume’s introduction, Nouzeilles argues that there is little that is actually “natural” about 
physical configurations of nature. To the contrary, nature is always perceived, 
constructed ideologically, and conceptualized. Latin America, a place figured as “other” 
or “backward” by the Eurocentric imaginary, has long been articulated as inherently close 
to nature. This proximity has been interpreted both in a positive and a negative light. 
Nouzeilles explains that Latin America’s association with “the natural” has led it to be 
nostalgically cast as one of the last refuges of ecological purity (13).10 Within this wistful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In Nouzeilles’s volume, there is a great deal of work being done to examine the intersection between 
representations of gender, race, and nature. As Nouzeilles’ own article suggests, the wilderness operates as 
the privileged stage for men to prove their masculinity, at a time when the city supposedly undermined 
manliness, a theme that I return to in Chapter Three. Chapter Three is also inspired by Ileana Rodriguez’s 
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framework, fantasies are projected onto Latin America that imagine it to embody the 
promise of a different sort of relationship with nature that is unaffected by the demands 
of modernity. Indigenous peoples, for instance, are romanticized as preserving a 
“primitive,” sustainable relationship with the land. Or countries like Guatemala are posed 
as perfect locales for carbon offsets, where trees can be grown to counteract the 
emissions of Westerners who want to jet set guilt-free.  
The other side of this coin is that Latin America’s assumed proximity with nature 
is interpreted not as idyllic, but problematic. Problematic precisely because the chaotic 
violence of nature supposedly counteracts or sabotages any attempts to “modernize.” 
Nancy Leys Stepan’s foundational intervention, Picturing Tropical Nature (2001), argues 
that throughout the nineteenth century, the tropics were not only cast as exotic, fertile, 
and sublime, but also as a hotbed for disease, laziness, and excessive sensuality. We 
might note that although nature is cast in a negative light within this paradigm, 
nonetheless, the environment is envisaged as imbued with agency and as affecting the 
humans that inhabit it. However, the interaction between human and nonhuman is framed 
as a Manichean struggle between good and evil, in which humans must perpetually push 
back against the disruptive forces of nature. 
If we think about the role of animality in this iteration, the proximity between 
Latin American subjects and nature was further naturalized through narrative. Some 
striking examples of this can be found in the work of North American short story writer 
O. Henry (William Sydney Porter), who coined the term “banana republic” in his novel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
description of how the foreign imaginary of Central America as the privileged site of ecological and 
agricultural abundance functioned to erase the presence of the subjects that lived there. 
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Cabbages and Kings (1904). That novel is a fictive account based on the months that O. 
Henry spent in Honduras in 1897 in order to evade prosecution for embezzlement. In this 
work, O. Henry repeatedly describes the Central Americans that he encounters as 
animalistic. “The ox-eyed women gazed at him with shy admiration, for his type drew 
them. He was big, blonde and jauntily dressed in white linen” (10). Not only are the 
women figured as animalistic—docile, dull, subordinate, driven by instinct—but O. 
Henry also describes the “native” men as existing outside of human language. “[A] native 
man, barefoot, glided noiselessly up and addressed the doctor in Spanish. He was 
yellowish-brown, like an over-ripe lemon... His face was like an animal’s, live and wary, 
but without promise of much intelligence. The man jabbered with animation and so much 
seriousness that it seemed a pity that his words were to be wasted” (33). Here racism 
functions hand-in-hand with dehumanization. The dividing line of language that separates 
humans from nonhumans is invoked in order to silence the other, to render his speech 
meaningless and unintelligible. The conflation of language with bios (or life recognized 
as legally human) operates to consign the racial other to gibberish or silence.11 This 
example illustrates Nouzeilles’s observation that “El espacio natural y el cuerpo del otro 
colonizado son el espejo en cuya superficie el sujeto imperial moderno se contempla y 
produce por inversion su propia imagen” (19). 
In Latin American literature, the question of the climate’s influence on human 
culture was most vividly taken up in the novela de la tierra of the 1920s and 30s. Sharon 
Magnarelli has argued that in many of these telluric novels, nature, along with women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Kalpana Rahita Seshadri’s HumAnimal: Race, Law, Language for more on how dehumanization 
operates through silence and speech.  
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and indigenous subjects, are configured as key antagonists that threaten to thwart the 
project of modernity. Guatemalan novelist Flavio Herrera’s novel, El tigre (1934), is a 
perfect example of this. In it, the jungle is presented as a space whose forces slowly erode 
the protagonists’ civilized decorum, leading them to give in to their base instincts and 
abandon “human” morality (Kane “El tigre”). By the novel’s conclusion, the protagonist 
is killed by his brother, who has metamorphosed into a tiger. Echoing O. Henry’s use of 
the discourse of animality in order to silence the racialized other, the indigenous subjects 
in El tigre are portrayed as chattering like incoherent animals. Herrera’s novel, like many 
others, illustrates Jennifer French’s insightful argument that nature is configured by 
regionalist writers as the fraught locus of the neo-colonial tensions that played out 
between foreign interests, local elites, and local workers (36).  
More recently, Adrian Taylor Kane’s edited volume The Natural World in Latin 
American Literatures (2010) and Mark Anderson and Zélia Bora’s edited volume 
Ecological Crisis and Cultural Representation in Latin America (2016), build upon the 
groundwork laid by Nouzeilles, Stepan, French, and others (including Marisol de la 
Cadena, Gisela Heffes, Jorge Marcone, Laura Barbas-Rhoden, Scott Devries, Carmen 
Flys Junquera, etc). Kane, Anderson, and Bora make compelling arguments that there is 
still a lot of ground to be covered in terms of environmental criticism of Latin American 
literature. Anderson points to this line of inquiry’s timeliness, invoking Mexican 
environmental philosopher Enrique Leff’s argument that “environmental crisis is the 
crisis of our time” (xiii). Environmentally oriented texts reveal how the projects of 
capitalism and modernity have been carried out in unsustainable and exploitative ways 
that abuse both humans and their environments. Anderson’s volume makes the case that 
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in order to approach the current crisis of climate change, it is key to find new ways of 
thinking about scale, both in terms of time and geopolitical space. Contemporary Latin 
American writers and filmmakers offer innovative “scalar strategies that they use to 
locate these crises as part of a system” (xxiii). 
Gisela Heffes’s intervention in the field, Políticas de la destrucción / Poéticas de 
la preservación (2014), cautions that the theoretical framework of ecocriticism developed 
by scholars in the United States and England is found lacking when put into dialogue 
with Latin American cultural production. Heffes poses that it is only by attending to the 
“praxis estética” that is particular to Latin American culture that we can find “una nueva 
episteme crítica” (27). For Heffes, it is important to attend to the tropes of discard that 
pervade Latin American works: waste, trash, and recycling. Also thinking about 
contemporary literature, but through the lens of Central America, Laura Barbas Rhoden 
points out the current trend in “green” literature by authors like Gioconda Belli and 
Anacristina Rossi. Barbas Rhoden argues that an ecocritical approach “will expose 
prejudicial power structures and also point to alternatives to these structures, conceived 
from different sources within society” (“Greening” 3). 
As we have seen, there is a growing body of eco-conscious Latin Americanist 
scholarship that attends to the representations of natural resources, environmental 
degradation, and climate change. Species Sadness is energized and informed by the 
overarching claim that unites these studies: that reading with an eye toward the 
nonhuman allows us to question the traditional dichotomies of human/nonhuman and 
nature/culture that have long structured humanist thought. However, this project is more 
directly conceived in dialogue with scholarship that zooms in on the figure of the animal 
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itself. In contrast with ecocriticism, animal studies seems to be more invested in 
problematizing anthropocentrism—the idea of human supremacy—and the ways in 
which formulating hierarchies of life that privilege the human above the animal is then 
mapped onto other bodies, such as man/woman or ladino/indígena. These “continuities of 
oppression” that begin with species function to bracket an outside, or an exclusion, from 
what is protected as a member of the category “human.” However, it is important to 
specify that this project is not interested in animal rights,12 but rather in how the human-
animal distinction functions throughout the twentieth century, as well as those artistic 
interventions that disrupt this logic of exclusion. 
Although less numerous in quantity than scholarship that fits under the rubric of 
ecocriticism, there is nascent critical interest in thinking about animal studies in the Latin 
American context. The scholars that are most active in this area include Gabriel Giorgi, 
Alejandro Lámbarry, Julieta Yelin, Raul Antelo, María Esther Maciel, Javier Hernández 
Quezada, Scott DeVries, and Fermín Rodriguez. Recently, the journal e-misférica 
published a special issue on this question, “Bio/Zoo,” curated by Giorgi, Rodriguez, and 
Álvaro Fernández Bravo. We might also point to John Beusterien’s work on dogs in 
Miguel de Cervantes, or Zeb Tortorici and Martha Few’s collaborative efforts to bring 
animals back into accounts of Latin American history. 
The most significant contribution to Latin American animal studies is Gabriel 
Giorgi’s recent monograph, Formas comunes. Animalidad, cultura, biopolitica (2014). 
Indebted to Cary Wolfe’s biopolitical approach to animal studies, Giorgi’s study 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Critics from Cary Wolfe to Kalpana Rahita Seshadri have pointed out that “justice should not and cannot 
be equated with liberal humanist investments in law and rights” (Jackson “Animal 676). 
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examines texts from the Southern Cone from the 1960s to the present. Giorgi relies on 
two significant theoretical interlocutors: Deleuze’s utilization of the animal to theorize 
deindividuation and multiplicity, and Agamben’s critique of the violent and arbitrary 
separation of bios from zoe. In terms of periodization, Giorgi proposes that the 1960s 
mark an important shift in the way in which Latin American writers inscribe the figure of 
the animal. From the 60s on, narrative imagines greater contiguity or proximity between 
humans and animals, departing from the age-old opposition between human and 
nonhuman that mapped onto other binaries such as urban versus rural. The shift, Giorgi 
elaborates, is from the stable clash between civilization and barbarism to a more 
dispersed, unstable biopolitical field. My dissertation is greatly indebted to the path 
opened by Giorgi, and to his insights about how animality interlocks with questions of 
gender and sexuality. Species Sadness endeavors to build upon Giorgi’s work by bringing 
Mexican and Central American texts into the analytical scope, as well as by expanding 
the timeframe in order to consider texts from before the 60s (as well as after). I am also 
attentive to the role of affect and the place of race as they intersect with animality, which 
is not present in Giorgi’s study. I believe that careful analysis of the way in which the 
human is rendered legible from the inhuman, and how ideas about blackness and 
indigeneity fit into this operation, allow us to comprehensively examine the significance 
of the nonhuman in its diverse forms. 
Outside of the meditation on race and indigeneity vis-a-vis animality in Chapter 
One and the Epilogue, this dissertation largely sidesteps (for now) the crucial question of 
indigenous cultural representations of animals. The epilogue is a preliminary attempt to 
think about the representation of animals in Central American literature by indigenous 
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authors. This will certainly be a topic that I will expand upon as I further develop the 
project. It is my belief that the contemporary deconstruction of the man/animal binary by 
Derrida, Deleuze, Haraway, and Agamben is anticipated by the Mesoamerican concept of 
the nahual, the belief that each human is born sharing a spirit with an animal companion. 
Taken up by 20th century indigenous and indigenist Central American thinkers as an 
autochthonous metaphysics with which to re-map human interaction with nature, the 
Maya belief in the mutual containment of human and non-human life in an ecological 
whole dovetailed with the contemporary leftist search for alternatives to the 
subject/object split legitimating capitalist exploitation (Beverley and Zimmerman 34). 
Counter to notions of human exceptionalism and individualism, the interpenetration of 
human and animal nahual indexes the interconnectedness and fluidity of life and matter. 
While outwardly manifesting distinct material forms that differentiate them as discrete 
species, the differences of the man-nahual duality are subsumed by ontological 
interchangeability. 
 
Reading Central America  
One of the aims of including a large corpus of Central American texts in this 
dissertation is, following Arturo Arias’ pointed critique in Taking their Word and Gestos 
ceremoniales, to push back against the tendency in scholarship to pay less attention to 
marginal sites of cultural production, which have been overshadowed by countries that 
loom larger, like Mexico or Argentina. Arias argues that there is also a pragmatic need to 
study Central America discursivity “if we are interested in creating or maintaining a 
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dynamic understanding of a culture that is contributing to the ever-changing landscapes 
of culture and identify in the United States itself” (Taking their Word xiii).  
As a scholar, I aim to contribute to efforts to make Central America more visible 
within the field through research that attends to its rich and varied cultural contributions. 
I am committed to bringing Central American literature and culture into conversation 
with Mexico and Latin America, situated within broader topical debates about 
subjectivity and politics or discussions of queer theory and affect studies. Second, my 
scholarship reflects my interest in the ethical and philosophical relationships between the 
human and nonhuman world. While ecocriticism has historically been myopically 
Anglocentric, my goal is to increase attention to how the environment has been framed 
and considered in the global South. 
The majority of Central American literary historiography has focused on the 
important task of tracing the complexity of culture in the isthmus—examining literary 
constructions of regional history (Caso), discursive formulations of political imaginaries 
like revolution and development (Saldaña-Portillo), literature’s engagement with political 
movements (Beverley and Zimmerman), gendered engagement with political 
articulations (Rodríguez), the importance of the isthmus’ cultural diversity (Arias), and 
disenchantment with neoliberalism (Cortez)—but rarely venturing past the human estate. 
My study contributes to the field by looking at how the isthmus’ literature figures human 
entanglement with the nonhuman, and how these figurations intersect with discourses of 
race, sexuality, and politics examined by previous scholarship. 
Rather than simply restrict my corpus to Central America, I have decided to also 
include Mexican texts. This is because I see overlap between the ways in which 
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discourses of animality operate in these contiguous regions.13 Nonetheless, although I 
consider both Mexico and Central American in this project, I find it important to be 
cautious when handling the historical particularity of each place and time. Thus, when 
considering how the animal is interwoven into revolutionary discourse, I restrict my 
corpus to the Sandinista Revolution, and when I look at the discourse around pets in 
Mexico, I am thinking specifically about the case of Mexico itself.  
Finally, it must be said that Species Sadness only includes a limited slice of the 
incredibly wide-ranging cultural production of the twentieth century that tackles animals. 
Works by Mexican writers such as Juan José Arreola’s Bestiario, Francisco Tario’s short 
stories, Amparo Dávila’s “Moisés y Gaspar” and “El huésped”, Elena Garro’s Andamos 
huyendo Lola, Octavio Paz’s El mono gramático, José Emilio Pacheco’s poetry, Sergio 
Pitol’s “La pantera”, Guadalupe Dueñas’ “La araña”, Leonardo da Jandra’s Zoomorfías, 
Salvador Novo’s Las aves en la poesía castellana, Áviles Fabila’s Los animales 
prodigiosos, Brianda Domecq’s Bestiario doméstico, Pablo Soler Frost’s Oriente de los 
insectos mexicanos, Juan Pablo Villalobos’ Fiesta en la madriguera, Ignacio Padilla’s 
Las fauces del abismo etc. all merit attention. Similarly, this study also oversteps relevant 
works by Central American writers, such as Flavio Herrera’s El tigre, Miguel Ángel 
Asturias’s Hombres de maiz, Augusto Monterroso’s La oveja negra y demás fábulas and 
Pájaros de hispanoamérica, Humberto Ak’abal’s El animal de humo and Jaguar 
dormido, Sergio Ramírez’s recent bestiary El reino animal, Claudia Hernández’s De 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Mesoamerica is therefore perhaps an appropriate term to describe the considered corpus. Mesoamerica 
refers to a geographical area that extends from central Mexico all the way south to Costa Rica. The region 
is shaped by a shared history, and was conceptualized as a region by the Mayas over two thousand years 
ago. The impact of these indigenous populations continues to shape culture and discourse. 
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fronteras, Rodrigo Rey Rosa’s Otro zoo and Lo que soñó Sebastián, and Horacio 
Castellanos Moya’s Baile con serpientes. Some of these works have been set aside 
because they primarily utilize the figure of the animal simply as a symbolic stand in for 
human culture. This is the particularly the case with Arreola and Monterroso, who use the 
allegorical tradition of the bestiary in order to humorously reveal human truths. While I 
think that this allegorical tradition merits further study for its ability to decontextualize 
and denaturalize human behavior, and ask the reader to reconsider cultural practices, in 
these works animals are not really considered with any depth, but rather used as 
rhetorical devices that advance the author’s argument. Additionally, I wanted to highlight 
several less canonical authors. Thus rather than focus on Flavio Herrera’s criollista novel 
El tigre, I look at authors that have lapsed into forget, such as Herrera’s Nicaraguan 
contemporary Hernán Robleto. What unites the authors that I have chosen to include is 
their shared interest in connecting the concept of species with projects that interrogate 
identity, as a means to think about the way in which life is partitioned and categorized. I 
specifically focus on moments of ideological change—rising interest in the discourse of 
mestizaje in Central America in the thirties, feminism in Mexico in the sixties, and 
revolution in Nicaragua in the seventies. 
 
Chapter breakdown 
To review, this project’s primary contribution to the field is to shed light on how 
the discourse of animality intersects with questions of race, gender, and politics in 
Mexico and Central America in the twentieth century. I am interested in how literary 
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representations of animals act as both a foil and a mirror from which human writers think 
about, or resist, the “natural” order of things. 
Chapter One, “Shameful Intimacies: Interspecies Desire in 1930s Central 
American Fiction,” explores how vanguard fantasy novels imagined alternative modes of 
coupling and nation building through an unexpected figuration: the sexual fixation on 
animals. While scholarship has underscored the constant transformability of bodies and 
genres in the Latin American avant-garde, I argue that this mutability is inextricable from 
the question of species. Two fantasy novels from the thirties, Rafael Arévalo Martínez’s 
El mundo de los Maharachías and Hernán Robleto’s Una mujer en la selva, 
compulsively circle around their protagonists’ taboo attraction to monkeys. I examine 
how the figure of the animal is racialized in these texts, and functions as a relatively 
neutral or “safe” figurative space from which to narrate the desire for a taboo other. I 
argue that these minor Central American texts, written under dictatorship, figure 
bestiality as a mechanism through which to question the regulation of sexual relations: 
the criminality of queer desire and reservations about mestizaje. The interspecies romance 
stages the authors’ anxieties about racial purity, but ultimately works to critique the 
unadulterated kinship promoted by the authoritarian state. 
Chapter Two, “Pets and the Patriarchy: Feminist Revisions of Domestication” 
shifts focus from race to gender in order to analyze how domesticated animals have been 
discursively inscribed as subservient, passive, and feminine. First I jump slightly back in 
time to show how Mexican modernistas Amado Nervo, Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera, and 
Alfonso Reyes were troubled by what they perceived as excessively intimate bonds 
between bourgeois women and their pets. At the turn of the century, women were the 
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primary advocates behind the nascent animal welfare movement. Intellectuals like 
Gutiérrez Nájera sought to redirect their female readers to more “appropriate,” less 
sentimental, political causes. Analogously, for Reyes, the domesticated animal is 
configured as homologous to the slave or hostage: a diluted, “feminized” degeneration of 
its untainted wild counterpart. Having established this framework, I pivot to Mexican-
Cuban writer Julieta Campos’ subversion of this trope in her short story “Celina o los 
gatos.” The story narrates Celina’s metamorphosis into a “crazy cat lady” as she slowly 
withdraws from society into the company of her cats. However, rather than pathologize 
this figure, Campos explores how the crazy cat lady’s seeming anti-social passivity 
counter intuitively formulates a potent critique of the productivity that was mandated 
both by traditional femininity as well as by the nascent movement for Women’s 
Liberation. Confuting the expected sentimentalism between wife and pet, Campos’s tale 
depicts intimate, affective alliances between human women and animals that explode 
sentimentality into a site of resistance and ethics. 
Chapter Three, “Becoming-Monkey: Bodily Vulnerability in Revolutionary 
Nicaragua,” looks at how the nonhuman intersects with revolutionary discourse in 
Sandinista texts. Concerned by agribusiness’ unsustainable exploitation of natural 
resources and unregulated use of pesticides, thinkers such as Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio 
Ramirez harnessed the discourse of toxicity in order to denounce the corrosive effects of 
capitalism and foreign intervention on the national body. Nonetheless, I demonstrate how 
this discourse of toxicity ends up reifying an idea of national and corporeal purity that is 
problematically nostalgic and essentializing. Along similar lines, Marcos Cabezas’ 
memoir of his time as a guerrilla, La montaña es algo más que una inmensa estepa verde, 
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articulates animality as a source of masculinist inspiration. Intervening in this debate, 
Lizandro Chávez Alfaro’s short story “Los monos de San Telmo” uses the 
commodification of monkeys as a narrative vehicle for reformulating the shared 
vulnerability of all life. Using the animal as a pedagogical tool for subject formation—a 
tradition I trace back to Rubén Darío—Chávez Alfaro’s moralizing tale of categorical 
uncertainty probes how we recognize the face of the other. Through Agamben’s 
definition of the “open wound”, “the central emptiness, the hiatus that—within man—
separates man and animal,” Chávez Alfaro examines the violence inflicted upon life 
caught in the caesura between human and animal, using species confusion as a way of 
exploring how to ethically approach an unknowable other.  
Finally, the Epilogue focuses on the Maya K’iche’ configuration of the nahual, or 
notion that each human individual is born connected to a nonhuman double. Rigoberta 
Menchú’s testimonio configures the nahual as the metaphysical basis for human 
imbrication with nature. Rather than locate difference in an external Other, nahualism 
conceptualizes it as intimately contained within the self. Unlike the Western pet 
economy—critiqued by Deleuze and Guattari as an Oedipal, narcissistic domestication 
and deanimalization (240)—the nahualism described by Menchú and K’iche’ poet 
Humberto Ak’abal is based on intimacy. It is realized not through communication or 
knowledge, but through affect and secrecy, a corporeal occupation that deindividualizes 
and deterritorializes the self while also founding multiple, unspoken inscriptions of 
identity. Similarly, Miguel Ángel Asturias in Men of Maize describes one character’s 
nahual as not “just an animal, but an animal that was a person,” a “deer who [is] not only 
deer” (68). This conceptualization of human/nonhuman undifferentiation extends ethical 
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treatment to nonhuman life by endowing it with personhood, while also deconstructing 
the fixity of species classification that might assert that a deer is “only” a deer.  
Debates over the veracity of Rigoberta Menchú’s autobiography and cultural 
appropriation in Asturias’s work have contributed to nahualism’s decline in critical 
attention, but I suggest that recent interest in animal studies and the urgency of climate 
change renew the relevancy of non-anthropocentric worldviews. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, nahualism’s interpenetration of human and animal constitutes a compelling 
epistemological compliment to animal studies’s deconstruction of anthropocentrism, but 
also fundamentally challenges its rejection of anthropomorphism, by proposing that the 
nonhuman is always on the verge of revealing its human nature. Although Species 
Sadness closes with the nahual, it has served as a poetic and theoretical point of departure 
throughout the development of this project: the examination of Central American and 
Mexican texts that explore the ontological continuity between human and nonhuman life, 
complicate delimited humanist conceptuions of the subject, and reimagine an ethics that 
thinks beyond the human. 
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CHAPTER 1: Shameful Intimacies: Interspecies Desire in 1930s Central American 
Fiction 
 
The Guatemalan modernista Rafael Arévalo Martínez concluded his prolific 
career with a philosophical tract, La concepción del cosmos, published in 1954. In it, 
Arévalo Martínez details his life-long spiritual quest for meaning through agnosticism, 
pantheism, and finally, through the return to Catholicism. As the prologue puts it, the 
book is “fruto de una crisis religiosa del autor, inicialmente católico y que volvió a su 
prístina creencia a los pocos días de haber recibido su edición.” Yet although faith is the 
tract’s stated central concern, La concepción del cosmos opens and closes with sections 
whose identical titles point to the metaphysical question that arguably undergirds the 
entirety of Arévalo Martínez’s oeuvre: “El hombre es un animal.”  
Reiterating this assertion in the first person, the opening essay begins with the 
declaration, “Soy un animal, el de más alta jerarquía” (7). Man, the treatise proffers, has 
been so focused on the latter half of this statement—his superior standing vis-a-vis other 
creatures—that the former, the bald recognition of one’s animality, has been forgotten. 
This erasure has been enacted, Arévalo Martínez theorizes, through three central 
mechanisms: clothing, which conceals the naked human form and centers the face; 
religion, which redirects attention from the corporeal to the divine; and funerary 
practices, like the use of coffins, which suggest the human body’s sanctified perpetuity. 
Additionally, humans disavow their animal bodies by distancing themselves from 
everything that their bodies ingest and expel. Food is cooked and decorously presented on 
adorned tables; modern toilets rapidly expunge excrement from sight. Yet above all, 
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Arévalo Martínez writes, “sobre todo, en el lecho olvidamos nuestro origen animal: en el 
lecho del amor, del descanso y del dolor.” In bed, clothes, blankets, and white sheets 
conceal the human form. When that decorum is stripped away, “abajo de todo eso y muy 
encubierto y escondido está el verdadero gusanito animal” (8). A dizzying array of 
philosophers follows, including Schopenhauer, La Mattri, and Bergson, to buttress 
Arévalo Martínez’s titular avowal that man is at his core no better or worse than an 
animal, tied to materiality, impermanence, and death.  
By foregrounding the bed as the central stage upon which man attempts to forget 
his animal origin, disavow bodily excretions, and sanitize desire, Arévalo Martínez points 
to a habitual pairing: animality and sex. He proposes that once the trappings of clothes 
and sheets that mask our “true” nature have been stripped away, the human animal 
uncovered in bed is not just a creature driven by instinct, but one that is soft-bodied and 
drawn to decay: a despicable “gusanito” or maggot. This tension between insisting upon 
man’s animality as an ontological truth—laying bare the “regulaciones sociales” or 
“productos de la industria humana” that “ennoblecen pero desfiguran todos nuestros 
actos” (7)—and the shame of these revelations, is a recurrent theme in Arévalo 
Martínez’s work. Rather than a regulated space that produces a sanitized version of the 
“human,” Arévalo Martínez imagines the bed to be an equalizing space. In it, man is just 
another body, driven by lust or structured by sickness: a human animal. 
In this chapter, I am interested in thinking about how the “regulaciones sociales” 
that circumscribed normative conceptions of human sexuality in the early twentieth 
century were productively deconstructed through the appearance of the animal on the 
page. Specifically, I examine the complicated erotics of interspecies entanglement in two 
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ex-centric Central American novels of the 1930s. These vanguard fictions imagine 
alternative modes of coupling and nation building through an unexpected figuration: love 
between humans and monkeys. Rafael Arévalo Martínez’s El mundo de los Maharachías 
(1938) and Hernán Robleto’s Una mujer en la selva (1936), compulsively circle around 
the human attraction to primate others, wondering whether such an attraction is abject or 
simply taboo. These minor texts written under authoritarian regimes in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua figure bestiality as a mechanism through which to explore race and the 
regulation of sexual relations. While scholarship of the avant-garde has underscored the 
constant transformability of bodies and genres in vanguard texts, I argue that this 
mutability is inextricable from the question of species. As Arévalo Martínez suggests in 
La concepción del cosmos, the animal, with all of its concomitant connotations of 
instinct, “the natural,” and transparency, is a privileged figure through which the 
conventions of heteronormative love can be problematized.  
In El mundo de los Maharchías, Arévalo Martínez imagines a world where 
evolution took a different course. Intimating the association of bestiality with sodomy, 
the protagonist Manuol longs to copulate with a primate deity, a shameful desire that is 
ultimately sublimated into dystopian extinction. Conversely, in Robleto’s playful “aping” 
of the Hollywood film King Kong, the fantasy of interspecies intercourse is realized. Sex 
between the protagonist, Emilia, and her gorilla captor in Una mujer de la selva is 
ontologically transformative. The loss of categorical integrity brought about by this taboo 
relationship stages Robleto’s anxiety about ecological and racial purity. Nonetheless, the 
heroine’s ultimate unjust expulsion from the polis and transformation into a mono-mujer 
that haunts the collective unconscious critiques the unadulterated kinship promoted by 
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the authoritarian state.  
Nonetheless, the animal itself is a fraught figure in these texts. The monkeys that 
move through these texts mediate racial anxieties that preoccupied Central American 
intellectuals throughout the thirties. In Arévalo Martínez’s mundo, blackness is situated 
beneath both “human” and “animal.” Set against the fantastical Maharachía primate race, 
morenos, but also subsequently ladinos, are found lacking. Realizing that they themselves 
are inferior to animals, the text dramatizes the self-loathing felt by Guatemalan 
intellectuals of the era. By contrast, in Hernán Robleto’s Una mujer, blackness and 
primate are collapsed. Robleto mobilizes this allegorical pairing in order to advocate in 
favor of the black subject’s “humanity,” yet nonetheless cements their occupation of 
animal form. Examining the intersection between discourses of race and species in the 
thirties, this chapter questions the “nature” of racial mixing. How is the metaphorical 
collapse of racial difference with animal difference problematic, and what insight does 
thinking about materiality and interspecies love bring to our understanding of racial 
discourse in Central America in the early twentieth century? 
 
Tale of tails: Rafael Arévalo Martínez’s El mundo de los Maharachías 
In La concepción del cosmos, Arévalo Martínez insists that man, at his core, is a 
lowly maggot in bed. This exemplifies two salient characteristics of his fiction: his 
penchant for psycho-zoological comparisons of humans with animals, and a relentlessly 
self-loathing autobiographical persona. In this sense, the work by Arévalo Martínez is the 
very embodiment of what I term “species sadness”: the pessimistic poetics centered on 
the impossibility of ever truly dwelling within the Cristo-Judean/Freudian definition of 
40 
	  
humanity.14 For Arévalo Martínez, to be “human” means to be able to control one’s 
desires—whether sexual, aesthetic, or monetary—and in this way attain higher moral and 
spiritual standing. Yet as his work repeatedly indicates, such a renunciation is illusory. 
One of the most prominent figures of Guatemalan modernismo, Arévalo Martínez’s 
fiction has been well attended to by scholarship. Most scholars have focused on the 
author’s iconic short story, “El hombre que parecía un caballo,” which narrates the 
author’s repressed homoerotic attraction to his friend, Colombian writer Porfirio Barba 
Jacob, and is a canonical text of Latin American queer studies.  
In order to meaningfully contribute to the existing body of research on Arévalo 
Martínez (particularly the strong corpus included in Dante Liano’s critical edition of El 
hombre que parecía un caballo y otros cuentos, as well as recent articles by Leonel 
Delgado and María Spitz), this chapter focuses on one of his lesser-known works, El 
mundo de los maharachías, published in 1938. Reworking the popularly accepted Social 
Darwinist notion that natural selection is a struggle in which only the fittest survive, 
Arévalo Martínez’s fantastical novel narrates the tragic consequences of favoring 
competitive brutality over morality and spirituality. At the core of this tragedy are the 
imagined Maharachía race, who have the bodies of primates, but are intellectually more 
advanced than humans. El mundo interweaves racial science into a tale of impossible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The correlation of sex with animals is not unusual. Biological urges, as an expression of animality, are a 
cornerstone for both science and psychoanalysis. In Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Freud argued 
that each individual must pass through the stages of evolution, “reenacting, as it were, the history of the 
species in the process of its individuation” (Lippit 164). In order to fully realize his “humanity,” man must 
reject his animal way of being and turn his back on smells, such as blood and feces, which might once have 
been stimulating. This rejection of the abject and embrace of sanitation, Carrie Rohman notes, is what 
Freud believes brings about family structure and human civilization (23). Arévalo Martínez’s argument in 
La concepción del cosmos responds to Freud’s theory of “organic repression” by proposing the inverse 
trajectory: shedding the false trappings of “humanity” in favor of revealing the “maggot” underneath. 
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interspecies longing, disclosing the affective power of feelings of ontological inferiority 
spread by theories of social Darwinism. 
Often identified as one of Arévalo Martínez’s utopian novels, El mundo de los 
Maharachías follows the journey of Manuol, the survivor of a shipwreck near the 
fictional land of Costa Dorada. Upon awaking from a coma, he meets his hosts, the 
elusive Maharachía species, who rarely permit contact with outsiders. An exception to 
this protectionist isolationism, Manuol has been chosen to record Maharachía culture 
before their imminent extinction at the hands of an external aggressor.  
Manuol is fascinated by this strange primate-like race, who he finds to be utterly 
dissimilar to humans: spiritually superior but physically more animalistic. He fixates on 
their monkey-like tails as markers of nonhuman difference, objects of his initial repulsion 
and subsequent desire. The more that he learns about these fantastical creatures, the more 
he questions the superiority of his own species. He starts to wonder whether humans 
really are more evolved than monkeys. This questioning of the established order of things 
is cemented discursively: Manuol rechristens humans as “hombres sin cola.” This 
rhetorical turn of phrase rewrites the excess of the Maharachía body—the tail—as a 
human constitutive lack. An explicit rebuttal of “racial science,” El mundo dramatizes 
Arévalo Martínez’s contradictory desire to discard eugenics but maintain a hierarchy of 
being that is linked to the laws of evolution. 
The novel is structured by two storylines. The first is a love triangle between 
Manuol and two Maharachía sisters, Aixa and Iabel, whom personify the struggle 
between “pure,” nonsexual, spiritual love (with Aixa) and instinctive carnal desire (for 
Iabel). This amorous conflict is further complicated by the impossibility of its 
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consummation. Because he is a tailless human, and thus inferior (physiologically 
lacking), the narrator is not permitted to mate with the Maharachías. His only chance at 
amorous partnership is with Aixa, who is a Maharachía without a tail, and consequently a 
more suitable mate. But without a tail, Aixa does not stir up Manuol’s passion. He 
admires, but does not desire her. Much of Arévalo Martínez’s work is rooted in 
psychoanalysis, and El mundo is no exception: it lingers on Manuol’s feelings of 
inadequacy triggered by his ontological lack. He struggles to repress his lust for the 
untouchable: an allegory for queer desire that is also explored in Arévalo Martínez’s 
other works, most notably in “El hombre que parecía un caballo.” Manuol’s self-loathing 
caused by his “lacking” body and inability to copulate with the tailed object of desire can 
be read as an allegorical dramatization of the adverse affects of heteronormativity on 
queer desire. 
The second plot follows the Maharachías’ impending extinction. An aggressive 
tailless (human) race has taken advantage of a standing trade agreement and threatens to 
wipe them out in order to fully exploit their resources. This threat of an external 
aggressor functions extra-textually as a barely veiled critique of dictator Jorge Ubico’s 
fostering of US interests in Guatemala—but was allegorical enough for the novel to avoid 
censorship.  
Traditionally, chronicles of extinction are symbolic of cultural crisis.15 Similarly 
to how contemporary anxieties about endangered animals are a touchstone for broader 
concerns about modernity’s irrevocable loss of nature, the Maharachías’ decline is a 
narrative vehicle for Arévalo Martínez’s fears that ethical, peaceful societies with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Ursula Heise’s Imagining Extinction. 
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traditionally conservative values were on the deline. The novel concludes with the 
Maharachías’ violent extermination by the invading race, a tragic end that vindicates their 
prior isolationism. Manuol, who was supposed to record the Maharachía culture for 
posterity, fails to learn their secrets before their extinction, and is imprisoned by the 
conquerors. Like many of Arévalo’s fictive avatars, Manuol is from beginning to end 
melancholic, isolated, and a failure—a stranger in a strange land who struggles to control 
his sexual appetite and is wracked by feelings of inferiority. 
While critics have classified El mundo as one of Arévalo’s two utopian novels 
(the other being Viaje a Ipanda), it is also firmly declensionist: a story of the decline and 
ultimate extinction of the utopian possibility. In El mundo’s Post-Script, Arévalo 
Martínez discusses the novel’s mystical origin and compares it to the co-conceived Viaje 
a Ipanda. While both are fantastical, he asserts that El mundo is more credible than Viaje 
precisely because it dismantles its imagined ideal: it ends in destruction, rather than hope. 
The utopian promise deracinated by the novel’s conclusion is the existence of “una raza 
mejor” that practices an ideal system of governance and lives in harmony. Defeated by a 
more bellicose, though less sophisticated civilization, their eradication is formulated 
within the logics of survival of the fittest.  
Arturo Taracena Arriola explains that it was commonplace for intellectuals at the 
turn of the twentieth century to describe the presence of the United States in Guatemala 
in Darwinian terms. Máximo Soto Hall, for example, in his novel El problema (1899) 
described the Latin race as “muy superior en el espíritu, pero inferior en materia”, y la 
sajona, inescrupulosa y cruel, práctica y dominadora” (qtd. in Taracena 241). Echoing 
this sort of formulation, El mundo reflects the belief that the natural struggle between 
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groups will favor the “fittest.” Yet it diverges from the dominant interpretation that this 
triumph will naturally lead to “progress,” since for Arévalo Martínez, the strongest is not 
necessarily the most ethically or spiritually advanced. 
Responding to the milieu of international conflicts that characterized the 1930s, 
including the Spanish Civil War, the expansion of US neoimperialism, and the advent of 
World War II, the extinction of the spiritually superior Maharachías at the end of El 
mundo exemplifies Arévalo Martínez’s conviction that natural selection among men 
favors aggressive practices such as imperialism and militarism. However, for the author 
the brutality and amorality of these “natural” processes made them ethically suspect. 
With respect to the “naturally occurring” development of the social organism, Arévalo 
Martínez doesn’t discard the premise that it is shaped by evolutionary struggle, but rather 
counters with a reform-minded rejection of natural selection’s amorality. The lesson 
conveyed by the Maharachía’s extinction is that groups that are more culturally advanced 
but less “strong” should decline to participate in laissez faire market forces and instead 
favor protectionist policies that remove them from the arena of combat.16 In this sense, 
this novel subscribes to the same message advanced by other anti-imperialist novels of 
the period.17 
The utopian model formulated in El mundo discloses Arévalo Martínez’s 
pragmatic politics. Alluding to the ongoing Spanish Civil War, the narrator explains that 
whereas humans “se matan por cada una de las doctrinas […] que creen contradictorias 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For more on how the market fits into Social Darwinist discourse, see Michael Lundblad’s The Birth of a 
Jungle. 
17 See Ana Patricia Rodriguez’s Dividing the Ismthus. 
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entre sí,” the Maharachías don’t kill each other over nonessential distinctions between 
socialism, communism or statism. Their State is modeled on the bee colony, wherein the 
survival of the hive takes precedence over individual happiness. Regardless of ideology, 
“el estado es el todo, y el bien sagrado que se defiende es únicamente el de la vida”(35). 
Though the State is all encompassing, its leader is disposable: the queen rules only as 
long as is useful for the collective, “aceptando la ficción de su reinado como símbolo.” 
This model, deemed by the author to be “una traducción exacta” of modern democracy, 
imagines democracy to be a cohesive ecosystem without inner turmoil, whose primary 
function is the protection of life, rather than the development of a specific ideology. The 
beehive reflects Arévalo Martínez’s utilitarian faith in a social organism that is 
fundamentally authoritarian (in which authority is strictly obeyed by the populace), but 
also his hostility toward the reigning despot of Guatemala, Jorge Ubico, and his practice 
of tyrannical irreplaceability and violent disregard of the citizenry. Nonetheless, in the 
novel this utopian model is doomed. In the context of the endless ideological conflicts 
lived by Arévalo Martínez—the Mexican Revolution, World War I, the dictatorships of 
Manuel Estrada Cabrera and Ubico, the Spanish Civil War, and World War II—the 
aspiration for functionality over ideological difference and peace over war seemed as far-
fetched as the existence of a enlightened monkey race. As Arévalo Martínez concludes in 
the post-script, “Están hoy día tan desacreditadas las utopías…. ¡Vivir los hombres en 
paz! ¡Qué locura!” (123). 
The other utopian aspect of Maharachía society imagined in El mundo is gender 
harmony, which is realized without the cumbersome trappings of equality. Although 
Arévalo infrequently wrote about women, instead privileging male characters, his early 
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work occasionally touched on the inevitability of female emancipation. In “El hechizado” 
(1915), he opined: “Toda la historia no es sino la historia de la redención de la mujer. 
Empieza en la esclavitud; va emancipándose poco a poco. Cuanto más progresan los 
pueblos más se respeta. En nuestros días ya casi es igual al hombre; después será 
superior; después será soberana” (52). Yet by the time women’s suffrage appeared 
imminent in the mid-1930s, he shifted position from predicting female sovereignty to 
rehearsing anxieties about its arrival. Although women were not granted the right to vote 
in Guatemala until 1946, women’s suffrage was being hotly debated in Spanish America 
throughout the thirties, with Spain, Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador all granting women the 
right to vote in the first half of the decade. In 1937, a year before El mundo was 
published, Mexican feminists fought to include women in the wording of the Constitution 
and were granted citizenship, though not the right to vote. A year after its publication in 
1939, El Salvador passed legislation giving women the right to vote. 
Within this climate of increased attention to the place of women in politics, El 
mundo blends Arévalo Martínez’s misgivings about female competency and 
neoimperialism into a cohesive cautionary tale about their combined perils.18 Halfway 
through the novel we learn that Manuol’s love interest, Aixa, is at fault for her race’s 
impending extinction. While her father was away, she precipitously negotiated a trade 
agreement with the tailless human race, who used the partnership to gain access to the 
Maharachías’ resources, and ultimately overthrow them. As is didactically explained, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The narrator asks the Maharachías whether the husband or wife is in charge. They respond, “Esa es una 
pregunta sin cola […] Aun antes de que el esposo exprese un mandamiento, ya su mujer lo ha obedecido. 
¿No ves que somos como el brazo de nuestros maridos? ¿Has visto alguna vez que una mano hable de 
obedecer a la cabeza? Así entre nosotros una mujer no habla de obedecer a su marido, porque es parte de él 
mismo. Y él es también parte de nosotras” (27). Each Maharachía couple functions as one body, with the 
man serving as the decision-making head, and the woman as the productive arm. 
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trade agreements bring certain death: “Favorecer ese tratado de comercio, es favorecer su 
intrusión […] y nuestra muerte” (47). To answer the narrator’s disbelief that a superior 
race could commit such a naive mistake, this strategic mishap is gendered as the result of 
feminine vacuity, thus extratextually making the case for women’s exclusion from 
government and against suffrage. The text’s insistence on female culpability for the 
extinction of the utopian promise figures women as shortsighted actors. Venerating Aixa 
for her feminine qualities, the text praises her warmth, kindness, and modesty, but 
underscores her inability to govern. 
The protagonist Manuol is a traveller, an outsider looking in at the Maharachía 
culture. Arévalo Martínez’s work often foregrounds protagonists who subscribe to the 
bohemian nomadic lifestyle typical of modernismo, but subsequently realize that they 
lack affective ties to a specific place or landscape, a conceptual leap that bridges 
modernism’s cosmopolitanism with the novela de la tierra’s situatedness. El mundo is no 
different. In spite of the fact that the protagonist is a traveller, the novel can be read as an 
affirmation of staying put, a telluric defense of connection with the land and even of 
isolationism.19 First, it is ensconced in protectionist rhetoric: the need to protect one’s 
race from aggressive outsiders. Second, this exploitative relationship is established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Unlike his contemporaries, Arévalo Martínez hardly travelled. In contrast to this rootedness, many of his 
works feature itinerary protagonists—they live in hotels or pass though foreign lands like the shipwrecked 
narrator of El mundo—a nomadic lifestyle characteristic of the modernista writers that he admired and 
associated with (Martin 273). In some of Arévalo Martínez’s early poetry, he describes this difference 
between modernista itinerancy and his own entrenchment with animal imagery: writing that the modernista 
poets are like “aves emigratorias” that pass through his city since, “(Por fortuna mi nación / es central como 
un corazón)”  (“Canción de bohemios” qtd in Martin 273). The poetic voice doesn’t aspire to join the flock 
of migratory birds, but instead aligns himself with the ground, rooted like the heart at the center of the 
ecosystem that brings all other transitory elements together. We might jest that this image is aspirational, in 
the sense that Quetzaltenango could hardly have been considered the ‘heart’ of Latin American culture in 
the early twentieth century.  
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crucially while Arón, the male leader of the Maharachías, is out of town. His absence 
opens up the gap for interested foreign parties to usurp resources from the more ignorant 
(i.e. female) Maharachías that have remained behind. Allegorically, the novel advocates 
for prominent intellectuals to persist in their countries of origin to look after national 
interests. And third, the Maharachías are superior precisely because they have not lost 
their connection to the land. Arón explains that “Todos los hombres, hasta los 
gobernantes, debieran labrar la tierra un poco” (90). The utopian race is one that does not 
place agriculture in the hands of foreigners or the uneducated, but rather sees laboring the 
land as crucial to spirituality and proper governance. This emphasis on the land, typical 
of a telluric novel, enters into interesting tension with the novel’s utopian structure in that 
it takes place in an abstract, universal space and ahistorical temporality—a narrative 
device that allows the writer to sidestep the baggage of history and nation. This position 
is renaturalized through the Maharachías’ animal bodies, which situates them as rooted in 
a specific landscape, and as close to nature. 
Beyond using the trope of the traveller to teach the importance of the land, this 
figure also allows Arévalo Martínez to explore taxonomical difference that isn’t just 
psychological, but ontological. Whereas his earlier psycho-zoological works make 
generous use of synonyms, matching each type of human with their symbolic animal 
counterpart (famously comparing Gabriela Mistral with a fierce lioness and accordingly 
diagnosing why she had difficulty finding male partners), these similarities are always 
figured as occurring to the author as a vision or intuition that can then be mapped onto a 
mystical, yet scientific taxonomy. El mundo takes this interest in categorizing types 
further, from the terrain of the synonym and ludic association to a biological material 
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plane. The traveller arrives to a land where the established evolutionary taxonomy has 
been scrambled. The hierarchy that ascends in value from animal to human is suddenly 
upended—the animal body no longer signifies animalistic or inferior behavior, and the 
human body no longer is immediately identifiably as superior to the animal. The narrator 
realizes that compared with the Maharachías, they are the humans and he is the beast.20 
 
Self-loathing and constitutive lack 
Manuol’s initial reaction to the Maharachías is one of utter disgust. He fixes his 
gaze on his hosts’ most identifiably nonhuman trait, the long furry tail. He is repulsed by 
this bodily appendage; an instinctive response that he explains is rooted in his “prejuicio 
profundamente antropocéntrico” (8) and innate love of the familiar (10).  However, rather 
than respond with pity or charitable paternalism to the inferior other, which would be the 
socially acceptable response at the time, the narrative lingers on the tail—this initial 
object of disgust—and recodifes it not as disgusting, but as the ultimate object of 
unattainable desire. Examining the body of the female Maharchía, Manuol explains:  
Todo se creyera igual [entre las dos razas], hasta llegar a las colas… Cuando la 
vista se detenía en ellas, que, como hermosos plumeros, erectas o semitendidas, 
eran el mejor adorno de la bella especie animal de los maharachías, se tenía una 
rara sensación. […] Al ver a las lindas mujeres maharachías me pregunté si podría 
yo amar en lo sucesivo a una mujer de mi especie. Con ninguna de estas ricas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Arévalo Martínez’s 1954 tract La concepción del cosmos reveals that the Guatemalan author was looking 
to Montaigne, Schopenhauer, Spinosa, Kant, Nietzsche, as well as Julier Offray de La Mettrie (L’homme 
machine), Jean-Marie Guyau, the exiled Spanish scientist Rafael de Buen Lozano, and HG Wells, among 
others, in his theorizing of man as animal. 
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hembras me podía enlazar un vínculo amoroso, por ser tan superiores a mí y tan 
desemejantes de mí. […] Era natural en todo hombre sin cola reverenciar a las 
maharachías; pero después de verlas le era imposible amar a una mujer de su raza 
(18-19).  
At this point, Manuol’s disgust has been redirected from its initial target—the primate 
tail—to its inverse—the tail’s absence. Following Kristeva’s theory of abjection in 
Powers of Horror, Manuol’s loathing and revulsion for the tail is reconceptualized as a 
desire that can never be achieved, must eventually be repressed, but continues to haunt 
the subject. It is also, of course, an allegory about transgressive desire: desire for that 
which is considered repulsive by society at large, be it bestiality or homosexuality.  
 Manuol’s attraction to the tail includes clear markers that situate it as queer 
allegory: it is enticingly erect, it prompts a “terrible y extraña atracción” (20). The tail 
functions as a sort of dildo that is attached to the female primate body: “entonces, la 
deliciosa e inolvidable sensación de deleite, de deliquio […] provenía de la borla de 
Iabel? - Sí… no te olvides de que la cola es nuestro caracter secundario sexual más 
prominente” (60). Arévalo Martínez dilutes the problematic homoerotic implications of 
Manuol’s desire for Iabel’s “delicious” tail by gendering the tailed love interests female. 
Within this context, gay desire finds a safer outlet both through the fantasy of bestiality—
copulation with a primate—as well as through the fantasy of pegging—of being 
penetrated by a phallic appendage attached to the female body. In El mundo these 
fantasies are never realized. Yet Manuol’s sadness and self-loathing originates from the 
foreclosure of his participation in the longed-for act of sexual love with the tailed 
Maharachías. 
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Freud advanced the hypothesis that zoophilia, or the preference for animal 
partners, was a deviant inclination that led man further and further away from 
civilization. In a letter from 1897, he mused, “Perversions regularly lead to zoophilia and 
have an animal character” (qtd. Lippit 126). Bestiality has long been condemned on 
moral grounds: as a disgusting practice that is not geared toward heterosexual 
reproduction, as well as, in more modern times, one that entails problematic questions of 
consent. Yet in spite of its taboo nature, bestiality has had an undeniable presence 
throughout the history of Western art and literature. In the many representations of 
interspecies eroticism, women are disproportionately portrayed as participants. This 
disparity led Erwin Haeberle to conclude that these works function to “satisfy certain 
male fantasies” (Johnson 97). Arévalo Martínez provocatively upends many of these 
common narratives. The zoophilic desire for the tailed Maharachía race is not a 
perversion in his telling, but the most elevated form of love. Manuol’s inability to 
participate in zoophilic love does not cement his association with civilization, but sadly 
distances him from it. In sum, Arévalo Martínez queers the “male fantasy” about 
zoophilia by figuring his narrative alter Manuol as longing to fufill his true erotic desires, 
but tragically unable to do so because of his own bodily lack. 
The text is structured by the premise that like Manuol, the reader will initially be 
disgusted by the Maharachías’ strange tails and furry bodies. By presuming this 
preliminary posture of contempt, the text first figures the reader (along with Manuol) as 
superior to the animal other, and throughout the rest of the text, endeavors to subvert this 
feeling of superiority. Manuol’s initial revulsion at the Maharachías’ strange excess folds 
back upon itself with the realization that the other’s excess is the very thing that he lacks, 
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signaling his own deficiency. Without a tail, he cannot seduce, climb trees, or read minds. 
Analogously, the novel seeks to correct the reader’s initial rejection of the unfamiliar and 
animalistic by turning these negative affects back upon the feeling subject, such that the 
despicable object is located not in the other, but in one’s self. Once the script is flipped, 
the reader begins to think of herself not as a superior being, but as deficient and 
subordinate.  
It is important to highlight that although desire for the primate-like race is not 
allegorical for desiring black bodies, it does have racial implications. Arévalo Martínez 
carefully establishes that while the Maharachías are hairy primates, they are also very 
white, “de radiante blancura” (22). The racial messaging of the novel is further 
underscored through the appearance of another character, Jana. She is a “morena” 
servant, who like Manuol, is also set in contrast to the Maharachías. Like Manuol, Jana 
worships the Maharachías. It is she who explains to Manuol the dangers that men without 
tails risk by engaging this race. “Los hombres sin cola [no podemos entrar] a su servicio, 
porque su contacto nos hace amarlos en tal modo y con tal demasía, que si después se nos 
priva, aunque sea unos minutos, de su presencia, languidecemos y morimos, faltos de su 
belleza y de su bondad divina, y de sus puras y fuertes irradiaciones magnéticas” (51-52). 
However, Jana’s black skin offers her a distinct advantage that allows her to avoid 
contagion. Her dark skin refracts the Maharachías’ magnetic radiation, fending off the 
energy that makes most tailless humans lovesick. She explains, “Mi mala condición de 
negra, refractaria a las influencias suyas, me salvó de morir” (52). 
Jana’s unambiguously “bad” condition of blackness is further inscribed in the text 
as Manuol realizes that his admiration of the Maharachías has made him even more 
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repulsed by the “bella joven morena.” With a description that typifies Arévalo Martínez’s 
interest in the intersection between sexuality, desire, and the abject, Manuol watches Jana 
dance with increasing disdain. 
Y yo, aunque pensaba en la maharachía, veía moverse a Jana. La veía moverse y 
un insistente y mortificante pensamiento me embargaba e inundaba mi corazón: el 
pensamiento de que Jana era un animalito que hacía ridículos movimientos en 
ridículas actitudes bestiales, un animalito nada más. Sentada en un taburete, a la 
mesa que trabajaba, me parecía verla por primera vez. Era la bestia bípeda, que se 
sentaba groseramente y movía con torpeza una extremidades que acababan de ser 
garras y hoy apenas eran manos inhábiles. ¡Ah manos! Manos eran las de los 
maharachías. (66) 
In this highly racialized passage, animality is detached from the ontological condition of 
species, and becomes a mobile signifier that is firmly reattached to blackness.21 Watching 
Jana dance or eat meat, Manuol feels utterly repulsed. He finds her to be less dignified 
than the morally superior, graceful, white vegetarian primates. This troublesome contrast 
invokes a commonplace that Michael Lundblad identifies in The Birth of the Jungle: the 
black subject is inscribed beneath both humans and animals.22 Consequently, even though 
Arévalo Martínez identifies “the human” as coincident with animality, he simultaneously 
reinforces the belief that blackness is inferior to both human and nonhuman species. This 
furthers the conclusion that animality has no specific referent, but can be displaced onto a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This racialization of animality is further invoked in Chapter XVII when some angry “visitantes de la raza 
de color” who are not very “agradable” come to visit the Maharachías. 
22 Could be interesting to bring in Joshua Lund’s analysis in The Mestizo State, which argues that by 
contrast with Mexico (and particularly Chiapas), Guatemala was figured in the Mexican imaginary as “a 
space of greater colonial purity” (80) with more clear-cut power dynamics between empowered ladinos and 
laboring indigenous.  
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variety of characteristics. It is a moving signifier. 
 A more generous reading of Jana might point us in an allegorical direction. Jana 
might for instance personify the author’s disgust for women in general, who lack phallic 
tails and masculine wit. It is also important to note that the disgust that Manuol feels 
toward Jana is not only directed at those humans who are black. His disgust at her 
animalistic, inferior body ultimately circles back onto his own body. Manuol’s realization 
that Jana, not the monkey, is the true “animal,” is subsequently extended to himself. 
Whereas before he dismissed the Maharachías because he only saw their animality, “hoy 
sólo veo al mono en los seres de mi propio raza” (68).23 
 In El mundo, all the characters that are explicitly dark are either servants or 
corrupt. However, the text also pointedly critiques eugenics and racial science for 
conceptualizing that that is not white as innately inferior. When Manuol notices that one 
of the disagreeable visitors of a darker race has an ear shaped like a monkey’s, Aixa (a 
wise Maharachía character) notes that according to his racial science, such an ear is a 
regressive characteristic. However, she cautions: “Cada uno de esos caracteres [faciales], 
que chocan con tu arraigado prejuicio racial, corresponde a una excelencia nuestra... Eres 
capaz de una abstracción?… Toma al [humano] más puro y ponle cola con la 
imaginación: nada más ni nada menos... La ciencia yerra a veces” (97-98). Racial 
science, she intones, leads to harmful and erroneous conclusions. This messaging 
suggests that racism is not based in fact, that the body cannot be read as a map that 
indexes inner value. Yet the novel doesn’t advocate for the removal of all hierarchies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Yet the novel’s play with disgust seems to be ultimately unproductive, as an endless loop it focuses its 
energy in erecting hierarchies of being, even if those are hierarchies that would not be normative. 
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Rather, the Mariachía maxim is: “Tenemos jerarquías, pero son más sabias y elásticas 
que las vuestras. Son jerarquías y no prejuicios” (102). Hierarchies must be maintained to 
keep the social order, but they should not be based on prejudice, but on merit.24 
Gerald Martin has observed that the characteristic that most dramatically sets 
Arévalo Martínez apart from his contemporaries (and perhaps from Latin American 
writers at large) is his self-contempt. Rather than use writing to self-fashion a virile or 
inspired authorial persona, Arévalo Martínez depicts himself as sickly, pathetic and 
worthy of humiliation. Martin points out that this discourse of inferiority crafts “oscuros 
paralelos entre él y su país”, since Arévalo Martínez understood Guatemala to be a frail 
“pueblo enfermo” along the lines theorized by Alcides Arguedas in his 1908 essay of the 
same name (265). Interestingly, this mirroring between nation and author as sickly, or we 
might say, as initially disgusting, redirects the correlation that Alcides makes between 
national infirmity and the indigenous body, and instead displaces the weight of inferiority 
onto the frustrated ladino—Arévalo Martínez himself—who is incapable of manifesting 
the healthy virility to which he aspires.25 Yet for the author, this inferiority can always be 
inverted, and put to use.26 
To close with a final example of how Arévalo Martínez utilizes disgust as an 
unlikely tool of mobilizing affect, in his 1959 autobiography, Hondura, the author again 
paints a pitiful self-image. He describes himself in biological terms: “Tenía toda la 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I plan to further extend this question of disgust vis-a-vis the ladino and moreno body. 
25 While Arévalo Martínez perceives writing as one path toward becoming a man (from his inhuman state), 
even becoming a successful poet does not in his estimation elevate him to the state of a man (Martin 266). 
26 In Teresa Arévalo’s biography of Rafael Arévalo Martínez, she explains that he lived by the “ley de las 
compensaciones” which asserted that each unit of pleasure exacts the same amount of pain. That is, 
pleasure is always accompanied by pain. The end goal of this philosophy is to achieve a state of ataraxia, or 
serene calmness, the virtue of moderation in which there is no pain nor pleasure (Liano 86). 
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apariencia de un buen muchacho; un bicho débil, un animalillo asustado y bueno […] Mi 
sola presencia inspiraba en las almas buenas el deseo de protección […] Con aspecto así 
se defienden todos los seres inermes de la naturaleza” (qtd. in Urruela 254-53). Arévalo 
Martínez rationalizes his own survival in Darwinian terms. Within evolutionary struggle, 
the weak do not survive because of dogged perseverance, but by capitalizing upon their 
outward manifestation of utter vulnerability, thus inspiring the compassion and pity of 
others. The description of his appearance as reminiscent of “un animalillo asustado y 
bueno” erects a different type of model for the early twentieth century. Unable to access 
the heteronormative model of masculine virility, the writer maximizes upon his “weaker” 
nature and manipulates this vulnerability into mobilizing the trust and protection of 
others. This alternative evolutionary model thus sidesteps sexual attraction and show of 
strength by promoting one’s “goodness” and harmlessness, which allow the self to 
survive and even prosper within a society that intermingled authoritarian rule with liberal 
ideology of care and compassion for the more vulnerable. Without abandoning Darwinian 
concepts of biological struggle altogether, Arévalo Martínez challenges the notion that 
evolution necessarily favors the aggressive.  
 
Discursive Partners: Animality and Race 
Before turning to the next novel, it is helpful to further contextualize the 
imbrication of race, sexuality, and the nonhuman that characterized thought in Mexico 
and Central America leading up to the 1930s. In the early twentieth century, racial 
“others” (primarily those who were indigenous and black) were repeatedly discussed by 
the letrado elite as analogous to animals, or described through the rhetoric of animality. 
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This discourse of animality had the effect of dehumanizing and objectifying these groups, 
demoting them below the more “human” whites and ladinos. These racialized types—
groups whose race was perceived as defining and delimiting them, thus excluding them 
from the universal, implicitly white, category of “the human”—were in this way 
discursively situated on a lower, less “evolved,” rung of the humanist hierarchy, 
implicitly marked as less-than human, and thrust into the realm of nonbeing or zoe, using 
Agamben’s biopolitical definition of biological existence that is shut out from political 
consideration.  
Yet while in some cases the rhetoric of animality was used reflexively in the 
descriptions of racial others, in many cases species was not just thoughtlessly deployed as 
a perennial metaphor, but invoked as a carefully considered concept backed by data that 
was thought to be objective. There was a lot of excitement around applying Darwinian 
theories of nonhuman biology to human social dynamics, as a sort of blueprint for 
modifying existing race relations. The Darwinian notion that life emerges in increasing 
complexity and is driven by the forces of sexual selection placed sex at the center of these 
conversations about racial mattering. Following Darwin’s theory of evolution, many 
thought that by bringing together divergent morphologies—specifically dissimilar racial 
types—though sexual and cultural contact, the forces of natural selection would produce 
increasingly complex (code for “modern” and whitened) forms of life. This interracial 
contact was not viewed as a contaminating event, but understood as a process that would 
ultimately evolve society and the species toward a more complete “humanity,” that is, 
toward progress, reason, whiteness and productivity. For all of these reasons, this 
interpretation of mestizaje has been justifiably critiqued for being inextricable from the 
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eugenicist legacy of social Darwinism, a discourse wielded by criollo elites to justify 
their leadership over other ethnic groups. 
Miguel Ángel Asturias’ law thesis, published in 1925, exemplifies how race was 
theorized in Central America in the early twentieth century as a question not of culture, 
but of biology. The title of his thesis, El problema social del indio, baldly references the 
prevailing axiom that the indigenous majority in Guatemala was a “problem” that needed 
to be solved. The “problem” was that indigenous peoples were indolent and passive by 
nature, and as such, constituted a biological barrier to national progress.27 Like other 
Latin American countries with indigenous majorities, in Guatemala the solution to this 
problem was to correct the national racial imbalance through immigration and mestizaje. 
Biological policies that promoted racial mixing would gradually shift demographics (the 
racial “matter” of the country) toward “civilization” and whiteness.  
Sociologist Mara Loveman has traced the argument in favor of European 
immigration back to the 1893 Guatemalan census, which noted that Indians’ 
“indifference” and “passive attitudes” could be counteracted by diluting the population 
with “European and North American immigrants, who are energetic and hardworking, if 
not as numerous as would be ideal” (qtd. in Loveman 147). The census categorized each 
individual into one of two racial groups, indian or ladino, with the classification of 
“ladino” referring not only to “white” individuals but also to mestizos.28 Glossing this 
taxonomical decision, the editor of the 1893 census noted that as far as he could tell, 
racial mixing “has produced neither facultative decrease nor intellectual or moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For more on the history of racial discourse in Mexico, see María Elena Martínez and Robert H. Jackson. 
28 Diane Nelson has noted that “Indian and Ladino function as operative categories, defined and produced 
in oppositional relation to each other” (211). 
59 
	  
debilitation,” and as such, a mestizo should be categorized under the same racial codifier 
as those who were “white” (qtd. In Loveman 158). Consequently, as of the nineteenth 
century, Guatemala imagined itself to be a country split in two: between a race that was 
capable and urbane, and one that was weak and regressive. However, the fact that the 
country was heavily composed of (or “weighed down” by) the latter, “weaker” race, was 
not seen as an irreversible indictment, but optimistically interpreted as a situation that 
could change, and continually evolve through racial mixing. The increase in mestizos 
produced by interracial procreation meant that demographically, the static “indian” 
category progressively diminished, while the promising “ladino” group exponentially 
expanded. Thus the dividing boundary between the two taxonomical types was not 
perceived as immutable, but fluid and easily crossed through social and sexual contact. 
As Loveman concludes, “Mestizaje was construed as a demographic process whose 
momentum moved Guatemala’s population toward whiteness, never the reverse” (158). 
Inverting the logic of the United States’ one-drop rule, which asserted that a person with 
just “one drop” of black blood must be considered colored, in Guatemala interracial 
contact always implied a favorable movement toward the ladino’s embodiment of 
civilization. National hopes for “modernity” hinged on the assimilation—or absorption—
of indians into the ladino population. 
Writing within this context, Asturias, who only a few years later pioneered 
interweaving indigenous (albeit mythicized) themes in national narratives with Leyendas 
de Guatemala, published the aforementioned “Sociología Guatemalteca: El problema 
social del indio” (1923), a treatise infused with racist rhetoric that examines the 
“physiological decadence” of Guatemala’s indigenous population as a crucial national 
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hurdle. Echoing the argument put forth by the 1893 census, the essay advocates for 
European immigration as a biological corrective to national degeneration. Invoking 
Herbert Spencer’s popular rhetoric of evolutionary positivism, Asturias warns that “los 
organismos heridos de muerte, como el colectivo nuestro, están llamados a desaparecer.” 
To evade this foreseeable extinction of the weakened national organism, immigration and 
its consequent genetic influx could revitalize Guatemala’s material structure. This 
strategy would phase out the weaker race, “llamados a desaparecer,” and usher in a more 
durable biotic composition. Explicit in this formulation is the caveat that material 
rejuvenation is only possible through the introduction of more “vital” races, that is, those 
that are externally sourced from honest, hardworking Europe (he mentions Switzerland, 
Belgium, Holland, Bavaria). Identifying some races as “degenerative” and others as 
“vibrant,” Asturias proposes that in order to counteract “el germen degenerativo que la 
sangre china ha dejado en nuestras venas” and the “signos degenerativos del indio,” an 
influx of “raza blanca” is essential. The most desirable white races are those that will 
easily adapt to the Guatemalan climate and high altitude, and bring productivity with 
them to the region, along with qualities innate to their congenital disposition, such as 
“una solida base moral en sus afectos familiares, cariño por el campo, honestidad, dulzura 
y costumbres muy arraigadas de trabajo y honor.”29 
The racist theories developed throughout Asturias’ tract are propped up by 
scientific discourse. While many scholars such as Isabelle Stengers have critiqued how 
the supposed objective rationality of science has been deployed to justify racist, 
colonizing practices, less has been said about how the discourse of animality functions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For more on Asturias’s El problema social del indio, see articles by Beatriz Cortez and Edgar Esquit. 
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within this paradigm. Or, along similar lines, about how references to nonhuman 
mattering operate to codify naturalized racial hierarchies. Asturias’ “El problema” 
exemplifies the animal’s place as a nodal mediating figure from which a naturalizing case 
is built for racial science. In briefly unpacking the centrality of the animal in this text, I 
will show that it is precisely its ambiguous nature, simultaneously disclosed and opaque, 
that makes the animal a highly flexible rhetorical figure of comparison. Because the 
animal is a life that is totally alien to the human observer—an entirely enigmatic other—
and yet also assumed to be totally transparent—knowable, tamable, familiar—it is a 
facile metaphor for the Indian, a being that is also totally opaque to the letrado, yet 
assumed to be easily understood.  
The crux of Asturias’ argument in favor of “saving” the Indian is developed 
through the gesture of equating the Indian with an animal; arguing that, like an 
endangered creature, in order to be salvaged it must be studied and treated. While this 
line of reasoning is transparently racist in its equation of Indian and animal, the text 
figures this equivalence not as a confirmation of what is already known—that the Indian 
human is an animal—but rather as a critique of the prevailing climate in which the Indian 
is not even considered on par with an animal. When making the case that the causes of 
Indian decline need to be systematically investigated—a gap the thesis positions itself as 
correcting—Asturias writes: “Cuando una acémila decae, el propietario ve, estudia el 
mal, mejora sus condiciones y hace lo posible para salvarla, no así con el indio que desde 
muchos años atrás viene decayendo, ¿es qué a la mayoría de los guatemaltecos mejor 
suerte les hubiera cabido sí nacen acémilas?” Like an ailing beast of burden, the Indian 
must be attended to if his owner, doctor, and caretaker—the letrado—desires to improve 
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his property’s lot. Significantly, the endangered “property” refers not to the Indian’s 
wellbeing, but to the health of the nation. The disgust of the final question, which 
scornfully muses whether the majority of Guatemalans would have been better off born 
as mules, elicits the reader’s shame and liberal sensibilities, the civic duty to “save” the 
Indian from a state of total nonbeing—dismissed as incurable by nature—and restitute it 
back into a state of studied animality.30 
In Asturias’ text, the discourse of animality works in two distinct, but parallel, 
veins. The Indians have been dehumanized, treated like “animalitos para vender” by the 
colonizers, and stripped of their rebellious spirits, “cansado en el tiempo y en el dolor que 
lleva de ser bestia de carga” (18). The fatigue and depleted energy resultant from 
historical injustice has become innate to the race, an evolved characteristic brought about 
by repetitive mistreatment. “Las bestias tienen más libertad […] El individuo (indio) 
lleva pues, en las sociedades indígenas, una vida sin importancia, vegeta; y usando un 
símil, es como esas plantas que olvidadas se van secando en tierras sin remover.”  
Asturias does not advocate that this “raza agotada” ought to be saved through 
their preservation. Rather, the race’s futurity is seen as only possible through radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 While Asturias’ patronizing argument is both outdated and racist, echoes of the concern at the heart of 
his lingering question of why animal lives are valued over those of vulnerable humans resurface even 
today. Last summer, the killing of an endangered African lion, Cecil, by an American hunter was 
immediately met with widespread condemnation and a huge emotional outpouring across the internet. Yet 
as many Black Lives Matter activists pointed out, whereas the death of one endangered animal easily 
prompted extensive public response, the troubling deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of the police 
occurred without provoking universal anger or sadness. Other critics underscored that the easy outrage with 
which the public responded to the animal’s demise was set in stark contrast to the general silence around 
Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe’s shoddy human rights record. Along these same lines of 
argumentation, Asturias questions why a majority of Guatemalans are given less consideration than a sick 
mule. Why is it that we (that is, the “we” of the educated elite) are more moved by the need to protect 
animals, than to protect other vulnerable humans who suffer comparable injustices? Yet as we have seen, 
Asturias’ argument rests on the presumption that there is an ontological abyss separating the “we” who pity 
and protect, from those in need of protection. 
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transformation. By introducing another more vital race into the gene pool, the Indian 
population will be “saved.” Of course, by this logic, the extinction (or eradication) of the 
Indian race is congruous with their salvation: 
Se trata de una raza agotada, y de ahí que para salvarla, antes que de una reacción 
económica, psicológica o educacional, haya necesidad de una reacción biológica. 
[…] Hágase con el indio lo que con otras especies animales cuando presentan 
síntomas de degeneración. El ganado vacuno importado la primera vez a la Isla de 
Santo Domingo, por Colón, en su segundo viaje, experimentó grandes 
decaimientos. El perro ha sufrido también modificaciones importantes, y como el 
perro algunas plantas. Para mejorar el ganado hubo necesidad de traer nuevos 
ejemplares, así para con el perro y así para con las plantas. Cabe preguntar, ¿por 
qué no se traen elementos de otra raza vigorosa y más apta para mejorar a 
nuestros indios? 
Nancy Leys Stepan has explained that “Genetics in the early twentieth century was a new 
way of organizing people’s understanding of how to think of variation in animal and 
plant populations, what the environment did to that variation, and how human agency 
could, and as a consequence, manipulate aspects of human variation” (200). Notably, in 
Asturias’ passage, racial mattering through sexual reproduction is not correlated with 
desire or even animal instinct, but rather with scientific experimentation: biological 
revitalization through genetic modification. So while he spends much of the thesis 
discussing the social, economic and educational obstacles that confront the Indian—
noting, in fact, that most of these problems are not of the Indian’s making, but legacies of 
the “doloroso recuerdo” of colonialism’s dehumanizing practices—he still concludes that 
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the solution is not to restructure the system (through economics, psychology or 
education) but rather to biologically revitalize the Indian race such that it regains its 
youth, vigor and vitality.  
Asturias’ solution to the “problem of the Indian” through whitening reflected 
broader beliefs that championed whiteness as synonymous with progress. As scholarship 
has pointed out, the rise of ideologies of whitening across Latin America in the early 
twentieth century was in direct response to the conviction that racial mixing posed a 
threat to the nation’s moral and physical health. In his analysis of the ideology of 
embranquecimento in Brazil, Alexander Edmonds explains, “while it still reflected 
assumptions of white superiority, the whitening ideal was meant to challenge the “racial 
pessimism” of European science” (129). To counteract these discourses of purity from 
within the confines of racial science that diagnosed Latin and indigenous races as 
naturally weaker and lazier, many celebrated mestizaje as a policy that could correct these 
naturalized ills without totally eradicating huge portions of the population. Policies of 
racial intermixing were perceived as a positive solution to the racial “problem” that 
plagued Latin America. As a result, the term “mestizaje” is largely perceived to be less 
negatively charged than its closest English translation: miscegenation. 
Contemporaneous with Asturias, other writers across Central America were also 
grappling with sexual encounters across types. Yet while the animal plays a crucial role 
as a point of comparison when Asturias and other intellectuals such as José Vasconcelos 
think about natural selection, his approach to sex (as an act that both animals and humans 
share) is clinical, sanitized of any erotic or affective strata. Unlike this approach stripped 
of all emotional and erotic intensity, the works by Rafael Arévalo Martínez and Hernán 
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Robleto are preoccupied with what it means to be an animal—a question they see as 
cutting across both humans and nonhumans—and particularly with the eroticism that 
characterizes these interactions. The feelings of love that these novels’ nonhuman 
protagonists display cuts against the prevailing notion that animals are purely driven by 
instinct. Whether we read these primate characters as “real” animals or as allegorical of 
human others, what do these amorous feelings tell us about their interpretation of the 
laws of nature? What cultural anxieties do these texts reflect and how do they fashion 
alternatives to normative sexual pairings? In an analogous effort to Asturias’ defense of 
mestizaje, these texts work against ingrained notions of the “animalistic” body’s inherent 
inferiority, whether it be of the nonhuman, or the indigenous or black human.31 
 
“Aping” King Kong: Hernán Robleto’s Una mujer en la selva 
A relatively unstudied figure, Hernán Robleto (1895-1968) is considered 
Nicaragua’s first national playwright and professional narrator. Robleto established a 
theater company in Managua, the Compañía Dramática Nacional, and over the course of 
his career wrote 16 realist plays, many of which focused on the life of peasantry, 
founding the costumbrista genre in Nicaragua (Cortés and Barrea-Marlys 331). Like most 
Central American writers of his generation, Robleto was deeply involved in national 
politics. He participated in the struggle between conservatives and liberals, siding with 
the latter, and was imprisoned by conservative troops during the Revolution of 1910 at 
the age of 18 (Urbina). After the conservatives seized power thanks to support from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Moving forward I think it will be helpful to contrast the racialized implications of Arévalo Martínez and 
Robleto’s messaging. 
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United States (motivated to stop Zelaya’s regulation of natural resources),32 Robleto went 
into exile in Mexico for several years. 
Though currently less remembered then his contemporaries Manolo Cuadra and 
Emilio Quintana, Robleto’s prolific production of prose and theater contributed to the 
national growth of these genres in the first half of the twentieth century. The 1930s were 
a transformative decade for Nicaraguan letters, marking the shift from the privileged 
poetic mode (Darío and the subsequent vanguardia) to prose (Beverley and Zimmerman 
180). Robleto’s best-known work, Sangre en el trópico. La novela de la intervención 
yanqui en Nicaragua (1930), is considered the first Nicaraguan novel with international 
resonance. An account of US interventionism, Sangre walks the line between fiction and 
non-fiction—and as such anticipates the rise of the testimonio genre—by seamlessly 
incorporating autobiographical anecdotes into its fictionalized narrative (Urbina).33 
An anti-imperialist, social realist novel, Sangre el tropico is a precursor to the 
banana novel genre (“novela bananera”) centered on the problematic politics and ethics 
of the banana plantation. The novela bananera rose to popularity throughout the region in 
the thirties, and culminated with its most celebrated iteration, Carlos Luis Fallas’ Mamita 
Yunai, in 1941. The genre’s rise to popularity reflected the changing belief that literature 
should no longer subordinate social justice to aesthetics, but instead actively reflect 
socio-political realities and practice “denuncia social” (Grinberg Pla and Mackenbach 
162). In addition to critiquing social inequity and transnational exploitative practices, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 From 1912-33, US Marines occupied Nicaragua, and facilitated the conservative Chamorro family in its 
domination of the government. 
33 Robleto later adapted the work into a well-received comic opera, Pájaros de norte (1936), which 
incorporated the previously omitted figure of Augusto Sandino into the plot. 
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social realist novels endeavored to redefine national identity by uniting the fractured 
interests of disparate subjugated groups. The hope was to shape a collective subject 
where none had previously existed by forging a sense of shared interests between 
dissimilar parties like the working class and rural proletariat, or different races, such as 
mestizos, indigenous, and the Afro-Caribbean population (Ortiz 2003 46-55).  
To create a sense of cohesion in the struggle against exploitation, these novels 
habitually subordinated questions of race to those of class. Mamita Yunai, for instance, 
discursively unified Costa Rican blacks and whites in class struggle against the 
transnational behemoth, the United Fruit Company.34 The novel’s inscription of blacks as 
part of a broader Central American identity was groundbreaking. Yet even though it was 
one of the first works to depict the isthmus’ Afro-Caribbean presence, it also reinforced 
racist depictions typical of the time. Observing the bodies of black workers, Fallas 
described them as not having “human” appearance: “más que hombres parecía demonios 
negros y musculosos brillando bajo el sol” (19). Similarly, indigenous characters in the 
novel are compared to barnyard animals used for labor or meat: “son como las mulas,” 
“cerdos,” “como bestias de carga.” As Valeria Grinberg Pla and Werner Mackenback 
explain, Fallas’ novel framed indigenous and black bodies (particularly those of women) 
as monstrous “objects of exploration and appropriation” (170). Through recurrent 
associations of racialized bodies and the nonhuman, the novel cements their standing as 
natural, material entities, that though united with others by class, are still subordinate: 
closest in kind to mute, anonymous beasts. Like Asturias’ comparison of Indians with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Mackenbach notes in his analysis of the bananera genre that the novels often configure North American 
characters as spiritually, morally and intellectually inferior to civilized Europeans. 
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beasts of burden, subjugated by the yoke of the colonizer; Fallas’ discussion of how 
neocolonialism “animalizes” men used the rhetoric of animality primarily to threaten the 
lettered ladino reader with the prospect of his reduction to this animalistic/racialized 
state.35 
Within this context, it is interesting to consider Robleto’s novel, Una mujer en la 
selva, which diverges from the social realist emphasis on verisimilitude and instead 
provides a fantastic tale about forbidden romance. Published in 1936, the novel is a loose 
adaptation of the film King Kong, which premiered three years earlier. Like the film upon 
which it is inspired, the novel uses the figure of the ape, Jongo, to allegorize racial 
alterity. My reading endeavors to parse how the use of an animal, rather than a black 
protagonist, is a tactic that allows Robleto to approach the question of race without facing 
it head on.36 However, I’m also interested in how the inscription of an animal also 
transcends questions of race to think more broadly about ontological stability and the 
interspecies erotics. Whereas other literary works utilize animals in order to mobilize our 
empathy for human others—arguing that if one cares about animals, one should care 
about vulnerable humans—Robleto’s novel takes an inverse trajectory: humanizing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This discursive move of associating indigenous and racialized human bodies with animals separates the 
author as distinct and superior to these groups (their observer, their classifier), while also positing that 
scientifically they are the evolutionary link between humans and animals. 
36 If the animal often functions as a figure through which to think about alterity, it is crucial to note that the 
homologous identification of animality with racial alterity has long reinforced the association of “the 
human” with whiteness, and “the animal” with blackness or indigeneity. Within this framework, the desire 
to copulate with, love, or fetishize that which is not human, also implies a movement toward blackness or a 
meditation on the racialization of metaphysics. The desire for the primate other both enacts the racialized 
terms of humanism, in which the white subject desires the dark object, but also mutates them, muddling the 
correspondence between human/white/superior and animal/brown/inferior. I argue that these novels stage 
animals as an allegorical site upon which to displace racial and sexual questions. However, I also question 
whether the animal is simply a zone of extension for race, or whether conferring color onto the nonhuman 
shift its significations. 
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animal in order to encourage greater awareness for animal mistreatment, and thus 
broaden the case for animal rights. 
Una mujer en la selva (1936) wasn’t Robleto’s first or last exploration of 
interspecies camaraderie in prose. Before Una mujer, he published La mascota de 
Pancho Villa: episodios de la revolución mexicana in 1934, and after, Cuentos de perros 
in 1943.37 In Cuentos, Robleto states that the aim of the collection is to contest the 
negative ascription of bestiality to animals and instead show that humans ought to be “tan 
justos y humanos como los perros” (60). This interchangeability between the 
characteristics that are supposedly innate to humans and those that are proper to animals 
is an undercurrent that traverses Robleto’s work, much of which takes the didactic tact of 
using animal traits (such as the dog’s loyalty) to teach humans how to be fully “human.” 
Una mujer similarly subverts the notion that humans are “naturally” superior, by 
revealing the ape’s “humanity.” 
Structured through a frame story, readers of Una mujer are introduced to the 
protagonist, Emilia Rivera, through a male narrator who discovers her manuscript while 
taking shelter from a storm in a cave. The narrator realizes that the document that he has 
unearthed is the autobiography of the “mujer mono,” a figure of local folklore that has 
haunted the riverbanks surrounding the city for the past century. Emilia’s manuscript 
recounts that she was spirited away to the jungle by Jongo, a preternaturally large and 
terrifying ape. Though she originally finds him monstrous, over time Emilia comes to see 
Jongo as her friend, protector, pet and lover. After his death, she attempts to return to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Robleto underscores the divergence between “real” animals and discursive constructions of negative 
animality. “Borremos la vieja interpretación del calificativo y busquemos ser humanos, tan justos y 
humanos como los perros” (6). 
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society, but is repudiated. As she writes toward the close of her manuscript, this social 
spurning is harder to bear than the corporeal fear she felt in the jungle: “Ahora [al ver el 
fuego] sí tiemblo más que en los brazos del mono, más que entre los peligros de la selva, 
circunscritos al cuerpo. Ahora corro el peligro de la soledad entre los hombres: temo a la 
acogida de curiosidad, a los dedos y a las almas llenas de prejuicios, que me señalarán 
como un monstruo” (143). The male narrator, after reading Emilia’s text, written a 
century early in 1842 (shortly after Nicaragua became an independent republic in 1838), 
decides to transcribe it for posterity and correct the belief that she, the “mujer mono,” is 
monstrous, concluding that “La leyenda pone toque injustos en su vida” (163).  
Like other tropical novels of the time, Una mujer subscribes to the belief that the 
tropics have a sensual, transformative effect over its inhabitants.38 As Emilia spends more 
time in the jungle, she becomes increasingly unconstrained by the trappings of 
civilization, governed instead by “unbridled sensuality” of the tropical heat (Stepan 112). 
The sensual stimulation of the climate becomes one possible cause of Emilia’s increasing 
openness to an erotic relationship with her captor Jongo. Yet unlike other tropical novels 
of the era like Flavio Herrera’s El tigre (1934), which describes ladinos’ mental and 
moral deterioration upon acclimation to the steamy Guatemalan tropics, in Una mujer, 
Emilia’s adaptation does not equate the loss of spiritual and intellectual rigor, but rather 
the acquisition of the jungle’s knowledge: she begins to care for her captor and acquires 
an appreciation for natural diversity. The novel ambiguously depicts the tropics as a place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Nancy Leys Stepan explains, “The ‘tropical’ came to constitute more than a geographical concept; it 
signified a place of radical otherness to the temperate world, with which it contrasted and which it helped 
constitute. […] the superabundance of nature was believed to overwhelm the human endeavor and reduce 
the place to nature itself” (17-18). 
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of abundance and anxiety, radically vacillating between praising the “maravilla del 
Trópico” and disparaging the terror of the “horror verde” (141). 
Robleto’s novel is inspired by two different primary sources. First, as Scott 
DeVries has noted in the only existing analysis of the novel, Robleto references José 
Eustasio Rivera’s La vorágine (1924) in his use of “Rivera” for Emilia’s surname. The 
foremost Latin American novel about the jungle, La vorágine narrates poet Arturo 
Cova’s odyssey from Bogotá to the jungle. The poet’s encounter with the violent chaos of 
the jungle, which he initially romanticized, culminates in his annihilation. This struggle 
between poet and nature has been interpreted as allegorical of the act of writing, in which 
“language is a perilous and violent entity that must be mastered by the poet, lest he be 
mastered by it” (Alonso 154). Setting allegory aside, La vorágine configures the jungle as 
a violent space ruled by the Darwinian struggle for survival, and crucially part of—not 
exempt from—politics and economics, in its critique of the rubber industry (French).  
If La vorágine provides a vision of the encounter with nature as a struggle for 
survival in which man is devoured by the primordial jungle—“Los devoró la selva!”—for 
Robleto, this is hardly the case. To the contrary, in Una mujer nature is endowed with 
positive, even edenic, vitality. Robleto borrows from La vorágine’s narrative arc, 
reenacting the protagonist’s journey from city to jungle, but inverts crucial structural 
elements. Whereas Arturo initially idealizes the jungle and then comes to fear its 
brutality, Emilia travels an inverse trajectory, from trepidation to acceptance. Robleto 
also alters the protagonist’s gender. Narrating from the female perspective further 
synthesizes his vision of human and nonhuman harmony, because whereas man and 
nature have historically been configured as antagonists, nature has been thought of as 
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feminine, a discursive collapse that has produced expressions such as “mother earth” or 
“fertile land.” As Stacy Alaimo explains, the synonymous formulation of woman with 
nature consolidated the notion that nature should be penetrated or molded by its rightful 
male dominator, and reinforced beliefs that women were passive matter. Much in the 
same way that racialized humans have been associated with the nonhuman to exclude 
them from human rights, “Defining woman as that which is mired in nature thrusts 
woman outside the domain of human subjectivity, rationality, and agency” (Alaimo 2). 
Una mujer replicates this patriarchal worldview in its depiction of Emilia’s congruous 
return to nature. Yet the novel is also a meditation on how the collapse of woman with 
nature is deleterious. The perception that Emilia has become a “wild woman,” too savage 
to return to society, culminates with her violent expulsion from the city. This act of 
exclusion of the natural and the feminine from society means that Emilia, the “mujer 
mono,” will forever haunt the polis, as its self-produced remainder. Reconfiguring the 
perceived tension between the primitive backwardness associated with undeveloped 
nature and the supposedly more desireable metropolitan civilization, Una mujer is a 
cautionary tale about the psychological harm enacted by the disavowal of nature. 
The second source that Robleto borrows upon for Una mujer is the film King 
Kong. In the 1933 Hollywood hit, the titular outsized gorilla takes an innocent blonde 
movie star, Ann Darrow, prisoner. After Ann is rescued, Kong is captured and brought 
back to New York City to be displayed as the “8th wonder of the world.” Enraged, he 
again breaks loose to reclaim his beloved. In the film’s iconic conclusion, Kong is 
defeated by airplane strikes as he straddles the top of the Empire State Building. Staging 
the confrontation between technology and nature, modern man versus ape, the 
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Hollywood classic celebrates man’s ability to harness modern technology in order to 
quash primitive threats. 
As critics have observed, the film’s racial messaging is impossible to overlook. 
Kong, a virile black beast from Skull Island, lusts after Ann’s desirable white purity. 
Kong’s boundary-crossing overreach—his belief that a human woman is an appropriate 
mate for a primate—unmistakably allegorizes white fear about black men: that they 
desire white women as partners, and that their sexual primacy is appealing to those same 
women (Haraway 161).39 The white “hero” is only able to defeat the black man/ape’s 
“naturally” superior strength with a supplemental assist from technology. Kong’s 
ultimate death at the film’s conclusion “remasculinizes the white man,” who defeats the 
black threat and reclaims the white woman for himself (Metzler 99). By allegorically 
portraying the black man as a monstrous sub-human, the film reinforces stereotypes that 
black men are excessively sexual and violent, the link between the civilized white man 
and his evolutionary past.40 
In Una mujer, Robleto borrows upon the film’s iconic mythology. Jongo, a giant 
monkey, emerges from the depths of the jungle to abduct Emilia, a young virgin. Like 
Kong, Jongo is driven by contradictory impulses: animal instinct (associated with 
violence and sensuality) and human morality (care, empathy, justice). In this way, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Alternatively, Kong’s menacing virility has been interpreted as a stand in for the white man’s animalistic 
sexuality, as a way to safely depict his sexual fantasies from the remove of a nonhuman and nonwhite. 
40 Kong is not exclusively a signifier for blackness, but also a figure that generally indexes the primitive, as 
well as the animal itself. In the film, Kong is a stop motion puppet that acquires an uncanny effect when put 
in motion. Because his eyes are expressionless spheres of glass, his gaze evokes little sentience, a trait that 
furthers his status as a non-subject. This glassy look depicts Kong not as an animal that feels and suffers, 
but as a brute (Bishop 241). 
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inhabits the grey zone that separates animal from human.41 
Borrowing from the Hollywood film’s premise, Una mujer constitutes a precursor 
of sorts to today’s “fanfiction” phenomenon, in which fans of a canonical or popular 
work write their own fictions that are inspired by the original source. The fanfiction 
writer does not usually intend to desecrate or satirize the work they love. To the contrary, 
fanfiction writers respect and adore their source material. They create content that builds 
upon the primary work, developing secondary characters, imagining alternative plotlines, 
or queering the work to beef up what might have simply been homoerotic hints in the 
original. They “see themselves as participants in world building, adding to the wealth of 
stories about their favorite characters” or fleshing out perceived gaps in the original 
narrative (Graham 131). While the fanfiction writer tends to publish their fanfiction in 
informal venues like online forums, others have been met with huge commercial success 
(For instance, E.L. James’ 50 Shades of Grey is a fanfiction inspired by Stephanie 
Meyer’s Twilight series). A precursor of this phenomenon, Hernán Robleto realized that 
Hollywood’s hit narrative of ape versus man mapped squarely onto the Latin American 
jungle novel’s preoccupation with the clash of modernity and nature. Adapting King 
Kong to the Central American context, Robleto reworks the racial tension established in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The choice of the ape as the imagined partner in the two works analyzed here underscores the ties 
between this fantasy and anxieties about evolution. The closest evolutionary kin to humans, apes only 
recently diverged from humans about 6 million years ago, and share 98% of their genetic material. The 
primate serves as a mirror through which humans imagine their past—either to disavow or idealize it—or 
wonder about what was lost in the process of becoming fully human. The closest kin to the human in the 
animal kingdom, the primate functions as a mediating paradigm or contact zone through which humans 
recognize themselves. Donna Haraway offers a critique of this view in Primate Visions. Borrowing from 
Said’s challenge to orientalism, Haraway explains that modern culture has been fashioned through the 
primate’s appropriation: “Primatology has been about the construction of the self from the raw material of 
the other, the appropriation of nature in the production of culture, the ripening of the human from the soil of 
the animal, the clarity of white from the obscurity of color” (11). 
75 
	  
the film in order to think through nonnormative couplings and mestizaje throughout the 
isthmus.  
Like King Kong’s heroine Ann, Emilia is the narrative vehicle that bridges the 
physical and psychological distance between dualisms such as animal and human, white 
and black, civilization and wilderness, fear and desire. In her analysis of Hollywood 
jungle films, Rhona Berenstein elaborates the white woman’s decisive role. 
The white heroine is a mediator between the worlds of the white and black man, 
with the latter assumed to include gorillas of all shapes and sizes. Like the 
Negro’s function in white discourses (bridging simians with humans), white 
women too are interstitial creatures. They pose a threat of interspecies and inter-
racial union—they introduce the possibility that the darkness which is spatially 
attributed to the ‘out there’ of the jungle also inhabits the racially pure ‘in here’ of 
the white domain (319).  
If the fear mobilized by many jungle films of the era is that white women are always on 
the verge of falling backwards—into depravity, away from civilization, toward animality 
and blackness—in Robleto’s reimagining, this anxiety about the loss of purity is rewritten 
to accommodate the increasingly popular view that mestizaje was not a negative, 
demoralizing phenomenon, but a positive trend that would further civilize Central 
American societies. 
Although like Ann, Emilia straddles the binary poles of nature/culture and 
black/white, unlike Ann, she is a mestiza protagonist.42 As we have learned from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Silvia Spitta argues that in Latin America there is more of a “continuum of mestizaje,” rather than a 
notion that the self is based on opposition to the other. 
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Loveman’s analysis of the Guatemalan census, mestizo or ladino status was equated with 
whiteness, both of which were constructed in opposition to indigeneity. However, the 
novel’s articulation of Emilia’s mixed race heritage adds nuance to this binary, 
demonstrating that in Nicaragua, mestizaje was still thought of in terms of “impurity.” 
Her great-grandfather, Emilia relates, was an English pirate who ventured deep into 
colonial Nicaragua in search of gold. There he encountered Black Caribs that had fled 
inland to evade the incursions of “hombres blancos que mataban a los nativos como si 
fueran zajinos” (21). This description diametrically opposes whites and natives, with the 
British grandfather as the exceptional figure that transcends this polarity. The simile 
linking natives with the “zajino,” a collard peccary or musk hog, discursively collapses 
indigenous peoples with wild animals, a correlation that later implicitly operates to 
racialize Jongo as allegorical of black indigeneity. At the same time that Robleto signals 
that both indigenous peoples and nonhuman animals are targets of unethical, 
discriminatory treatment—the Caribs are “hunted like animals”—this rhetorical 
correspondence also operates to establish the indigenous population as closer to nature 
and in need of rescuing by the white letrado/a.43 
The “caribes” that Emilia’s grandfather encounters is a reference to the mixed-
race descendants of indigenous Caribs and enslaved Africans who were exiled from the 
Caribbean island of St. Vincent during the colonial period and settled along Central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Discussing Adorno’s “People Are Looking at You,” Akira Lippit explains that Adorno finds the origin of 
violence in the encounter between human and animal. “Adorno has located a crucial moment in the rhetoric 
of violence: as a performative statement, “it’s only an animal” transforms other beings into things “so that 
[their] stirrings can no longer refute the manic gaze. Adorno’s insight reveals that the animal as such is 
never a mere animal, its gaze exceeds the “thingness” of a nonhuman being and penetrates the human 
sphere—which is to say, that the “it’s only an animal” utterance fails, in the first instance, to perform the 
immunity from guilt that the metaphor promises to the perpetrator of violence” (168-169). 
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America’s Atlantic coast, identified today as the Garifuna people. As I discuss in Chapter 
3, Nicaragua’s Afro-Caribbean population was omitted from constructions of national 
identity throughout the twentieth century. Intellectuals were perplexed by whether the 
Garifuna—who have a distinct race, language, and culture from the rest of the country—
could ever fit into a coherent national narrative. Most scholars agree that it wasn’t until 
the Sandinista revolution that authors such as Lizandro Chávez Alfaro, David McField, 
and Carlos Rigby began to narrate the Atlantic Coast’s black populace as a significant 
national presence. An unacknowledged precedent to these foundational writers, Una 
mujer is fundamentally concerned with the existence of this “other” and how to 
assimilate them within a totalizing national narrative, finding the solution in Emilia and 
Jongo’s idealized union. However, unlike Chávez Alfaro, McField, and Rigby’s complex 
engagement with the Garifuna, Una mujer remains patently problematic in that it 
understands human alterity though the distanced rhetorical flattening of the animal figure. 
By linking the Garifuna with the exceptional primate, Robleto reiterates the correlation of 
blackness with the nonhuman. Yet Una mujer remains nonetheless a pioneering attempt 
to argue in favor of Black Caribs’ moral and amorous worth at a time when this ethnic 
group was wholly marginalized from intellectual thought. 
In Emilia’s recounting of her family history, the originary encounter between the 
three races—white, brown and black—and the implied interracial sex is framed as an 
engagement with nature that indelibly transforms the white participant from a state of 
purity to one of bodily difference. “El bisabuelo corsario se enredó con las muchachas 
caribes, que lo tatuaron para siempre. Casi no se distinguían sus ojos azules entre las 
rayas negras y rojas de su rostro, impregnado con especies brujas, sobre todo la leche de 
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los árboles cómplices” (21). The great-grandfather’s Aryan characteristics—specifically, 
his blue eyes—are almost “indistinguishable” on a face shrouded by cross-cultural 
contact. Catching sight of his altered visage in the river, he cries, too embarrassed to 
return to civilization. He remains self-exiled in the tropics, surrounded by his children 
“morenos y de ojos claros” (21). One of these descendants, Emilia describes herself 
through the rhetoric of racial impurity: “Yo era una niña de ojos de un azul adulterado 
[…] El trópico va quemando en sucesiones humanas las pupilas de extrañas herencias, 
diluyéndolas o carbonizándolas” (22). Marrying the negative charge of “adulteration” 
with the naturalizing implications of “dilution” and “carbonization,” miscegenation is 
constructed as a natural alchemical process impelled by the tropics’ unstoppable energy. 
Emilia’s romance with Jongo is clearly meant to echo her British grandfather’s 
commingling with the Caribs. This identification of bestiality with mestizaje is 
complicated. On the one hand, the equivalence immediately frames both relationships as 
abject. On the other, because the novel ultimately asks the reader to accept the more 
taboo of the two—Emilia’s intimacy with Jongo—, the allegorical invocation of 
interspecies love probes the boundaries of “who or what can count as an “other” that we 
feel “for,” and what forms such feeling takes” (Boggs 100). Nonnormative romance, in 
this way, functions both to unify society (along the lines hypothesized by Doris Sommer 
in Foundational Fictions), but also to “combat social convention and conservatism” 
(Marting 28-29) by depicting a heterosexual romance entangled in bestiality. For 
Robleto, the question of attraction or love for the other—whether in the form of gorilla or 
Carib—is a one-sided dilemma that is always primarily a concern of the white/ladino 
subject. Whereas Emilia grapples with whether or not she can love an ape; Jongo’s desire 
79 
	  
to participate in their union is never up for debate. Because of this lopsidedness, both 
interracial coupling and bestiality are formulated as an encounter between a subject that 
feels and thinks, and an amenable nonsubject.  
 
Bestial erotics 
Fanfiction is often erotic in nature. The creative reinterpreter identifies sexually 
charged moments in the original text and replaces repression with consummation, giving 
the audience the satisfying climax that was previously only intimated. Una mujer 
similarly capitalizes upon the erotic undertones of Kong’s designs on Ann, and fleshes 
them out in terms that are not pornographic, but far more explicit. Robleto’s inclusion of 
interspecies erotics perceives what King Kong’s filmmakers were forced to censor: a 
“salacious” scene in which Kong forcibly disrobes Ann and suggestively tickles her bare 
legs.44 Emilia, a prototypical damsel-in-distress conjured up by the patriarchal 
imagination, reacts to her captor’s lechery in a way that mirrors Ann’s response to Kong, 
which Haraway succinctly sums up as a combination of “terror and rapture” (162).  
While the conclusion of Una mujer ultimately sanitizes and naturalizes the love 
between Emilia and Jongo (by inverting their gendering in the text in order to maintain 
human/masculine superiority and a heteronormative relationship, as I discuss further 
ahead), the erotics of the human-animal encounter are staged from the very beginning as 
abjectly enticing. The monkeys are unabashedly interested in humans as sex objects, as 
young Emilia observes: “Los animales, libidinosos, obedeciendo a quién sabe qué 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The scene’s censorship supposedly surprised the director, Merian C. Cooper, since in screenings viewers 
responded with laughter, not shock (Baker 313). 
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secretos instintos, les han levantado con mucho tiento las faldas [de las lavanderas], para 
mirar hacia arriba, en los humanos ángulos” (33). In this primordial event of Emilia’s 
sexual awakening, the monkeys’ unseemly display of lustful curiosity is enticingly 
stripped of ‘human’ propriety. Like many Spanish American bildungsroman,45 sexual 
desire is depicted as instinctual but also lubricious. Following Freud’s use of the animal 
as the privileged site for thinking about human biological drives, Robleto projects 
shameless interest in the female genitalia onto the animal proxy. Because of its imagined 
ontological irreproachability (its perceived innocence and distance from reason), the 
animal is a figure from which the writer can safely indulge the reader with a scene of 
voyeuristic perversion, unshackled from decorum. 
Yet rather than maintain a strict separation between the lustful animal and chaste 
human, the text plays with the slippery commonality of “primitive” desire across species. 
Upon witnessing this spectacle of the animalistic male gaze, Emilia fearfully speculates 
as to whether the monkeys might actually be “una raza de hombres degenerados.” 
Immediately after questioning the primates’ animality—perceiving their sexual appetite 
for human women as signaling their humanity—Emilia remarks that they carry their 
infants on their backs, “como las indias de San Buenaventura, de Tierra Blanca, de 
Saguatepe y Sácal” (33). Implicitly, the proximity between primate, Indian, and the 
degenerate is reiterated by the mestiza spectator, who anxiously taxonomizes lust as 
proper to the “primitive.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Yolanda Doub observes that sexual discovery is a central characteristic of Spanish American 
bildungsroman, along with the search for one’s home, “families that are absent or inaccessible; the 
questioning of hierarchies central to the socialization of the protagonist [… and] the formation of the 
writer” (90). 
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If interspecies lust is first figured as originating with the primate and cast toward 
human women, Robleto further titillates readers with Emilia’s ambiguous response to this 
abject possibility. The primates’ uninhibited looks arouse in her a “misleading,” 
“electrifying” push and pull. To dodge the shameful desires awakened by the local circus 
monkeys, Emilia avoids them. “Como les he cobrado un repentino miedo, miedo del 
sexo, pavor a la idea de más extraviadas cercanías, ya me privo de pasar bajo las soleras 
en que “Pancho” danza con sus cinco patas o sus cinco manos. Me electriza la idea de 
que aquella cola elástica se anude a mi garganta, como en otras ocasiones” (34). In this 
sensationalist passage, Robleto touches on two taboos: bestiality and active female 
sexuality. The “electrifying” image of the tail wrapped around Emilia’s throat suggests 
rape, bestiality, and sadomasochism all at once. This abject fantasy stimulates 
contradictory feelings of fright and desire in the subject, who vacillates between 
repulsion and enticement. In this fantasy of abjection, the border between the self and the 
other—human and nonhuman, chastity and concupiscence—is exposed and threatens to 
break down. Julia Kristeva explains that the possibility of this dissolution is what makes 
the abject frightening and compelling. The lurid subject matter of Una mujer endows it 
with the “primal attraction” of exploitation films, whose “sensuality and shock,” chaotic 
narratives, and “fevered construction” fascinate scholars and viewers alike (Schaefer xii). 
By foregrounding Emilia’s sexuality, and specifically her zoophilia, or sexual 
desire for animals, Robleto joins other writers of the period who reacted against 
modernismo’s moralizing tendencies and configuration of the soul mate a critical spiritual 
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search (Shaw).46 Diane Marting explains that female sexuality was not frequently 
depicted in early-to-mid twentieth-century Spanish American literature, and can be 
considered a “minority phenomenon” (27). Writers that did treat themes of female 
sexuality were those of “anticanonical, antimoral, and avant-garde tendencies” (Marting 
26). Robleto’s depiction of Emilia’s transgressive sexuality—not directed toward men or 
marriage—playfully rebukes Nicaragua’s conservative climate that thought of marriage 
as the only acceptable institution within which women could be sexually active. Emilia’s 
sexuality is thus both the expression of a male fantasy about the kinky feminine libido, 
and a playful rebuke to the “purity” defining the modernista concept of true love. 
Nonetheless, in spite of her deviant thoughts, Emilia still fits within the tendency of early 
twentieth-century Latin American novels to represent sexual women as victims or 
victimizers (Marting 31). Emilia falls into the former category; she endeavors to control 
and regulate her feelings of desire—which she codes as shameful—, but is ultimately 
taken captive by her primate suitor. Her sexual activity is forced, not sought out. 
In each abjectly erotic passage, Robleto underscores the gaze. For instance, in the 
previously cited passage where Emilia finds herself unable to look away at the monkeys 
peering up under the washerwomen’s skirts, the female bodies are the fetishized objects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In her book, Animalia Americana, Colleen Glenney Boggs writes that bestiality can be understood both 
“through its historical definition as the performance of human-animal sexual relations and in its broader use 
as a synonym for any act of sodomy… [B]estiality signifies as a mode of embodied animality, that is, of 
human interaction with the animal body and an animalization of human bodies” (101). Bestiality’s 
implications of eroticism, deviance from heteronormativity, and human animalization all operate in 
Arévalo Martínez and Robleto’s texts to unearth the anxiety that is felt in crossing identificatory borders, 
whether that be the species barrier, homosexuality or interracial sex. In both works, sexual desire across 
types is ontologically transformative; the protagonists find themselves shuttled back and forth between the 
categories of “human” and “animal.” By engaging, or even desiring to engage, with a partner that is not 
deemed sexually acceptable, in a liaison that society prohibits, these authors reflect on how social 
expectations construct our ideas about “humanity.” 
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of the androgynous animal gaze. The female voyeur gazes back, watching the spectacle 
of watching. Unlike the male gaze, Mary Ann Doane writes in her discussion of 
Hollywood cinema, the female gaze is not one of power, but curiosity. Emilia finds more 
pleasure in looking, than in being looked at. Once she finds the animal’s gaze turned back 
on her, she becomes aware of the erotic charge of her own scrutinizing stare, and is 
ashamed. “Yo veía, también, en los ojos del mono triste, un fondo de sensualidad 
insatisfecha que me sonrojaba, cual si sus pensamientos (claro que piensan los monos) 
fueran directamente a mí para provocarme repelos” (37). The animal’s lustful gaze, 
associated with pleasure and lack of restraint, objectifies Emilia and defies her inhibition. 
The parenthetical note that “of course monkeys think” problematizes the traditional 
collapse of instinct and irrationality. If animals are not blind to reason, then following 
one’s urges is not illogical, but respects an alternative episteme. 
In a way, these passages that stage the gaze across species, interactions charged 
with erotics and shame, resonate with Derrida’s essay, “The Animal that Therefore I 
Am.” In that piece, Derrida describes standing in front of his cat in the nude, feeling 
unexpectedly ashamed as he finds himself captured by his cat’s gaze. The cat’s 
perspective, illegible to Derrida, makes him suddenly self-aware, caught off guard. In that 
encounter, the supposed stability of the dialectic between human/subject and 
nonhuman/object is upended. This is so, Alice Kuzniar explains, because the gaze across 
species is usually formulated as unidirectional, with humans observing animals in zoos, 
circuses or cages. By reversing this and instead highlighting the animal’s look and how it 
might confound or perturb us is to recognize our own exposure. Like in Derrida’s essay, 
the underscored gaze in Robleto’s erotic passages is not that of the human, but the 
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animal. The monkeys’ insistent scrutiny, first of female genitalia and then of Emilia 
herself, rouses her embarrassment. The other’s gaze provokes shame because, as Sartre 
notes, “Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me” (qtd. 
Kuzniar 70).47 
Yet the metaphysics of the looking is pushed further here, not just to curious 
glances and shameful recognition, but to taboo cross-species erotics. Derrida simply 
alludes to how sexuality emerges in the encounter between man and cat, describing his 
cat’s look as erotic potentiality. “To see, without going to see, without touching yet, and 
without biting, although that threat remains on its lips or on the tip of the tongue” (373, 
emphasis in original). Robleto leans into this threat of animal mouth on human genitalia, 
inducing the reader’s panicked consternation that humans and animals are not separate 
erotic creatures, but desire each other. The uneasy reciprocal desire configured between 
virginal white woman and the large, dark ape intends to titillate. Emilia speaks of the 
unspeakable, the biological consequences of reproduction across species: “Yo sé, por los 
libros de aventuras, lo que pasa en la Naturaleza, que se desenvuelve en permanente, en 
eterno deseo. […] ¿Y si quiere la Naturaleza que haya lo que tiene que haber, por culpa 
de los instintos? ¿Y si de esta mezcla de células…? ¡No! ¡Eso sería horroroso!” (45). In 
this self-referential wink, Robleto points out the adventure genre’s circulation of fears 
and desires about Nature’s capacity to awaken impermissible appetites. Adventure 
fiction, rooted in narratives of colonialism that stage sexually charged encounters 
between white explorers and dark savages, is driven by fantasies of acting on the desire 
for the savage other, but also anxieties about what this commingling will produce. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In the work of Freud and Lacan, shame is typically invoked as a form of separation (Kuzniar 69). 
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Following generic conventions, this passage from Una mujer reaffirms the myth that 
sexual pleasure found with a forbidden other—articulated as impossible to avoid, “lo que 
tiene que haber”—is socially disruptive, even biologically dangerous. Emilia’s murmur 
about the “mix of cells” that would occasion in the wake of interspecies sex drops off into 
ellipsis, unutterable. 
Yet the novel doesn’t unfold in this direction; Jongo and Emilia bear no 
monstrous kin.48 Instead, after appropriating and having fun with the sensationalist 
fantasy of a virginal white woman deflowered by a black animal, the novel shifts course, 
and endeavors to prove to the reader that Jongo is a far cry from the embodiment of the 
age-old fear of the primitive other. Rather, confounding Emilia and the reader’s fears of 
animalistic lechery, Jongo turns out to be an acceptable mate. Robleto sets out to 
convince the reader of the primate’s sentience and subjectivity, depicting him as a 
misunderstood, albeit sensual, giant. Whereas Kong’s eyes are expressionless, the 
Nicaraguan fanfiction repeatedly references Jongo’s evocative eyes, setting out to 
“humanize” him. Nevertheless, for engaging in depraved love, Emilia is banished. Yet 
this expulsion from society, the novel concludes, is ultimately unjust. 
 
Normalizing bestiality 
In order to redeem the relationship between Emilia and Jongo as distinct from the 
lurid fantasy of bestiality that dominates the first half of the novel, in the second, Robleto 
scrambles gender and species to naturalize the interspecies coupling. Justifying why she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Robleto’s imagining of the relationship between Emilia and Jongo hints that bestiality is a violent act, but 
ultimately chooses to naturalize the boundary-crossing partnership. 
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hasn’t fled from her captor, Emilia explains that she cannot kill him because “Para mí, 
Jongo es un ser humano. Y sería horrible un crimen, un uxoricidio” (124). Since 
uxoricide refers to killing one’s wife, this revealing rationale genders Emilia, the more 
human and thus ‘superior’ mate, male, while her animal spouse, previously coded 
excessively virile, is feminized. Reflecting Judith Butler’s observation that gender “is a 
fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies,” that isn’t true or false, but is 
“only produced as the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity” (174), 
Robleto relationally deems Emilia the human husband and Jongo her human wife. By 
categorizing both as “human,” the text removes the prurient spectacle of interspecies 
fornication from the equation, and moves the relationship toward a more normative love 
partnership. Yet while both are set on equal terrain as “humans,” the gendering shifts to 
reflect the originary power of Emilia’s whiter humanity, equated with masculinity. 
Whereas her femininity was previously underscored to accentuate her proximity to 
nature, and Jongo’s masculinity highlighted to emphasize his sexual prowess, in this 
queer regendering, ideas about human exceptionalism and racial science converge with 
patriarchal discourses of masculine power and superiority in order to situate Emilia’s 
agency and authority over Jongo.49 
The revelation of Jongo’s true “humanity” is crucial to the narrative’s redemptive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Yet we cannot totally assert that the problematics of an interspecies erotic relationship is totally resolved 
through the effort to reduce it to a heteronormative coupling between male and female. Following Butler, 
the “‘presence’ of so called heterosexual conventions within homosexual contexts” cannot be through of as 
merely “chimerical representations of originally heterosexual identities.” Rather, this repetition within a 
queered site denaturalizes gender categories because “the replication of heterosexual constructs in non-
heterosexual frames brings into relief the utterly constructed status of the so-called heterosexual original. 
Thus, gay is to straight not as copy is to original, but rather, as copy is to copy. The parodic repetition of 
the ‘original’ reveals the original to be nothing other than parody of the idea of the natural and the 
original.” 
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arc from aberrant interspecies sex to chaste matrimonial kinship. In the lead-up to his 
death, the progressively weakened Jongo becomes all the more “human.” Emilia 
describes his metamorphosis as a pedagogical triumph: 
Se me quedó viendo a los ojos, humanamente. Y—¡cosa rara!—descendió 
valiéndose de la escalera de bejucos que sólo yo utilizaba […] Como los hombres, 
tocó el suelo con las extremidades inferiores y siguió en dos pies, 
dificultosamente. Yo lo miraba de espaldas, ancho todavía, encorvado como al 
peso de un fardo. Sus manos le llegaban más abajo de las rodillas; pero no osaba 
tocar el suelo con ellas. 
 Se volvía a mirarme, como para decir: “¿Ves? ¡Voy andando como un 
hombre!” Porque sabía que a mí me gustaba enderezarlo cuando trataba de 
apoyarse en los nudillos (127) 
Notably, what elevates Jongo to the position of “human” is not language, but his 
ability to correct “natural” behaviors into appropriate, controlled postures. The exchange 
of gazes—in the place of language—between the pair is no longer erotic, but maternal 
and pedagogical, with Jongo occupying the child’s subordinate position. The ape’s 
essential biological difference is erased and he becomes Emilia’s kin—but only as he 
approaches death—a transformation that in kind alters his reception from fear to pity.  
Yet the question remains, why endeavor to ‘humanize’ an animal in order to 
normalize love across different types, when Robleto could have forgone the animal 
altogether and instead simply portrayed a partnership between a white ladina and an 
indigenous black man? That is, why use an animal at all? On the one hand, the 
introduction of the animal as the human love object is more rigorously taboo than 
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interracial love. The extremity of this case, with its implications of bestiality and 
zoophilia, makes interracial relationships seem ‘normal’ by contrast.50 If what makes the 
relationship “natural” is Jongo’s adaptation of human postures, his care of Emilia, and 
moral obedience, then by proxy, black and indigenous subjects that adopt these 
characteristics must also receive the ladino reader’s acceptance and empathy. By the 
opposite token, interracial relationships had yet to be portrayed in Nicaraguan literature. 
Consequently, the fantastical improbability of human-ape love makes it a more ludic, less 
polemical stance. Finally, the use of the primate as a stand-in for racial difference both 
reaffirms standing racist notions based in racial science about the evolutionary proximity 
of black/brown humans with monkeys while also patronizingly arguing in favor of the 
need to accept these ‘harmless’ others if they assimilate into ladino society. 
If we accept that Jongo allegorically represents indigenous or black masculinity, 
Robleto’s fanfic conjures up a divergent message than its Hollywood inspiration. 
Whereas in King Kong, “the image of the black male as sexual savage serves to construct 
white male sexuality as the protector of white womanhood, as contained, and 
importantly, as capable of intimacy and humanity,” (Metzler 99) Una mujer complicates 
the exclusion of the black subject from more subdued modes of affection. Jongo’s 
narrative conversion from symbol of racialized sexual excess to controlled intimacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 In both novels, the fantasized interspecies couplings are perhaps better identified as zoophilia than 
bestiality. While bestiality is closely tied to sexual interaction, zoophilia is often used by scholars as a 
broader term for the spectrum of affective relationships with animals that can range from violent to 
nonviolent (Boggs 30). Extreme fondness for an animal partner is perhaps not that distant from the more 
normalized relationship between humans and their pets. Yet, as Alice Kuzniar has pointed out, animal 
studies scholars have been reluctant to engage with this taboo form of pet love, which carries with it 
complicated questions of consent. Thus far, Colleen Boggs is the only scholar who has seriously engaged 
with the topic of bestiality in literature, as a relationship that does indeed exist on the spectrum of affective 
relationships between humans and animals and needs to be acknowledged. 
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portrays the black/indigenous male as a nonthreatening subject who can be taught to 
comfortably occupy the amenable roles of protector, pet and child. Allegorically, 
Emilia’s pedagogical success indexes the hoped-for possibility that the indigenous and 
Afro-Caribbean populations could be assimilated into ladino culture, thus consolidating 
the desired national unity that propelled political and intellectual projects throughout the 
1920s and 30s (Hedrick 112). 
With the decline of Jongo’s health and virility, his appearance is increasingly 
articulated as feminine and indigenous. “Los estratos de sus músculos pectorales cuelgan 
fláccidos, como los pechos de las indias viejas que han tenido docenas de hijos” (126). 
This parallelism between primate and female bodies exemplifies Carol Adams’ 
observation that in Western patriarchal societies, animals and women are both 
consistently abjected in ways that discursively overlap.51 Like the female indigenous 
body, the sick animal’s “flaccid” chest is desexualized; the teleology of both animal and 
indigenous woman essentialized to reproductive capacity.  
Consequently, although Robleto complicates the conception of the animal by 
arguing for its moral consideration within the logic of humanism, he also perpetuates an 
unproblematized discursive construction of indigenous peoples as animalized humans. 
Jongo’s ascent toward ‘humanity’ elevates him from animal state to the lowest rung of 
the human evolutionary tree, those “darker-skinned races such as Indians [who were 
thought to have] obviously belonged at the bottom of the evolutionary ladder, as 
evidenced by their seemingly natural relationship to the earth” (Hedrick 111). Whereas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Through this comparison the boundary between human beings and animals is destabilized, while 
simultaneously reinforcing the dominance of men as virile, superior beings. 
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Jongo is able to move between distinct ontological categories based on his gesticular and 
moral adaptation, by contrast, the anonymous indigenous characters that periodically 
surface throughout Una mujer are not endowed this ontological mobility. They remain 
flatly animalized, a point of reference utilized by the ladino taxonomizer. Robleto’s 
consideration of nonhuman subjectivity intends to, by proxy, stretch the reader’s empathy 
for racial others and elevate interracial love from a degrading act to a harmonious 
kinship, but this effort is consistently undercut by the inability to extend this categorical 
destabilization from certain bodies to others.52 Similarly to Clare Bradford’s conclusion 
in her analysis of harmless, friendly aliens in films like E.T. as allegorical of indigenous 
naivety, Robleto’s use of the primate-as-indigene “claim[s] that “they” are “just like us,’” 
but ultimately function[s] to reinforce reductive colonial hierarchies (209). 
The importance of assimilation into mainstream culture as the true differentiator 
between “human” animals and those that remain trapped in their animality is underscored 
when another primate, a “monster” “de otra raza, más ridículo, más bestial” arrives on the 
scene to capture Emilia during Jongo’s absence (114). With this new “diabolical” 
monkey, the text resists the nuance of character endowed to Jongo. “No era un libidinoso. 
Antes bien, un rabioso que invadía por primera vez aquellas zonas de la selva […] Era un 
mono negrísimo, como acabado de salir del infierno” (115). This still-darker “congo 
negro de la leyenda” (116), emerges as a counterpoint that foregrounds Jongo’s 
exceptionality. Through Jongo’s foil, Robleto insists that civility, or ‘humanity,’ is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 When Emilia realizes that she can no longer smile because “La sonrisa exige una correspondencia, y a 
fuerza de soledad se me han atrofiado los músculos del rostro,”She explains that “Ya soy un animal y 
recuerdo el argumento de Fray Bartolomé de las Casas ante las Cortes españolas, al defender a los indios 
nativos de América, alegando su condición de racionales. —Ellos ríen, señor!—alegaba el santo fraile—
Ellos ríen y eso demuestra que son hombres. Pero con quién voy a sonreírme?” (90-91). 
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innate to all beings, but dependent on assimilation. Even if the other does not look like 
‘us,’ if he walks like us and adheres to ‘our’ moral code, he can be accepted, even 
declared ‘human.’ But if not, there is no need for empathy. We might posit the difference 
between the monstrous “black Congo” and Jongo indexes a perceived distinction between 
the black coastal Garifuna and other indigenous groups in Nicaragua. The caricature of 
the angry black savage serves to parse docile autochthonous subjects from angry 
outsiders who do not organically belong to the landscape, and as such, merit revulsion. 
And yet in spite of its confused racial politics, Una mujer ambiguously circles 
back to the question of why certain bodies are valued above others. Robleto’s insistent 
return to this issue, and tentative critique of pigmentocracy, is particularly evident in 
Emilia’s questioning of the inherent merits of whiteness. Describing Jongo’s 
“deformities” developed after years in the jungle, she suddenly doubles-back to query 
where the definition of “deformity” originates. This moment of discursive suspicion 
problematizes the objectivity of scientific rhetoric that designates certain forms “natural,” 
and puts the entire premise of evolved perfection into doubt. The supposedly natural 
hierarchies of race and species are revealed to be socially constructed:  
¿Quién puede dar lineamientos sobre la belleza, cuando está visto que ella es una 
costumbre, una imposición a los sentidos y a la llamada estética humana? De 
seguro que si se encierra a un recién nacido en una jaula, con una mona y una 
mujer, al cabo preferirá a la mona. O en un plano menos brusco, de explicable 
transición: los mongoles o los negros no despreciarían a un tipo de belleza 
amarilla o negra por acoger a uno de raza blanca y que los civilizados consideran 
el prototipo de la perfección. (104-105) 
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 This critique of the “prototype of perfection” posits racial identities to be contextual, 
produced in relation to each other, rather than firmly situated on a fixed grid. Notably, 
human exceptionalism is linked to racial science as interlocking, parallel conceits that 
operate to impose aesthetics of primacy and conceal their constructedness under the guise 
of naturalizing rhetoric. 
So the novel vacillates between demanding the assimilation of difference and 
contesting the construct of a homogenous ideal. The designation of which bodies qualify 
as “monstrous” constantly shifts: from Jongo to the black Congo monkey, and finally, 
settles upon Emilia herself. The very same force with which she villainied the primates’ 
lechery ultimately folds back. Because of her corporeal proximity to dark nonhuman 
organicity, she becomes like them, and by the novel’s conclusion, is rejected by society, 
and gains a second life as legend. 
 
Haunting 
The interspecies romance is ontologically transformative, hybridizing both Emilia 
and her gorilla captor. Jongo becomes more “human” and Emilia less so. She forgets how 
to speak or smile, describing her face as only capable of twisting into a primitive 
grimace. Mirroring the trajectory of her great-grandfather, Emilia’s loss of cultural and 
sexual purity manifests itself physically and psychically.53 Because of her betrayal—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The specter of colonial miscegenation resurfaces in Emilia’s accounting for the legacy of her British 
great-grandfather’s coexistence and amorous entanglement with the indigenous Caribs that he encountered 
on the Nicaraguan coast. Integrated into this “primitive” culture, the sexual and social contact with a 
different race psychically and physically altered the great-grandfather. His couldn’t return to the ship, 
mirroring Emilia’s inability to return to civilization after she was transformed by nature. Robleto vacillates 
ambivalently about these encounters. The novel explicitly relates how colonial interlopers killed off the 
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being a sexually active woman, mating with an animal, becoming-nature—she is unable 
to reenter civilization. She too becomes “other”: a nature/culture hybrid that must be 
excluded from the polis’ policed border. Emilia is not just transformed into an animalized 
human, a “mujer mono,” but into phantasm and legend; condemned by the “virtud de la 
selva que le transmitió el secreto, [… al] pecado horrible de no morir” (164). As the 
narrator of the frame story attests, according to the boyhood tale he was told by his 
“criollas criadas,” the mujer mono periodically materializes on the village riverbanks. 
This specter of the Agambian “wolf-(wo)man” persists, always threatening to reemerge, 
haunting the collective unconscious as a reminder/remainder of the jungle’s repressed 
secrets.54 
The temporal deferral of the specter’s reappearance indexes the phantasm’s 
anachronism: it transcends its origin in the past by persisting in the present, and the 
possibility that it will resurface in the future transcends its present articulation. In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
natives as if they were animals, but then follows this with a story about interspecies love that is careful to 
articulate how monkeys are not inferior to humans. 
54 The romance transforms Emilia into an Agambian “wolf-(wo)man,” a human-animal hybrid banned from 
the polis, but circulating its limits: an aberration that haunts the collective unconscious. The threshold of 
indistinction that Emilia embodies is a space in which Robleto stages anxiety about the irrevocable 
consequences of the loss of purity. However, any hint that such deviant couplings should be rejected is 
undercut by narrative pathos persuading the reader to sympathize with this unusual coupling. Una mujer 
ultimately formulates a potent critique of the impossible, unadulterated kinship promoted by Hollywood as 
well as the authoritarian Nicaraguan state. Robleto allegorically extends this metamorphic loss of 
ontological “purity” to the ecological and racial: condemning the deforestation resulting from human 
penetration of the tropics and ambivalently accounting for colonial miscegenation. Emilia is in a way an 
originary figure of the mestiza mother. Mary Louis Pratt explains that the indigenous mother was a 
ubiquitous figure in early twentieth century literatures, mythified through endless repetitions as 
“simultaneously victim and traitor, as the mother of the American mestizo peoples” (59). A variation on 
this indigenous mother who “stood for the all the indigenous peoples conquered (feminized) and co-opted 
(seduced) by the Spanish” (Pratt 59), Emilia is configured as the originary mestiza, who is in turn 
conquered and seduced by the allure of the dark ‘other.’ Her sexual and psychological devotion to nature 
makes her both victim and traitor, the originary female subject who is unjustly expelled from the polis for 
recognizing the true ‘humanity’ of the black and indigenous cultures that have been pushed to the margins 
of Nicaraguan society. Yet it is also crucial to note that Robleto’s project aims to rescue Emilia, the 
mestiza/ladina as part of the polis, not necessarily Jongo, who must die, or the indigenous bodies with 
whom he is insistently compared. 
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way, neither imaginary nor real, the phantasm haunts the present and future as a 
persistent and disturbing reminder of the past, an intrusive remnant that endangers the 
stability of the present and the viability of the future. Deleuze remarks that phantasms 
“inspire in us an unbearable waiting—the waiting of that which is going to come about as 
a result, and also of that which is already in the process of coming about and never stops 
coming about” (11).55 While Una mujer purports to be about a found manuscript that 
documents past events, it is a past that continues to “come about,” to bubble up at the 
liminal sites of human civilization. This resonates with the origin of the word 
“phantasm,” derived from the Greek phantazein, which means “to make visible” 
(Gordon).  
As phantasm, the mujer mono makes visible the possibility that nature is not just a 
resource to be monetized or forgotten, but a transformative space of fantastic possibility 
and veiled secrets.56 The phantasm incarnates the loss of the jungle’s supposed timeless 
purity in the wake of industrialization, forcing the reader to question whether “esto que 
queda ahora es selva?” (15). By lamenting deforestation, Una mujer is not just part of the 
jungle adventure genre, but pertains to a nascent environmentalist tradition57 that looks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Deleuze explains, “What appears in the phantasm is the movement by which the ego opens itself to the 
surface and liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal, and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned. It 
literally releases them like spores and bursts as it gets unburdened” (213). Emilia’s metamorphosis from 
woman to phantasm is one from coherent, material individual to pure energy surrounding the collision of 
nature and culture. 
56 She embodies the fatal attraction ascribed to the tropics; “Todos conocen la atracción, la serie de peligros 
de la selva” (15). 
57 Lawrence Buell writes that the sympathetic view of nature of “environmentalism” emerged in the US in 
the nineteenth century. Environmentalism, Buell explains, is made up of several key characteristics: the 
view that humans should be held ethically accountable to nature, that human history intersects with natural 
history, and that the environment is not static, but in process. For Buell, these factors emerged in response 
to the rise of industrialization, which prompted the realization that the environment was more fragile and 
susceptible to human intervention that previously thought. 
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back nostalgically—in this case, a century prior, when Emilia wrote her manuscript and 
lived in harmony with the land—to a time when the environment was not tainted by 
human development in the name of “progress.” The entire novel, then, challenges the 
commonplace that nature must be put to work, tamed for modernity. Whereas 
contemporaneous literary works generally narrate the failed return to nature, Una mujer 
is a crucial counterexample that writes against this trend. As Scott DeVries notes, “the 
representation of a literal love for nature in the human/gorilla couple comprises […] 
aspects of feminist ecocriticism inasmuch as human identity is reconfigured as relational 
rather than isolated, unaffected by, and not accountable to the nonhuman world” (149).  
This longing for a lost sense of ecological purity coincides with Robleto’s 
romanticized view that humans should not imagine themselves to be separate from, but 
embedded in an environment that resists human fashioning: “Los hombres somos unos 
infusorios entre la espantosa selva que nos absorbe” (10). Forgoing the simile in favor of 
the metaphor’s one-to-one equivalence, humans are equated with infusorian, minute 
aquatic creatures or microorganisms that exist in ponds. The tiny size of infusoria, small 
white specks adrift, provides a sense of scale for how the tropics dwarf humanity. The 
reference to the wilderness’ frightening vastness juxtaposed with human minuteness is 
recurrent to the jungle genre, like La vorágine’s depiction of man swept up in ecological 
chaos. Yet unlike the generic convention to dichotomize culture and nature, in Una 
mujer, these two elements operate in tandem. The jungle augments Emilia’s manuscript: 
culture is inspired by nature; nature acts upon culture not to destroy it, but to enliven it: 
“La humedad imprime más vida en los rasgos [del manuscrito] y casi los impermeabiliza, 
los torna indelebles” (12). The text is literally a site of environmental inscription, its 
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material traces embedded within the story’s surface. 
Emilia’s 1862 manuscript is not just a fossil—a record or proof that captures an 
instance of the past—but is ongoing, reenacted both through the narrator’s re-writing and 
through oral legend. It is helpful here to bring Homi Bhabha’s notion of time-lag to bear. 
Indebted to Roland Barthes and Walter Benjamin’s writing about photography and 
theater, Bhabha argues that in the postcolonial space, the colonial past returns to haunt 
and “hybridize” the present, its traces continually resurfacing “to slow down the linear, 
progressive time of modernity to reveal its ‘gesture’, its tempi.” Bhabha continues,  
This slowing down, or lagging, impels the ‘past,’ projects it, gives its ‘dead’ 
symbols the circulatory life of the ‘sign’ of the present, of passage, the quickening 
of the quotidian. Where these temporalities touch contingently, their spatial 
boundaries metonymically overlapping, at that moment their margins are lagged, 
sutured, by the indeterminate articulation of the ‘disjunctive’ present. Time-lag 
keeps alive the making of the past. (254, emphasis in original) 
 The mujer mono is not a “dead” symbol of the past, but maintains cultural 
circulation through enunciation. The temporal asynchonicity of the Emilia’s tale is 
interpreted by the frame narrator as a critique of modernity and its insistence that 
progress be founded upon expulsions of nature, the feminine, racial difference, and non-
normative love. A caesura in the present, the specter of the mujer mono articulates an 
alternative temporality in which the excluded subject does not quietly disappear but is an 
absent presence that disrupts the logic of the present. This continued presence of her 
absence interrogates Nicaragua’s present: its focus on progress at the expense of the 
environment, and its narrative of homogeneity that glosses over difference. 
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The Fantastic, Not the Real 
By mode of conclusion, I find it helpful to discuss the place of genre in these 
efforts to reimagine the social fabric. Central American fiction that was published during 
the 1920s and 30s has gone largely overlooked by scholars of the Latin American avant-
garde as well as by Central Americanists, with the oft-cited reason being its lack of 
cohesion. Instead, scholars have argued that the region’s privileged genres of the period 
are poetry and social realism. The minor genre that Arévalo Martínez and Robleto’s 
novels inhabit, the fantastic—exploding outward toward the utopian, science fiction, and 
the absurd—does not smoothly fit into broader regional trends.58 The fantastic is not 
mentioned in Adrian Kane’s analysis of Central American avant-garde as a genre that 
operates within the vanguardist mode,59 nor has it been discussed by other scholars in 
their analysis of the fiction produced during these crucial decades of social upheaval and 
aesthetic innovation. 
In contrast with the didacticism that characterized the social realism that 
dominated the isthmus’ literature in prose during the 1930s, both El mundo de los 
Maharachías and Una mujer de la selva forgo the unambiguous mode of realistic 
representation in favor of narratives that are far from absolutist. Whereas most of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 In Mexico, the only novel that might be considered similar would be Eduardo Urzaiz Rodríguez’s 
fantastic, futuristic utopian eugenicist novel, Eugenia (1919).  
59 Echoing Vicky Unruh’s analysis of the Latin American vanguardia, Adrian Kane posits that in Central 
America, the avant-garde put forth “a critique of the model of modernity that was based on the positivist 
notion of progress, while simultaneously manifesting a desire for a new form of modernity in which artistic 
expression plays a central role in the transformation of society through a renovation of the human spirit.” 
Both of these characteristics—antipositivism and the spiritual importance of creation—are salient in Rafael 
Arévalo Martínez and Hernán Robleto’s work. 
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social protest novels of the decade were, as Ana Patricia Rodríguez puts it, “site-specific, 
historically situated, and referent-bound” (45), these two novels loosen their grip on the 
imperative of verisimilitude, detaching themselves entirely from history and nationalism 
in order to play with one particular fantasy: the impossibility of love across species. 
However, this doesn’t mean that they totally disregard the contemporaneous mandate to 
practice social critique. Both novels enact criticisms commonplace to the banana novel 
genre, challenging US encroachment and the exploitation of natural resources and labor. 
Nonetheless, these works don’t just focus on the problematic promises of progress and 
modernization. Instead they go beyond the baldly political to the micropolitical by 
thinking about how power is manifest not just on the scale of nation or class, but 
ontologically, by grappling with bodily difference across species and race.60 
El mundo and Una mujer can be situated within the tradition of science fiction, if 
we think of “SF” in the broad sense as narratives concerned with the fiction of science. 
Both works probe the entrenched narrative that humans are the culmination of evolution, 
and question the status of the primate as an “almost human” figure that links humans to 
their originary true nature. Imagining alternate worlds in which primates are not inferior, 
but superior, to humans, these speculative novels invent possible worlds as an experiment 
that allows the reader to question the present. Teresa de Lauretis concisely sums up 
science fiction’s ability to deconstruct the present. SF, she explains in The Technological 
Imagination, is “potentially creative of new forms of social imagination, creative in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Both novels go back in time—Arévalo to thousands of years ago and Robleto to the colonial period. How 
does turning back the evolutionary clock permit a way of thinking ‘forward’ about the futurity of racial and 
species mixing? The contemporaneous genre in Mexico of “literatura colonialista” enacts a similar 
operation of looking back in order to imagine forward, but minus the explicit fantastical elements present in 
the two novels analyzed here.  
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sense of mapping out areas where cultural change could take place, of envisioning a 
different order of relationships between people and between people and things, a different 
conceptualization of social existence, inclusive of physical and material existence” (161). 
Imagining a society where primates are more advanced than man, as in El mundo, or a 
scenario where a woman falls in love with an ape, as in Una mujer, both borrow from the 
real: in the former, the concept of evolution, and in the latter, the cliché of finding one’s 
soul mate. However, they also blur what is possible or “natural” to the real with what is 
unreal and impossible: a world in which evolution unfolded differently, or one in which 
erotic love with a monkey is not only possible but a romantic model.61 Compared with 
the social realist genre that predominated Central American literature at the time, both 
novels stress improbability. 
In the Post-Scriptum of El mundo de los maharachías, Arévalo Martínez writes 
that he didn’t invent the novel’s conceit, but rather that it was recounted to him by a Latin 
American diplomat who copied the book (as well as its sequel, Viaje a Ipanda) from texts 
that he read in the astral plane. In theosophy, the astral plane is the nonphysical, 
paranormal realm that can be accessed only by separating one’s consciousness from the 
physical body.62 Access to this alternate realm is only available to the spiritually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 As Donna Haraway explains in Primate Visions, the monkey has long occupied a privileged position in 
the Western imagination. Unlike other creatures that populate fantastical fictions, the ape isn’t dreamed up 
but firmly planted in “fact” (4-5), and as such, occupies the boundary where nature and culture meet. 
62 The fact that theosophy is a central structuring element of El mundo is not a rarity for the time; Latin 
American intellectuals as prominent as Gabriela Mistral and José Vasconcelos continued to practice it as 
late as the 1930s. Theosophical beliefs influenced Central American politics (embraced by such 
oppositional figures as Augusto César Sandino and Jorge Ubico) as well as novels like Carlos Wyld 
Ospina’s 1936 La gringa (Finzer 27). In Central America, theosophy’s drive for universal harmony and 
rejection of dogma in favor of multi-modal spirituality (integrating science, philosophy, and mythology 
with religion) inflected regional projects that pushed for racial equality, Central American unionism, and 
anti-imperial egalitarianism (Casaús Arzú 76). However, Arévalo Martínez’s ascription of embarrassment 
to the diplomat’s overt espousal of theosophical beliefs point to its declining popularity bythe late 30s. 
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advanced. Yet in spite of realizing this remarkable transcendence, the diplomat begs the 
author not to reveal his identity. “Perdería, sin duda, el puesto diplomático que tengo, y la 
estimación social. Debo esconder mis investigaciones espiritualistas con más empeño que 
un hábito vergonzoso, como el del alcoholismo o el homosexualismo” (119). Playing 
with authorial revelation and concealment in a fashion similar to Arévalo Martínez’s 
description of homosexual desire only to later repudiate it, the diplomat asserts the 
veracity of the astral plane but also the need to conceal belief in the supernatural. This 
conceit aligns the reader with the authorial persona in a state of simultaneous belief and 
disbelief. We are left to determine for ourselves whether the fantastic is solely confined 
to the fictional text, or whether it exists in the “real,” outside of signification. 
This metafictional trick of “discovering” an already existing manuscript and then 
copying or reproducing it is often designed to lend greater credibility to a text 
(Cervantes’s claim that Don Quijote was translated from a found volume in Arabic is a 
foundational example). The metafictional discovery of El mundo in the astral plane by a 
diplomat who relates the story to the author functions to distance the author from the 
paranormal, while also providing a veneer of veracity to the text’s spiritual content. In 
this sense, El mundo engages with a central tenant of fantastic literature, as articulated by 
Andrew Bush, the “breakdown of distinctions between real and unreal” (88).  
Robleto’s Una mujer en la selva is also described as a found text. This assertion 
of the manuscript’s existence as a “real” object that exists outside the frame of the 
narrative, functions to bridge the generic abyss that separated these two novels from 
dominant genre of the era: social realism. Both novels are interested in subverting the 
perceived objectivity of science (particularly the racial science of eugenics), and as Roger 
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Caillois has pointed out, “The fantastic is always a break in the acknowledged order, an 
irruption of the inadmissible within the changeless everyday legality.” That is, as a genre, 
the fantastic defies the laws that we assume structure the world; it provides a counter 
narrative to projects of modernity, industrialization, and scientific progress.  
The critique often leveled against the fantastic is that it has nothing to say to 
sociopolitical realities. In 1955, Mexican critic José Luis González, scorned the genre: 
“No se trata, pues, de una manera ‘distinta’ y ‘superior’ de expresar la realidad; se trata 
lisa y llanamente de no expresar la realidad. La ‘literatura fantástica’ de nuestros días es 
la literatura de avestruz […] El universalismo de estos escritores tiene un punto de partida 
bien conocido: olvidarse de que México existe” (qtd. in Duncan 17). Such rejections of 
the fantastic were rooted in the belief that literature has an obligation to reflect reality and 
confront immediate social problems. As Cynthia Duncan has noted, “because the 
fantastic was originally cultivated for bourgeois, urban readers,” it is genre plagued by 
the perception that it is escapist and elitist (1). Dismissed as an “intellectual game” 
(Duncan 2), although the fantastic flourished in regions like the Southern Cone, in 
Central America it remained a minor genre, particularly during the 1930s when Arévalo 
Martínez and Robleto penned these works. As a reaction against modernismo, in its wake 
aesthetic projects that were not explicitly dedicated to social critique were seen as less 
pressing and have subsequently been forgotten. Yet the use of the irrational and the 
improbable in these texts, I argue, led readers to think about ontology in ways that 
cultivated ambiguity. Their destabilizing, fantastical elements broke down the 
normalizing effects of didactic works that led the reading public to think in reductive 
dichotomies that set good against bad. While El mundo and Una mujer have received 
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little critical attention because of their opaque strangeness, their use of uncertainty brings 
into question the supposedly stable distinction between natural and unnatural, human and 
animal.63  
In conclusion, through the improbable trope of interspecies desire, Arévalo 
Martínez and Robleto open up space for non-normative sexual possibility. Although both 
hasten to conclude by reaffirming heterosexual human love, their queering of desire 
unleashes unexpected lines of flight. The narrative of human-primate lust in these minor, 
fantastic works destabilizes the fiction of the human body’s integrity, and challenges 
normative structures of racial containment and heterosexual alignment. The role of the 
animal in these texts is pivotal: it functions as a “safe” narrative space from which to 
allegorize desire for the other, that is, for taboo interracial or homoerotic couplings. The 
ambiguity of the animal body as both relatively asexual (and thus impossible to really 
imagine erotically entangled with a human) but also a site that has been sexualized by 
humans for centuries through forbidden practices of bestiality, makes it propitious 
narrative space for visualizing complex intersectional couplings, while not necessarily 
advocating for anything specific. These fantastical narratives of bestiality as love thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 While these two novels are about the fantasy of human-primate partnership, and by and large try to 
differentiate themselves as more about love than sex, the shame and abjection of the taboo erotics of these 
relationships still bubbles up. Because the representations of the animals in these books can be taken either 
literally or figuratively, the erotics of these love stories both unearths the taboo specter of bestiality, while 
also avoiding its complications (by, for instance, giving the monkey protagonists the ability to indicate 
consent through speech or actions). Ultimately, I agree with Boggs’ observation that animal love is “a site 
where raced sexuality gets negotiated” (32). Because of sexuality’s relational nature, the animal is often 
figured as “a metaphor of choice for other social and political relations” (Marting 27). As an imagined third 
option that exists beyond the binaries of gender and race, the animal allows writers to think about coupling 
outside of heteronormativity or racial science. Yet as Boggs notes, it is equally important to be wary of 
celebratory posthumanist proclamations that animal love is emancipating. Instead, it is crucial to think 
about how boundary crossing in these novels in some ways subverts gendered or racial bias, but in other 
ways, perpetuates them. 
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play with its taboo nature while simultaneously stripping it of its troubling erotics. 
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CHAPTER 2: Pets and the Patriarchy: Feminist Revisions of Domestication in Mexico 
 
 
“What I am interpreting and criticizing is precisely the fact that the philosophical subject, 
historically masculine, has reduced every other to a relation within himself – his nature, his universe, his 
complement, his projection, his inverse, his instrument [...] within his own world, his own horizon.”  
- Luce Irigaray, Democracy Begins Between Two 
 
 
As we saw in the first chapter, improbable interspecies love stories operated as a 
surprisingly productive narrative vehicle during the 1930s to think through which unions 
ought to be deemed socially acceptable, and which not. These inconceivable romances 
between humans and monkeys, with their taboo implications of bestiality and sodomy, 
worked through anxieties around interracial and non-heteronormative relationships. The 
sympathetic portrayal of the desired primate partner, as a metaphor for a racialized other, 
normalized and naturalized national projects of mestizaje and racial integration. The 
dilemma faced by these novels’ ladino protagonists, their romantic passion for an 
Other—a nonhuman animal, or a racialized (indigenous or black) subject—forced the 
reader to grapple alongside the protagonists with presumably stable taxonomical 
hierarchies, to question their inherent ontological superiority (as in Arévalo Martínez’s El 
mundo de los Maharachías) or interrogate society’s rejection of nonstandard desires (as 
in Robleto’s Una mujer en la selva).  
In this chapter, I continue to look at narratives about love for animals. I turn my 
focus from race to gender, and from erotics to kinship, in order to examine how the figure 
of the pet has been inscribed in late nineteenth and mid twentieth-century Mexican 
literature. Specifically, I’m interested in the way that male writers have framed 
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relationships between women and their pets as problematic. Problematic because the 
corporeal, affective intimacy between women and domestic animals is perceived as a 
threat to the privileged place of the man in the household, redirecting female attention 
from domestic duties of childrearing and domesticity to the seemingly frivolous, 
nonproductive bonding with animals. Conversely, I then look at how women writers in 
Mexico, particularly Julieta Campos, play with these masculinist fears and anxieties in 
order to reinscribe the relationship with pets as a feminist site of patriarchal subversion. 
Campos’ feminist narratives of intimacy between women and their domestic animals 
echo Luce Irigaray’s epigraph; they critique the masculinist assumption that women and 
nature are always reducible to their relationship with men, to whom they are subordinate. 
Instead, in Campos’ texts, women and their pets are figured as opaque sites that resist 
patriarchal capture. 
 
Why so sentimental? Pets and the patriarchy 
Whereas the fantastic novels explored in Chapter One capitalized upon the 
titillating shock of interspecies romance in the jungle in order to delight and scandalize 
their readers, other texts from the turn of the twentieth century extended this interest in 
the erotic undertones of human relationships with animals to the domestic sphere. Of 
particular interest for male writers was the love that women felt for their pets, which 
seemed to them to be an attachment that was ridiculous, bourgeois, and excessively 
sentimental. The unduly intimate bonds between women and their pets became a frequent 
topic for modernista writers, as a subject to be poked fun at, as well as to be mulled over 
as a legitimate cause for concern.  
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Although the majority of my larger dissertation project is focused on narratives of 
the twentieth century, I find it useful here to bring in texts from the late nineteenth 
century that established many of the dominant cultural patterns for conceptualizing the 
link between gender and nonhuman animals. Because modernismo viewed language as “a 
tool of politics and power” that could reformulate national cultures and identities (Jrade 
4), we find writers who were actively reflecting on topics as seemingly trivial as the 
relationship between women and their pets. Grappling with how Mexico might best enter 
modernity, and what the domestic sphere ought to look like in that modern society, led 
many modernistas to reflect on how women were spending their time at home, as well as 
what political causes were appropriate (or not) for women to take up. Examining these 
foundational discourses allows me to illuminate the tropes that feminist writers of the 
1960s later wrote against. 
Mexican modernista Amado Nervo’s humorous short story “Sombras chinescas” 
exemplifies the era’s fascination with the relationship between bourgeois women and 
their pets, and mocks male anxieties about their exclusion from that intimacy. While 
Nervo is most studied for his mystical poetry, he was also a prolific cronista and short 
story writer with a massive popular readership. Written under the pseudonym Román64 
and published in El Mundo. Semanario Ilustrado in April 1895, “Sombras chinescas” 
recounts a story told to the author by Esteban. Over a steamy cup of Uruapan coffee 
boosted with a spoonful of cognac, Esteban describes his past obsession with a young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Nervo began using the pseudonym “Román” in 1892 for the crónicas he published in El Correo de la 
Tarde (304). He used many other pseudonyms throughout his career, including El Conde Juan, Rip-Rip, 
Tricio, Triplex, and Joie. This was a common strategy of the era. Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera used nearly 
thirty pseudonyms throughout his career. As Aníbal González explains, the pseudonym became a popular 
journalistic device at the end of the nineteenth century “to protect journalists from being accused of libel” 
and to “diffuse the question of the journalist’s authority” (164). 
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woman, Mignon. Every evening, for hours he would spy on his beloved from across the 
street, smoking cigars and shifting positions so as not to grow stiff. From his vantage 
point, he could only make out the muddled movements of her silhouette, since gauzy 
window curtains obscured his view. (Thus the title’s reference to Chinese shadow 
puppetry, in which cutout figures are dramatized between a source of light and a 
translucent screen.) Esteban justifies his “eternas guardias” of his beloved—his furtive 
watch over her, the literal embodiment of the male gaze, which would today be deemed 
stalking—as motivated by his desire to “know her” and appreciatively observe her 
undulating silhouette (212).  
One night, as Esteban watched Mignon, he realized that her shadow “¡no estaba 
sola!” (213). As he peered closer, struggling to interpret the indistinct shadows moving 
behind the curtains, he grew convinced that she was accompanied by a second figure: “la 
[sombra] de una cabeza, al parecer, netamenta masculina, y se proyectaba cerca de la 
primera” (213). With horror, Esteban observed as his beloved pulled the male figure 
closer to kiss him on the lips. Incensed by this licentiousness, he burst into Mignon’s 
house to confront the lovers. Much to his surprise, he discovered that she was not kissing 
another man, but “un lanudo faldillero,” a lapdog or poodle (214). Having realized his 
mistake, Esteban sputtered out a reproach at his bewildered beloved, before fleeing the 
scene: “¡sucia!” (214). 
With this unexpected concluding twist—in which Esteban’s self-righteous battle 
against disloyalty is in reality a deluded crusade against a lapdog—Nervo pokes fun at 
the absurd lengths of masculinist jealousy. The male flâneur is left stammering in 
indignation, revealed to be an insecure suitor and incompetent spy. Esteban’s effort to 
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preserve a veneer of dignity in this mortifying moment, by calling Mignon “sucia” for 
kissing her poodle on the mouth, backfires as the reader laughs at his foolhardy rashness. 
This moment of inversion, in which the readers are no longer aligned with the 
protagonist, but scoff at him, can be attributed to Nervo’s wry humor, but also to his 
recognition that women constituted a large part of his readership. He often directly 
invoked the “lectoras mías” in his prose, like in “El coscorrón” (20). Since Nervo 
frequently wrote for an implicit female reader, we might imagine that “Sombras 
chinescas” intended to elicit a laugh of amused recognition in a reader deeply familiar 
with widespread unwarranted fears about female infidelity. 
Nonetheless, when Mignon’s paramour is revealed to be a lapdog, Esteban does 
not react with embarrassment but with resentment, sneering that Mignon is “sucia” even 
so. His concluding retort of her foulness typifies male efforts to police female sexuality: 
to regulate who and what are appropriate objects of female affection. The relationship 
between the bourgeois woman and her lapdog is codified as unbecomingly intimate, cursi 
(in bad taste), and even precariously verging on erotic perversity. It is important to note 
that rather than treat this outcome with a tone of self-importance (which as Aníbal 
González has observed, was more characteristic of contemporaries like Rubén Darío or 
Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera (61)), Nervo satirizes Esteban’s reaction by mocking male 
anxieties about female sexuality as culminating in the absurd, such that women are not 
even allowed to kiss their dogs.  
Yet while Nervo treats the short story’s climax satirically, the concluding 
“dirtiness” of the spied-upon woman resonates as much as does the ridiculousness of the 
overly jealous suitor. In this sense, “Sombras chinescas” is tinged with the misogynistic 
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undertone that characterizes much of Nervo’s early prose. His short stories frequently 
thematize female infidelity and unreliability, illustrating the difficulty that men face when 
trying to reign in female frivolity. This negotiation of female sexuality and practice is 
often enacted through aggression in stories such as “La bofetada” in which misogynistic 
violence is able to “cure” female indiscretion. The concluding slur that Mignon is “sucia” 
for her inappropriate proximity with the pet thus works in two directions: humor at the 
expense of the bumbling male lover, but also at the expense of the excessive, feminine 
bourgeois love for the pet.  
As Nervo’s story suggests, the bond between women and their pets was perceived 
as an obstruction to healthy heteronormative relationships. Following this line of thought, 
affection for pets had no reproductive or productive purpose, but distracted from the more 
suitable love directed toward men and children.65 
Moreover, women’s love for animals at the turn of the century was perceived as 
problematic in a different sense, as a misguided object of sociopolitical concern. Women 
led the charge in bringing the question of animal welfare to public attention in Mexico, as 
in other countries. This rising awareness of the mistreatment of animals, particularly on 
the part of women, made its mark in literature. José Martí’s novel, Lucía Jérez or Amistad 
funesta (1885), for example, details the opposition of “alma sencilla” Ana to Juan’s habit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 We see this dynamic in twentieth-century texts as well. Juan García Ponce’s short story “El gato” (1972) 
similarly dramatizes an eroticized love triangle between the male narrator, a cat, and his female lover. The 
cat mediates the couple’s sexual dynamic. Ultimately the cat takes on such a central role in the couple’s 
erotics that it becomes indispensable in order for the woman to derive pleasure. In the concluding line of 
the story, the female lover is so distracted by the cat’s absence that she is no longer capable of listening or 
attending to her male partner. Instead, “su cuerpo solo esperaba la pequeña presencia gris, tenso y abierto.” 
Although Ponce himself later explained that the cat is symbolic of how external elements get embroiled and 
enmeshed in a couple’s romance (Chacón 184), the choice of the domesticated animal to personify the 
erotic interruption and the emphasis on the woman’s need for the cat to be present, underscore the 
masculinist fantasy of corporeal intimacy between woman and pet that tends toward perversity and 
heteronormative disruption.  
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of hunting rabbits. Ana makes the case to spare the rabbits from this cruel fate by arguing 
(in a way that anticipates Freud) that humans are just animals that disguise their animality 
in the trappings of civilization.66 Although the text often privileges Ana’s perspective as 
able to “look beyond face value and see the monster that lies beneath the mask of 
civilization and modernity” (Lapolla Swier 100), her opposition to the practice of hunting 
is framed as melodramatic and ultimately ill-conceived. Following her wishes, Juan traps 
the rabbits instead of killing them so that the women can keep them as pets. However, 
this transition to a newly “enslaved” state proves fatal. “El rey cautivo […] mordió la 
cadenilla que lo sujetaba, y con ella en los dientes quedó muerto.” The message is clear: 
female sentimentality not only strips hunting of its fun, but also yields similar ends: 
killing the animal through its domesticated objectification.  
Mexican intellectuals of the era also worried that the campaign for animal welfare 
reform diverted attention from more pressing (human) ethical concerns. Manuel 
Gutiérrez Nájera’s canonical crónica, “La hija del aire,” exemplifies the letrado’s 
impatience with the bourgeois interest in animal rights. First published in El Nacional in 
April 1882, “La hija del aire” critiques the squalid conditions borne by a young female 
acrobat that Gutiérrez Nájera saw perform in Mexico City’s Circo Orrin. The crónica 
makes a strong statement against exploitative labor practices, particularly those endured 
by children, that prevailed in Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century. While this 
crónica has received ample attention from scholars, including Aníbal González’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ana’s paintings also explore the distinction between beast and beastliness (the latter, as in Martí’s 
Nuestra América, is attributed to the United States). Deconstructing the line between human and animal, 
she observes, “Una se vista de pieles, devora animales, y anda sobre garras; otra se viste de trajes elegantes, 
come animales y almas y anda sobre una sombrilla o un bastón” (92). 
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compelling interpretation of the essay’s suggestion of the author’s complicity with 
societal ills, one detail of Gutiérrez Nájera’s rebuke has been overlooked. Key to the 
author’s argument in favor of social protections for the most vulnerable is a critique of 
the rise in popular sentiment in favor of animal rights. Gutiérrez Nájera writes: 
Oigo decir con insistencia que es preciso ya organizar una sociedad protectora de 
los animales. ¿Quién protegerá a los hombres? Yo admiro esa piedad suprema, 
que se extiende hasta el mulo que va agobiado por el peso de su carga, y el ave 
cuyo vuelo corta el plomo de los cazadores. Esa gran redención que libra a todos 
los esclavos y emprende una cruzada contra la barbarie es digna de aprobación y 
de encarecimiento. Mas, ¿quién libertará a esos pobres seres que los padres 
corrompen y prostituyen, a esos niños mártires cuya existencia es un larguísimo 
suplicio, a esos desventurados que recorren los tres grandes infiernos de la vida—
la Enfermedad, el Hambre y el Vicio?” (100). 
In this passage, Gutiérrez Nájera acknowledges the potential value of animal rights 
movements, nodding toward the common problematic of exploitation that interlocks 
issues of animal abuse, slavery, and poverty. He is careful to situate the argument around 
animal rights in terms of its affective power, as a liberal project that is rooted in “piedad”: 
compassion, mercy, and pity. This sentimental concern for animals, Gutiérrez Nájera 
argues, could and should be extended to the plight of impoverished children. 
 My aim here is not to reject Gutiérrez Nájera’s critique—which I believe 
legitimately criticizes how animal rights movements have been carried out by white 
bourgeois culture at the expense of the subaltern—, but to point out how it operates along 
gendered lines. Describing the public’s reaction as they watch the girl hang in the air, 
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Gutiérrez Nájera disdainfully observes, “Ninguna mujer llora. ¡He visto llorar a tantas por 
la muerte de un canario!” (97). The female onlookers are singled out in this reprimand for 
their inability to translate empathy from one vulnerable body to another. The male 
viewing public goes unmentioned—their lack of emotive response to both forms of 
exploitation is not necessary, as the male subject is presumably guided by reason rather 
than emotion. We can safely posit Gutiérrez Nájera primarily directs his argument to the 
female reader, to convince her that her sympathy for animals is misplaced, and must be 
course-corrected by the male letrado to a more fitting target.  
 Echoing critiques of suffrage movements, proponents of animal welfare in the late 
nineteenth century were scorned by intellectuals like Gutierrez Nájera as mawkish and 
unaware of more pressing societal concerns.67 “La hija del aire” scolds its female 
audience for their specious concern for animals, patronizingly redirecting their empathy 
to the more suitable human body. Through this discursive invocation of irrational 
feminine affect, women interrogating the ethicality of animal treatment were facilely 
dismissed, subsumed under the sign of excessive sentimentality, ignorant of 
“appropriate” humanist ethics. 
 Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan have theorized that one reason that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 One of the most overt reflections on why sentimental responses to animal suffering are difficult to 
contain (but must be overcome) comes from José Vasoncelos’ memoir, Ulises criollo. Describing his first 
experience hunting, Vasconcelos writes: “Los ojos de súplica del noble animalito miraron en vano; 
inspiraron ternura, pero una alegría irreprimible espiritualmente criminal, arrancaba gritos y carcajadas a 
los cazadores. Sin duda por ser la primera vez que miraba aquello sentía amarga la boca y un dolor casi 
lloroso me empañó el panorama que un momento antes era inocente y claro. Nunca he padecido el 
sentimentalismo de los animales, y creo que estorban y nos distraen de reflexiones en que ellos no cuentan, 
pero no se puede evitar el golpe de náusea que inspira nuestra naturaleza obligada a tomar de alimento 
especies repugnantes como el cerdo, amables como el cordero” (385). Vasconcelos argues that feeling for 
or empathizing with an animal’s pain distracts from more important (human) politics. Sentimentality, when 
confronted with the dying animal, is hard to suppress (but nevertheless must be, in order to preserve 
masculinity and intellectual status). 
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women emerged as early advocates for animal welfare can be located in the historical 
discursive link that bound justifications of female inferiority with their corporeal 
proximity to nature. Like nonhuman animals, women have been formulated (in contrast 
with men) as irrational, delimited by the body, and driven by instinctual emotion rather 
than logic. This discursive alignment of women with animals—particularly domesticated 
animals—in order to reinforce an ontological hierarchy that privileges the (white) human 
man continued to operate throughout the twentieth century. 
 This alignment of the animal with the feminine is even more exaggerated in 
discourses around the pet, or domesticated animal. In contrast to the domestic animal’s 
perceived subservient femininity, the animal fiero or salvaje has historically proven more 
conceptually attractive (I analyze the correlation of masculinity with the fiero at work in 
Omar Cabezas’ memoir in Chapter Three). In its “untouched” state, the wild animal 
symbolizes the purity of natural life autonomous from human culture. Thinkers from 
Rousseau and Nietzsche to Deleuze have all drawn inspiration from the idealized figure 
of the wild animal, equating wildness with moral and physical wellbeing (Weil 56). The 
domesticated animal, on the other hand, is not nearly as conceptually enticing. 
Domesticated animals, defined as those adapted to live with humans, have been theorized 
as lacking the freedom and integrity that wild animals retain. Underlying this belief is the 
assumption that domestication entails unidirectional domination. Held captive by its 
human master, the domesticated animal is forced to conform to demands that are 
contradictory to its essence, and to abandon an unaffected, “natural” way of life.  
An archetypical case of the discursive collapse of domestication with domination 
is found in Alfonso Reyes’ essay “La garza Greta Garbo” (1932). In it, Reyes recounts 
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his experience domesticating a heron that lived on his property, which he named “Greta 
Garbo.” The process of domestication began after the heron’s mate died. Without her 
male partner, the heron found a new provider in Reyes. Reyes articulates the changing 
relationship between himself and the bird in terms of power and control. Greta, he 
describes, “decidió, como las razas vencidas, someterse para subsistir […] La voluntad 
animal se abría su senda, de un modo patético, hacia el hombre” (483). In Reyes’ 
formulation, the domesticated animal is a “vanquished race” that pitiably submits 
concession to survive. Domestication is thus a form of acquiescence, or colonization, that 
substantiates human supremacy over animal life.  
Alluding to colonization as his point of reference for the domestication, Reyes 
problematically articulates colonization as the “pathetic” submission of one “raza 
vencida” to a more-human “hombre.” This semantic collapse of the tamed animal with 
the colonized produces discursive cross-pollination: racializing the domesticated animal 
and animalizing the colonized. Such a double movement exemplifies what Mel Chen 
terms the “racial politics of animality” (34), in which both domesticated animal and 
colonized human are figured as diminished versions of the ideal: denaturalized and 
dehumanized.  
This displacement of being to a lower hierarchical level functions not only 
through species and race, but also gender.68 By giving the heron the sobriquet “Greta 
Garbo,” the name of Hollywood’s famously reclusive screen actress who ambivalently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Without denying domestication’s power asymmetries or glossing over its negative corollaries, it is 
important to indicate its discursive collapse with slavery and femininity. These overlapping constructions 
rest on the notion of immutable ontological “essence” that fixes species, race, and gender as static and non-
adaptable. The fetishization of the untamed animal’s “pure” wildness parallels nostalgic appropriations of 
indigenous culture as “untainted” alterity organically proximate to nature. 
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related to fame, Reyes contracts female celebrity into pitiful captive, gendering the 
submissive (human) animal female. Reyes finds the heron and her alluded namesake to 
be creatures that cannot survive without paternalistic care; stripping both of agency. Torn 
between the vacillating instinct to love or to flee, the heron’s equivocating movements 
toward and away from the author are understood as part of the “trance exquisito” of the 
“ataque de sumisión” (484). This “exquisite” dance of submission, in which both actress 
and heron are tamed and fashioned into docile bodies by their male interlocutors, reifies 
the patriarchal worldview in which coercing control over “inferior” creatures is 
pleasurable and self-affirming. In contrast to the deadly cost of domesticating rabbits in 
Martí’s Amistad funesta, for Reyes the process of domestication is a form of seduction 
that shores up the domesticator’s masculinity and cements his mastery over nature. 
As Reyes’ text exhibits, the domesticated animal has long been discursively 
configured as homologous to the slave, colonized, or hostage,69 as a diluted, “feminized” 
degeneration of its untainted, virile fiera counterpart. Generally, domesticated animals 
are parsed into three types: working, livestock and companion. Whereas working animals 
are valued for their labor, and livestock are produced as commodities—relationships that 
can be critiqued as exploitative or viewed as utilitarian commingling (analogous to 
hunting for survival)—companion animals, or pets, are not linked to productivity or 
sustenance. Like Reyes’ tame heron whose domestication transforms a willful, wild 
creature into a garden attraction, the pet is associated with non-utilitarian superfluity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For the homology between pet and hostage see Cary Wolfe’s Animal Rites (104). Additionally, Mexican 
writer Amparo Dávila’s short story “El huesped” plays with the slippage between guest (invited stay) and 
hostage (forced stay), oscillating the housewife and unidentified animal Other between these two slippery 
categories. 
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Rather than provide monetary or comestible compensation, the pet only produces 
affective pleasure. Spending more invited, permissible time with humans than other 
animals, companion animals inhabit the intimate space of the home and even share the 
bed. The intimacy fostered across space and time between humans and pets is often 
articulated as indulgent or sentimental pampering (as we saw with Nervo’s short story), 
manifest in the idiomatic use of phrases like perrito faldero to describe one who is weak, 
spoiled and easily controlled. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have laid out the most vehement critique of the 
pet as a problematic cultural construct, positing that human relationships with pets are 
grounded in anthropocentric narcissism. They argue that pets are “sentimental, Oedipal 
animals each with its own petty history, “my” cat, “my” dog. These animals invite us to 
regress, draw us into narcissistic contemplation, and they are the only kind of animal 
psychoanalysis understands, the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little brother 
behind them” (Thousand Plateaus 240). We imagine that we know and understand the 
pet, a knowledge that is obtained by projecting human feelings and features onto the 
nonhuman face. This anthropomorphism Oedipalizes the pet, it into a child surrogate by 
“playing house” and fantasizing familial intimacy (233). 
The strength of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique is their identification of self-
centered narcissism. That is, humans are overly invested in the concept of the self: a 
singular and autonomous individual identity. This human desire for stable and coherent 
individuality is then falsely projected onto animals (Kuzniar 56). Thus we favor the pet, 
to whom we ascribe a name and an identity, above other nonhuman assemblages, like the 
de-individuated swarm of bees or herd of cattle. Cary Wolfe furthers this critique by 
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explaining that the humanization of pets operates through a logic of individual 
exceptionalism: by exempting this particular animal from suffering, we absolve our guilt 
about treating other, anonymous animals with violent disregard (104). The Real 
Academia Española explicitly incorporates the notion of sacrificial exemption in their 
definition of animal doméstico: “El que pertenece a especies acostumbradas secularmente 
a la convivencia con el hombre y no es susceptible de apropiación.” The pet is spared 
appropriation (capture, slaughter) because of its coexistence and affective proximity to 
the human realm, already belonging as property or kin to a specific household.  
A troubling moment in Deleuze and Guattari’s critique, however, is its reiteration 
of the cliché pairing of the Oedipalized animal with the bourgeois woman as the primary 
perpetrator of this interspecies house playing. Their flippant remark that the pet is “the 
little cat or dog owned by an elderly woman who honors and cherishes it” (Thousand 
Plateaus 269) echoes the gendered association of indulgent relationships with pets as a 
feminine pastime. The sad, frivolous bourgeois woman is perceived to ridiculously 
“fashion” her pets into adored accessories. Donna Haraway has famously excoriated 
Deleuze and Guattari’s remark. “I am not sure I can find in all of philosophy a clearer 
display of misogyny, fear of aging, incuriosity about animals, and horror at the 
ordinariness of flesh” (When Species Meet 30).  
For Haraway, it is the theorists’ singling out of the elderly woman that is most 
reductive. It implies that women who out-age their sexual and maternal roles hasten to fill 
this “essential” void through Oedipal relations with pets. Rather than consider what might 
come from companionship across species, Deleuze and Guattari’s rebuff fits squarely into 
a tradition that has long pigeonholed relationships between women and their pets as 
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saccharine. The archetype of the “crazy cat lady,” for instance, alludes to female isolation 
and madness. Synonymous with failed heteronormative femininity, the crazy cat lady 
substitutes children with cats. She is a lonely collector and manic accumulator, whose 
overrun house deviates from properly manicured domesticity. The crazy cat lady is 
deemed “crazy” precisely because she opts out of nurturing children or erotically 
engaging men, and instead redirects these affects onto a pack of cats. One only has to 
look at how this dynamic has played out in relationship to Elena Garro, who lived out her 
final years in social isolation, except for the close relationships with her daughter and her 
many cats.70 As Joshua Lund has pointed out, interviewers “invariably remarked on 
[Garro’s] small apartment shared with a considerable army of cats,” often in disparaging 
and judgmental tones (114). 
The notion that pets are receptacles for unfulfilled maternal instincts or a training 
ground for motherhood recurs to a discourse of essentialism (women are mothers first 
and foremost) and a pedagogy of womanhood (women are compelled to rehearse the 
maternal role), which overlooks the possibility that there might be other reasons besides 
maternal instinct that inspire interspecies relating. The reductive mapping of relationships 
between women and their pets onto the discourse of motherhood is exemplified by 
analysis of Frida Kahlo’s self-portraits. Scholarship repeatedly asserts that given Kahlo’s 
reproductive trauma, the presence of animals in her minimalist, intimate portraits proves 
that they served as her surrogate children. This placement of the relationship between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Elena Garro’s later novel, Andamos huyendo Lola, can be read along these lines of argumentation as 
well. Garro depicts herself and her cats as enduring similar forms of patriarchal oppression. Lola is a cat 
that constantly hides in the wardrobe or takes refuge under the sofa, reflectign the fear and isolation that 
Elena experienced while self-exiled in Spain in the wake of the fallout after Tlatelolco. 
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artist and animal onto a matrix of maternity discards the possibility of attachments that 
push past the human, kinship that crosses boundaries. What if, instead of reducing the 
figuration of pets in Kahlo’s portraits as fulfilling her frustrated maternal aspirations, 
Kahlo anticipates Donna Haraway’s observation that “all actors become who they are in 
the dance of relating [... rather than] precede the relating” (When Species Meet 25)? 
To review, as we have seen, affective proximity between women and their pets 
was perceived as a form of maternal mimicry that satiated women’s primordial drive to 
nurture—or conversely, as madness that verged on perverse intimacy, contrary to 
heteronormative and domestic wellbeing. Concern for animal welfare was thought of as 
an excessively sentimental issue that was irrelevant to “real politics.” Domesticated 
animals themselves were gendered feminine, aligned with women under the rubric of the 
submissive and colonized.  
Because of all of these aforementioned stereotypes, feminists have been hesitant 
to align themselves with companion animals, or to affirm their association with the 
domesticated (Adams and Donovan). Perhaps this is because to align oneself with the pet 
implied the assumption of domesticity’s negative implications: sentimentality, excess, 
isolation, madness, and submissive enclosure. Only recently have theorists including 
Donna Haraway, Alice Kuzniar, Susan McHugh, and Vienciane Despret urged a 
rethinking of how domestication might be reclaimed not as a process of unidirectional 
domination, but as collaboration and companionship. Without dismissing the structural 
asymmetry at work in domestication, these thinkers argue that the historical coexistence 
of human and animals should not be thought of as an inorganic domination of one group 
by another, but as an interaction that brings species together in unpredictable ways. The 
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view of domestication as oppression has shifted with these interventions to think instead 
about companion species as co-evolving through symbiotic cooperation and negotiation. 
 With this in mind, I will now pivot to consider at length the work of a writer who 
has been attentive to the relationship between gender and species, Julieta Campos. 
Campos, I suggest, capitalizes upon the problematic proximity between women and their 
pets that was overtly thematized by male writers such as Nervo and Ponce. In the short 
story “Celina o los gatos,” Campos adopts one such voice of masculinist concern, which 
grapples with how to understand the overly affective relationship between Celina and her 
cats. Angered by Celina’s opacity to male reason and the cats’ substitutive power, the 
patriarchal narrator unravels, himself driven mad by Celina’s “madness.” Through ludic 
play with the subject/object binary that structures the relationship in humanist thought 
between human and nonhuman, and man and woman, Campos ultimately reformulates 
depression and domesticated passivity as modes that resist patriarchal control.  
 
Depressed passivity and refused productivity in “Celina o los gatos” 
In her celebrated novel, Tiene los cabellos rojizos y se llama Sabina (1974) 
Cuban-Mexican author Julieta Campos writes of the ocean: “El mar = res nullius = cosa 
de nadie” (110). The reference is to the sea’s legal classification as res nullius. An 
abstract, common space that lies between nations and separates continents, the sea is “no 
one’s thing.” Covering more than three-fourths of the earth’s surface, the sea envelops 
the planet, and is a space that cannot sustain human life (Mentz 586). Like outer space, it 
cannot be technologically mastered, nor claimed by any single state, and as such, 
constitutes a commons (Milun 76). Through the ruminations of a woman staring at the 
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ocean from a balcony in Acapulco, Mexico at 4:00 PM—a meditation that takes the form 
of a single paragraph extending over 200 pages—Campos’s novel dramatizes that the 
ocean cannot be captured. To the contrary, it absorbs those that engage it. Observing the 
endless lapping of the sea, Campos’s protagonist Sabina is simultaneously subject and 
object. The sea is the object of her gaze, but as she watches it, she also is absorbed. 
Transformed into inert matter, Sabina’s agency is dissolved as she is captivated by the 
sea’s vibrancy.  
If according to Merriam-Webster, property is “something owned or possessed,” 
then res nullius describes a thing that is destined for ownership (res), but has not yet been 
claimed: an object without a subject. This ownerless property is susceptible to 
appropriation, free to be possessed by whoever might seize it, exemplifying for Kant the 
boundlessness of human will. The law discerns humans from things: differentiating 
knowing, reasoning subjects from their others, their objects. What does it mean, then, to 
be res nullius, a thing that belongs to no one? An expression derived from Roman law, 
res nullius—no one’s property—is a contradiction in terms. “Empty” unclaimed land is 
colonized as real estate, and wild animal life, once captured, is domesticated. However, 
the second definition of res nullius—not just “property currently unowned,” but 
“property incapable of ownership” (Fellmeth and Horwitz)—shows that this concept not 
only indexes inexhaustible human ambition, but also those entities that confound it.  
This ludic blurring of the traditional subject-object divide is characteristic of 
Julieta Campos’s oeuvre. Writing in the sixties in Mexico alongside the emergent Latin 
American Boom, Campos deviated from the Boom’s stylistic tendencies, aligning herself 
more closely with authors of the French nouveau roman such as Natalie Sarraute and 
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Claude Simon than her contemporaries Carlos Fuentes or Gabriel García Márquez. 
Campos’s novels—including Tiene los cabellos rojizos and her first novel Muerte por 
agua (1965)—offer very little plot, are deeply invested in subconscious myopicity, and 
vertiginously construct a kaleidoscopic arrangement of time. While critics have 
celebrated her ludic use of language, Campos’s commitment to textual play has 
contributed to the perception that her work is overly contrived and disengaged from 
complex social realities. The impression that Campos is primarily invested in intertextual 
and metafictional intricacies—“art for art’s sake”—has led scholars to conclude that her 
“approach to fiction is unconcerned with political issues” (Jehenson 86), which has 
resulted in her marginalization from the canon.  
Following Debra Castillo’s observation that “the educated reader, who too easily 
mistakes [Campos’s] works for superficial and merely brilliant verbal games... embodies 
… the antagonistic reader who is indeed intended to misread the complexity of such 
games as an ideologically free surface” (169), this chapter reevaluates the claim that 
Julieta Campos’s work is apolitical. Specifically, I argue that Campos’s engagement with 
the nonhuman becomes a touchstone through which she reconsiders the overlapping 
codification of women and the natural world as res nullius: currently unowned property. 
Rather than debunk the objectification of women and nature to argue that these entities 
are not “things” at all, Campos plays with the secondary definition of res nullius: 
property incapable of ownership. Against expectation, Campos figures women as 
material objects, but objects that resist possession. It is this play with the subject-object 
relationship that founds Campos’s unexpected political move: a move toward a “politics 
of refusal” that is not based on subjectivity or agency, but on passive material vibrancy, 
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from which she problematizes the foundational rhetoric of feminism in Mexico and its 
argument that women should become more active, productive citizens that seize and 
master the world around them.  
In Campos’s fiction, nonhuman intrusions are persistent topoi: the ocean in Tiene 
los cabellos rojizos, rain in Muerte por agua, and cats in Celina o los gatos (1968). This 
representation of the nonhuman has not gone unremarked by scholarship. Critics have 
proffered metaphorical or symbolic readings of her representation of animal and natural 
incursions, positing the ocean and rain that seep into Campos’s texts are evocative of the 
maternal, timelessness, death (Fallon), perpetual motion (Sánchez Rolón), or sensual 
humidity (Chambers). Without discounting the valuable insights of metaphor, this article 
expands upon existing scholarship by reading Campos’s engagement with the nonhuman 
as neither apolitical nor metaphoric. To the contrary, nonhuman natural bodies—
including the cats, sun and sea—become in Campos’s narrative exemplary of an active 
form of negation that appears at first glance to be passive, a mode of refusal Campos ties 
to domesticity and depression. 
Campos’s understudied collection of short stories, Celina o los gatos, situates 
nonhuman presence centrally within both its title and content. Interestingly, the title 
Celina o los gatos has so confounded readers with its unexpected use of the conjunction 
“or” where “and” is expected, that some critics have mistakenly referred to the book as 
Celina y los gatos when analyzing Campos’s work.71 This accidental misnaming is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See Martha Martinez, for example. It is worth noting that the titular negative conjunction was a trend in 
Mexican literature at the time. Celina o los gatos (1968) was a relative latecomer compared with Octavio 
Paz’s ¿Águila o sol? (1955) and Salvador Elizondo’s Farabeuf o la crónica de un instante (1965) and 
Narda o el verano (1966). 
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perhaps due to the reader’s unconscious desire to resettle the disruption wreaked by the 
negative conjunction. Celina or the Cats can be read as two different, yet equally 
possible, titles for the work, which when separated, highlight different protagonists: 
“Celina” or “The Cats.” The “or” in Celina or the Cats also perturbs the assumed stability 
of relation between distinct categories of being—human and nonhuman—reformulating 
this pair to both emphasize difference and question nominal categorization: human or 
nonhuman? When articulated as Celina and the Cats, humans and nonhumans are 
configured as separate but joined, sequenced in an order that prioritizes the human 
individual, followed by the nonhuman clowder. Contrary to the assertions of traditional 
metaphysics, Campos indicates that the relationship between human and nonhuman is not 
necessarily additive or sequential. Instead, Celina or the Cats constructs the human-
animal encounter as potentially exclusionary (one or the other); the second term threatens 
to swallow up its antecedent. Additionally, as Noé Jitrik suggests, Celina or the Cats 
directs attention to the human-animal divide not only as a distinction of species, but 
between named subject and undifferentiated pack: “individuo y masa, precisión y 
difuminación” (147). However, as a close reading of Celina o los gatos demonstrates, in 
Campos’s fiction, difference—between individual and throng, human and nonhuman, 
man and woman, nature and culture—is continuously disseminating. Consequently the 
intermediating “or” does not signal the threat of difference, but mobilizes ontological 
confusion. The “or” asks if there is a difference at all: is she Celina or is she the cats?  
 In the collection’s titular story, “Celina o los gatos,” Campos plays with this 
ontological confusion between domestic housewife and domesticated animal while 
imagining depression as the affective modality that characterizes Mexican bourgeois 
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domesticity. Enclosed in the domestic sphere, the protagonist Celina is stuck, physically 
and emotionally brought to stasis. Although the negative aspects of depressive 
domesticity (and its associated feelings of disappointment, disillusionment and despair) 
manifest themselves in the protagonist’s masochistic withdrawal from society, I argue 
that Campos recasts depression as a “politics of refusal” that critiques productivity. 
Rather than articulate feminist empowerment around reform and positivity, the force of 
negativity in “Celina o los gatos” is deployed to trace an alternative feminist model that is 
rooted in passivity, a refusal that unravels the logic of the self-actualized, self-activating, 
productive liberal subject. Within this framework, feeling bad is not a political dead end, 
but signals a refusal to “be woman” at a time when formulations of the self as active and 
choosing dominated the political sphere. By arriving at the threshold of motionlessness 
that depression embodies, Celina-as-subject becomes dismantled, refuses to cohere, and 
suspends purpose. 
 “Celina o los gatos” is narrated by Carlos, Celina’s husband, on the day after her 
suicide. Writing to make sense of her death and to examine his part in her self-
destruction, the text is Carlos’s account of the past thirteen years: a fragmented record of 
the dissolution of their marriage and Celina’s retreat from society. As Carlos tells it, the 
beginning of their relationship was intensely happy. A successful surgeon, he moved 
through the public sphere, mediating the outside world while Celina remained at home, 
tending to the house and influencing his practice from afar. “Intoxicated” by Celina’s 
dependence, Carlos encourages her isolation, preferring she not go out or read the 
newspaper so that her experience of the world might be filtered through him. 
Reciprocating this assimilation, Carlos too becomes increasingly like his wife: “era yo 
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quien reproducía (sin intención, por supuesto) el tono, la sonrisa, las palabras de Celina 
… un afeminamiento … Me miraba en el espejo tratando de espiar un brillo de los ojos 
semejante al brillo que tenían los ojos de Celina” (16).  
Fearing this feminization, Carlos distances himself from Celina, taking refuge in 
the singularity of his name and identity.72 Celina too pulls away, but rather than embrace 
her individual identity, erodes it further by subsuming herself into others, throwing 
parties that fill the house with guests. Then, in what Carlos perceives to be a further 
regression, Celina radically depopulates the house, invites her childhood nanny to return 
as her caretaker, and opulently refurnishes the bedroom with flowery rugs and thick green 
curtains that cloak the room in sickly green light. The bright, utilitarian apartment is 
displaced by disorder and excess, transformed into a sumptuous artificial landscape: 
bourgeois domesticity gone feral. Retreating further into isolated domestic enclosure, 
Celina stops leaving the house, inhabiting the bedroom with a cohort of purebred cats that 
permeate the room with animal odor. Shut out entirely, Carlos feels ostracized from the 
world that Celina has created without him. He also becomes intensely jealous of her 
intimacy with the cats. In retribution for her betrayal, he sends her anonymous letters that 
claim that he has been unfaithful, in an effort to incite her jealousy and catalyze her 
demise. As he expects, Carlos finds Celina dead of an overdose, surrounded by her cats. 
In the story’s conclusion, Carlos asserts his role in Celina’s suicide, because if not, “esa 
muerte de Celina sería como si ella me hubiera destruido a mí” (34). 
On the surface, Celina’s retreat into domestic enclosure and subsequent suicide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Carlos’s fear of feminization echoes Octavio Paz’s “Los hijos de la Malinche,” which helped solidify 
notions of feminine passivity and masculine action. 
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can be read as a cautionary allegory of female bourgeois decadence. The bored, 
purposeless housewife, dependent upon male mediation of the outside world, withers 
away to the point that death is preferable to a life of opulent paralysis. A similar critique 
of the Mexican woman’s adherence to conventional femininity is advanced in Rosario 
Castellanos’ canonical essay “Self Sacrifice is a Mad Virtue,” published shortly after 
Celina in 1971. As Castellanos explains: “In Mexico, when we utter the word woman, we 
refer to a creature who is dependent upon male authority… subject to alien decisions that 
dictate her personal appearance, her marital status, [her] career” (261). To counteract the 
feelings of frustration that emanate “from the precarious ways she tries to satisfy her 
needs, from being cooped up in a house—and sometimes in one room—with no other 
stimulation than the child’s demands,” the Mexican woman subscribes to the cult of self-
sacrifice, the belief that her worth is only found in the selfless and self-effacing charge of 
motherhood. For Castellanos, the fundamental injustice that the feminist movement 
combats is that only one partner is able to experience “the joy of being useful, of 
becoming a participant in the community, of being fulfilled through creativity, while the 
other carries out duties not worthy of remuneration, that barely reduce the feeling of 
superficiality and isolation... that one of them has every freedom of movement while the 
other is reduced to paralysis” (262). To rectify this, each woman should fight “to obtain 
and preserve her personality” and thus “develop more complete human beings, happier 
marriages, [and] more harmonious families” (263). Castellanos frames the Mexican 
feminist struggle in terms that align with broader Western women’s liberation 
movements: women must resist passive complacency and instead contribute to society. 
Rather than occupy predetermined archetypes, women’s activation outside of the 
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domestic realm will strengthen, and not disrupt, the traditional heteronormative 
institutions of matrimony and the familiar unit.  
The feminist project of the sixties, which sought gender equality through 
liberation from domestic and maternal constraints, thus defines feminism as activity. 
Within this discourse, a feminist actively rejects prescribed gender roles and instead 
embraces more “productive” forms of empowerment through sociocultural contribution. 
This rejection of the evasion or nihilistic tolerance of conventional femininity is further 
elaborated in Castellanos’ often-cited poem, “Meditación en el umbral.” Published in 
Poesía no eres tú in 1972, “Meditation” expands upon the precepts put forth in “Self-
Sacrifice.” Castellanos reflects on the search for “another way to be human and free,” an 
alternative mode of female existence that lies outside of the whore/saint dichotomy that 
has delimited the stories of fictional and nonfictional women for centuries.  
Castellanos’ puissant plea for “otro modo de ser,” as Pilar Melero points out, 
purposefully utilizes the verb ser instead of its counterpart estar. Whereas estar indicates 
a condition—how something is—, ser indexes an essence—what it is. Melero 
extrapolates from this verb choice that Castellanos’ pursuit of “otro modo de ser” is not 
linked to activity, but to a new ontological form of Being. However, while this 
foregrounding of “Being” over “being” moves Castellanos’ feminism away from “the 
urgency of the feminist project” that defines feminism as activity (Melero 86), the rest of 
the poem’s content foregrounds action—or rather the lack thereof—by highlighting how 
the dearth of constructive social activity obstructs the formulation of new ways of Being. 
Castellanos posits suicide, depression, and self-isolation as negative responses to the 
patriarchy that perpetuate women’s roles as victims or witnesses, roles that are passive 
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and powerless. “It’s not a solution / to throw oneself under a train like Tolstoy’s Anna / 
or gulp down Madame Bovary’s arsenic / … / before binding one’s veil back over one’s 
head / and starting to act” (111). This repudiation of melancholy as apolitical frames 
feminism in terms of public visibility (removing “one’s veil”) and engagement. Or, as 
Castellanos puts it in an essay praising Simone de Beauvoir, the liberated woman is she 
who can “move on from being a reproductive entity to a productive person” (Peña 128).73 
This discursive emphasis on productivity as the privileged mode for undoing 
restrictive notions of femininity long predates the 1960s and 70s, and can be traced back 
to the early twentieth-century work of writers like Sara Estela Ramírez and Antonieta 
Rivas Mercado (Melero 84). In 1928, Antonieta Rivas Mercado published the essay “La 
mujer mexicana” in the Madrid newspaper El Sol, encouraging Mexican women to 
exorcise their characteristic “bondad pasiva.” Lamenting the lack of educated women in 
Mexican history—an absence the author provocatively argues indicates that “la mujer 
Mexicana no existe... Sin embargo, en México hay mujeres”—, Rivas Mercado attacks 
the prevailing delimitation of Mexican women to the domestic domain. Anticipating 
Castellanos, Rivas Mercado articulates the lag in feminism as resulting from inaction: 
“Las mexicanas no actúan... su labor no fue constructiva, sino sentimental... ni siquiera se 
hicieron oír... no hay feminismo” (317). In other words, passivity—the absence of action, 
defined here as public engagement—means that women have no voice, no impact, no 
constructive labor. As Melero glosses, for Rivas Mercado, “passivity is but a cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 In order to escape the Madonna/whore binary that she critiques in “Meditation,” Castellanos crafted a 
public persona that was intentionally asexual and whose productivity was linked to intellectual rather than 
domestic labor. As Emily Hind argues, Castellanos emphasized the precepts of reason, compliance, and 
decency as central behavioral modes for a woman to be taken “seriously” as a writer. 
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sedative, a way to keep women in a numb state” (87). 
Read within this framework defining feminism as activity, “Celina or the Cats” 
analogously narrates the immobilizing effects of domestic confinement and patriarchal 
mediation of female bodies. Unlike the other short stories in the volume, “Celina” is 
narrated by a single, coherent male diegetic voice. Whereas in Campos’s other works 
(including Muerte and Tiene los cabellos rojizos) male and female voices wrestle for 
narrative control, generating fragmented, discontinuous texts, in “Celina,” Celina’s 
husband Carlos is an uncontested narrator. By narrating from Carlos’s perspective, 
Campos dramatizes how patriarchal discourse diagnoses and regulates women.74 As 
Carlos struggles to process Celina’s depression he recurs to conventional descriptions of 
uncooperative bourgeois women as frivolous, decadent and mad. Staging the expiations 
of patriarchal logos against mute, inaccessible Celina not only performs male externality 
to the woman-object, but also embroils the reader in this masculinist agenda. The reader 
can only access Celina through Carlos, whose confessional tone mobilizes the reader’s 
confidence in his retelling. However, strategic moments of transparency prompt the 
reader to be suspicious of Carlos’s account and notice the scientific and psychoanalytic 
discourse that he uses to supplement his incomprehension of her depression. Carlos’s 
drive to contain Celina’s narrative within a logical framework is taken to the extreme 
when he asserts his own culpability in her suicide. His claim of responsibility affirms his 
control over her life and death. Yet it is precisely Carlos’s lack of control, his inability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For the savvy reader accustomed to Campos’s distrust of coherent, linear narrative, it is precisely the 
cohesion of Carlos’s narration that inspires distrust. This strategic depiction of woman as externally 
discursively constructed is developed further in Tiene los cabellos rojizos, which figures the “woman with 
reddish hair” as the passive yet inscrutable object of a cacophony of competing voices. 
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“penetrate” Celina’s body as well as the world that she creates inside their bedroom—an 
intimacy with cats that is not heterosexual or (re)productive—that provokes what Carlos 
perceives to be the final unraveling of his masculine reason, the impulse to pen spurious 
letters, a recourse he disparages as “recursos de mujer, de mujer celosa” (30).  
Troubled by how his gestures have begun to mirror Celina’s and by her slipping 
recognizability as his bourgeois wife, Carlos’s account is steeped in anxiety about trans-
formation of kind (male to female, female to animal, subject to object). This 
preoccupation with categorical stability is put into crisis when Carlos’s mediation of 
Celina transposes and the mediator becomes the mediated. Fearing feminization he recurs 
to signs that index his identity: “me llamaba Carlos Manuel y tenía un apellido, y… esa 
persona que era yo estaba completamente separada de esa otra persona que era Celina” 
(13). Fearful of becoming Other (feminized or unmoored from the signposts of bourgeois 
health and success), Carlos invokes his proper name to reinforce his stable, continuous 
identity as a man of medicine. Unlike Carlos’s relieved embrace of his identity, Celina 
fears hers and progressively vacates the conventions proper to the Mexican bourgeois 
housewife. As Celina withdraws from the role of wife and assimilates into other affective 
constellations—from friends, to nanny, to clowder—the regulated relations of the 
housewife (directed toward husband and children) explode into non-normative, 
unproductive groupings. Carlos pathologizes this behavior, viewing her progressive self-
confinement as “mad,” as a depressive agoraphobia that leads to the loss of the world, “el 
verdadero mundo, el mundo de afuera” (30). 
Read under the feminist-as-activity model propounded by Castellanos, Rivas 
Mercado and others, Celina’s failure to free herself from convention—or develop the 
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“personality” advocated by Castellanos outside of it—is progressively paralyzing to the 
point that death is preferable to the stasis of bourgeois domesticity. Suicide, in this 
interpretation, is the upshot of the Mexican woman’s self-sacrifice. Scholarship 
reinforces this conclusion, suggesting that Celina’s suicide demonstrates that domestic 
confinement leads nowhere and that death is the logical consequence of feminine 
passivity (Lagos-Pope 39). However, although “Celina or the Cats” doesn’t recount the 
heroic defeat of woman’s “(mad) imprisonment in convention” (Castillo 9), or Celina’s 
activation into a participatory subject, I propose that Celina’s opposing trajectory is not a 
cautionary tale underlining the urgency of the feminist project, but rather a divergent 
mode of feminism that questions the established model of active, choosing subjects. By 
excessively inhabiting the domestic space, Celina alters domestic imprisonment into a 
frame of her own making, a refuge from external dictation and refusal of the paradigm of 
bourgeois housewife as well as of the active “useful” woman whose aim continues to be 
the production of “happier marriages [and] more harmonious families” (Castellanos 
263).75 Celina’s immanent intimacy with cats and metamorphic unraveling is not 
presented as a redemptive narrative, but a way of persisting at the limits of liberalism, 
until even that liminal frame is exhausted, and becomes unsustainable. 
While Celina’s silence, social isolation, and self-destruction appear incompatible 
with feminist objectives of emboldening women to live more vibrant, participatory lives, 
passivity and evacuation are not necessarily antithetical to feminism. To the contrary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Most scholars of Campos’s feminism cite an interview in which she criticizes women who “let 
themselves be seduced by the ease with which they can fulfill themselves effortlessly, through men, 
passively, without assuming the responsibility for their own destiny” (Miller 90). While this quote aligns 
Campos with “responsible” self-actualization, rather than resistant passivity, I argue that her fiction opens 
up ways to read passivity differently, a reading overlooked by critics relying on extratextual statements.  
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Celina’s trajectory can be located within what Judith Halberstam terms “shadow 
feminisms.” For Halberstam, shadow feminisms have “long haunted the more acceptable 
forms of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than 
negativity, rejection, and transformation. Shadow feminisms take the form not of 
becoming, being and doing but of shady, murky modes of undoing, unbecoming, and 
violating” (4). Characterized by “negation, refusal, passivity, absence, and silence,” these 
tenebrous feminisms offer “spaces and modes of unknowing [and speak] in the language 
of self-destruction, masochism, [and] antisocial femininity” (126). Rejecting the social 
mandate to cultivate identities by becoming productive members of society, shadow 
feminists purposefully fail at being woman as stipulated by Western philosophy. In 
neglecting to speak, do, or cohere, these subjects “refuse “being” where being has already 
been defined in terms of a self-activating, self-knowing, liberal subject” (126).76  
Celina’s trajectory of attachment travels from husband to friends, nanny to cats, 
and closes with her self-annihilation. This progression can be interpreted as a descent of 
the humanist ontological hierarchy; a Freudian dive down to the unconscious to surface 
unprocessed material and differentiate one’s animal drives from those of the reasoning 
human. However, rather than become-animal in order to resolve unconscious qualms and 
reemerge as an integrated individual, Celina instead occupies the threshold where 
binaries such as life and death, culture and nature, and human and animal muddle. This 
representation of Celina’s limit dwelling can be constructively read, I suggest, through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 While I do not read this short story as a national allegory, it was written during a decade of economic and 
sociopolitical tension in Mexico. Widespread resentment bloomed in response to President Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz’s policies that primarily benefitted the entrenched elite. Increasing repression and censorship spurred 
student protests, which culminated in the bloody events of Tlatelolco in 1968, when over 300 people were 
shot and hundreds more wounded by the Mexican army. Depression, thus, could be read as the national 
affective mode. 
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Rosi Braidotti’s lucid examination of Deleuze’s theory of “becoming 
animal/insect/imperceptible” in her essay “The Ethics of Becoming-Imperceptible.” 
Braidotti explains: 
Our culture has confined into the container-category of ‘self-destruction’ or 
‘nihilism’ bodily practices and phenomena which are of daily significance: 
disaffection of all kinds; addictions of the legal (coffee; cigarettes; alcohol; over-
work; achievement) and of the illegal kind (natural and pharmaceutical toxic and 
narcotic substances); suicide...; birth control, abortion, and the choice of sexual 
practices and sexual identities; the agony of long-term diseases... depression and 
burn-out syndromes. (145)  
Under the moralizing rubric of Christianity, which holds ‘Life’ as sacred, these sorts of 
liminal practices have been repeatedly pathologized and condemned. However, following 
Deleuze, Braidotti argues that such a view is rooted in a narcissistic understanding of the 
individual, for whom it “is unthinkable that Life should go on without my being there” 
(144). To the contrary, Braidotti affirms that “Death is not a failure, or the expression of a 
structural weakness at the heart of life: it is part and parcel of its generative cycles” (147). 
Therefore these sorts of “dark” practices should not be seen as self-destructive, but rather 
as “a process of experimentation with [the] limits of sustainability” and as “merely 
another phase in a generative process” (145). By thinking about Life as a generative 
process, propelled forward by “an impersonal, or rather an a-personal force” (147), we 
are pushed to reconsider that like Life itself, the subject too is non-unitary. This 
understanding of Life as impersonal and non-unitary is, for Braidotti, at the core of what 
she terms a post-humanist ethics, which resists being reduced to the life of a single 
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human individual. At the center of such an ethics is the paradox “that while at the 
conscious level all of us struggle for survival, at some deeper level of our unconscious 
structures, all we long for is to lie silently and let time wash over us in the perfect 
stillness of not-life” (152). It is this stillness, this passivity, this unraveling of the self as a 
coherent singularity, that Campos brings to her figuration of Celina. 
Disinterested in the pursuit of happiness or positivity, Celina rejects prescribed 
purpose and instead de-activates her self. A melancholic subject who refuses to move 
forward or outward, Celina kills the fantasy of marital proximity and the promise of well-
manicured domesticity. She eschews female emancipation in which the self-actualized 
woman leaves the house only to become newly subsumed into capitalist paradigms 
equating one’s worth with one’s production.77 From Carlos’s point of view, by not 
cleaning, mating, or socializing, Celina not only becomes less visibly woman but also 
less “human.” As she transforms the ordered domestic space into an artificial landscape 
populated by animals—including herself—and objectifies herself into a motionless body, 
one item among others, she becomes less recognizable and narratable. Celina’s 
masochistic refusal to be active critiques the convention of organizing agency and 
subjectivity through liberal humanist reason, productivity and able-bodiedness.78  
This critique of productivity is still attentive to the privilege at work in the politics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The model of the dynamic, assertive woman unbound by the constraints of femininity unsettlingly aligns 
with the neoliberal ideal of self-determination. The move toward individual responsibility under 
neoliberalism advocates that as long as women work hard enough they can get ahead, regardless of social 
inequity. 
78 Passivity is similarly thematized in Tiene los cabellos rojizos, in which the self imagined by competing 
discourses refuses to be part of any story at all, dissipating to the extent that it becomes an open-ended 
vessel that the narrative pours through, never sticking, a refusal that leaves the reader rudderless and 
disoriented. The woman with reddish hair considers suicide to escape the narrative voices that try to define 
her, but the narrative resists this and inhabits the masochistic death drive without moving forward or 
backward. 
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of refusal. That is, Campos’s reappraisal of depression and passivity as a form of politics 
is still situated within larger social structures of class and race. Celina’s depression is 
marked by her class privilege; to become undone, she requires the assistance of her 
Jamaican nanny Lydia, who manages the house while Celina deteriorates in bed 
surrounded by her cohort of purebred cats. This is an example of what Braidotti deems 
the “politics of location”: the awareness of one’s position within a larger collectively 
composed spatiotemporal fabric (Metamorphoses 12). Following Braidotti, by accounting 
for one’s “embodied and embedded location,” the limitations of familiar truths and 
discourses are disclosed. Rather than locate difference in the Other, these “materially 
embedded cartographies” of difference locate estrangement within the self. In “Celina o 
los gatos,” Celina undergoes a process of affirmative deconstruction of the power she 
inhabits: in the presence of her maid, the bourgeois woman metamorphoses into 
domesticated animal; not shedding her power-relations but moving toward a hybrid, 
multilayered subject position not intended by the phallogocentric system. Campos 
dramatizes the importance of situated perspective through Carlos’s narration, which 
observes Celina’s metamorphosis from an external, stable site, contrasting 
phallogocentric unicity against the estranged self, which recasts domesticity in radically 
altered dimensions. 
While Carlos’s narration endeavors to pathologize Celina’s inertia—a critique of 
bourgeois immobility echoed by Castellanos’ argument that complacency is antithetical 
to feminist political action—, the text compels us to reconsider why negative feelings are 
automatically associated with the pathological or politically useless. The withdrawal, 
melancholy and death narrated by Campos certainly manifest antisocial tendencies, yet 
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these negative feelings also create new attachments, a distinction recently made visible 
by scholars of queer theory (Cvetkovich 5). Without lapsing into wishful thinking or 
redemptive exposition—depression does lead after all to Celina’s suicide—Campos’s 
work doesn’t dismiss the bourgeois woman’s isolation as a frivolous or elitist concern, 
but instead engages the felt sensations of depressed domesticity.  
Depression manifests the refusal to engage with society and instead withdraw into 
oneself, setting aside productivity to let the body be ruled by base requirements for 
survival. If depression is the condition of being-stuck, Celina’s flight from society and 
restriction to the bed with other beings unconcerned with productivity or gentility—the 
cats—reimagines how domestic enclosure both perpetuates depression but is also an 
impasse that opens up possibilities. This feminism of stasis appears passive (to Carlos) 
but actually deconstructs the association of productivity with creativity, instead relating 
creativity to unbecoming, depersonalization and meditative silence. This is what 
Halberstam terms a “politics of refusal,” the rejection of feminist political models that 
prioritize self-activating subjects. Campos reworks resistance from an active stance to a 
posture of passivity and evacuation: refusing to “be” in terms dictated by patriarchal 
society. While the notion of the “impasse” appears to index inaction, it can also be 
understood as a knot of unresolved tensions, simultaneously confounding and promising. 
This sort of impasse slows us down, and as Lauren Berlant explains, in the “unbound 
temporality of the lag,” the impossibility of moving forward frames a space for 
exploration, “dog-paddling around a space whose contours remain obscure” (“Starved” 
434).  
Campos’s approach to woman’s confinement to the domestic sphere similarly 
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engages the dynamic intersection of circumscription and potential. In an essay titled “Mi 
vocación literaria,” she explains: “Habrá en aquella limitación del espacio vital la 
privación de una gama extensa de experiencias que le estaban vedadas, pero, a la vez, un 
ahondamiento en cierta vivencia de lo fundamental, un apropiamiento del corazón 
palpitante de lo real” (469). While acknowledging the housewife’s privation of 
experience, Campos finds in this limited mobility a means of investigating the depths of 
the “real.” Celina inhabits domesticity by constructing a delimited frame (enclosed, 
withdrawn, surrounded by luxury) that is stripped of productive coordinates.  
Rather than leave the purportedly apolitical home to participate in the social 
political sphere, Celina’s excessive dwelling of domestic immobility politicizes the home. 
The world of feral domesticity fostered in her intimate, enclosed relationship with the 
cats and her radical refusal to engage with the demands of society stage the failure of 
patriarchal control. The reproduction of normative life is suspended by Celina’s retreat 
into feral intimacy with the cats, creating a “space of internal displacement [that shatters] 
the normal hierarchies, clarities, tyrannies, and confusion of compliance with 
autonomous individuality” (Berlant “Cruel” 34). The appearance of the cats in the 
domestic space creates an interruption in which Celina is “lost” to the narrator, dissolved 
in the somatic animal encounter. The reader, who cannot access an explanation that sheds 
light on this ‘other’ affective space because Celina doesn’t speak, also experiences 
Carlos’s externality from this intimacy. Celina’s absent testimony at first appears to be a 
privation (enforced by Carlos) or a reiteration of the predictable collapse of language 
with masculinity, but this withdrawal from language is not negatively configured. Celina 
and the cats’ remove from speech points to Campos’s belief that the mysterious, 
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affective, and nonhuman unfold on a nondiscursive terrain that cannot (and should not) 
be fashioned into a coherent, cogent account. By not divulging its secret to the narrator or 
reader, this ‘other’ affective space retains its alterity, and externality to reason, science, 
language and patriarchal control. The “secret” of intimacy is thus maintained and this 
opacity to interpretation is what refuses phallogocentricism (Derrida’s neologism for 
masculine privilege in constructed meaning).79 
In the short story, Celina’s identity progressively becomes ‘undone’ until what 
remains is the material singularity of her body, which she renders static, inert, and 
lifeless: an object. Carlos is troubled by Celina’s ontological scrambling, which once felt 
accessible, but has transformed into an elusive thing: “Quizás eso es lo que era Celina; 
algo duro y perfecto. ¿Y cómo algo así puede desvanecerse?” (11). This description of 
the “hard and perfect” woman alludes to the classic configuration of the bourgeois 
woman as an item of luxury: an aesthetically beautiful, capricious object. However, the 
desire to possess the “hard and perfect” thing is offset by its “dissipation,” contrasting the 
object’s psychical constancy with its disappearance before the phallocentric eye: res 
nullius. Rather than denounce the metaphorical collapse of women and objects—as might 
a more expected feminist critique in order to re-humanize women as active subjects, not 
passive, static objects—Campos reworks the ontological hierarchy deeming humans more 
agential than objects. She asserts that humans are in fact things: objects composed of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Because Campos’s fiction often takes place in enclosed domestic spaces (home, garden, balcony), 
figured nonhuman life is often of the domesticated variety (cats and roses). Exemplary of the passive, non-
productive subject, the domesticated cat is of particular centrality, seemingly superfluous yet resistant to 
domination, unperturbed by human expectation or the pressure to please. The socially constructed divide of 
nature and culture has made the domestic cat a categorical challenge, as it is considered both dependent and 
independent, wild and tame, lazy and vigilant, loving and aggressive. Zoologists have noted that modern-
day cats are strikingly similar to their predecessors and that “the domestication of cats can be seen as 
incomplete inasmuch as cats resist human attempts to dominate and control them” (Thompson). 
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chaotic interactions between human and inhuman matter. As Celina objectifies herself—
becoming an object of her own design and no longer the feminine object desired by her 
husband—her identity dissipates, until it becomes imperceptible. 
This construction of the human as a nonhuman thing is a philosophy Campos 
shares with the proponents of the nouveau roman, the “new novel” of 1950s France 
frequently identified as her most significant literary influence.80 The novelty of the 
nouveau roman resides in its critique of the traditional construction of literature as a 
sense making medium, structured through plot-driven narrative and propelled by active, 
choosing subjects. Instead, the new novel stresses representation’s inability to disclose 
the universe, privileging the depiction of opaque surfaces over the excavation of 
meaning. The resultant aesthetic of alienated, sketchy characters and refused narrative 
cohesion has been alternately critiqued as “asocial, ahistorical, excessively formalist, 
[and] solipsistic” or more positively received as depicting “the depersonalization and 
alienation of postwar capitalism” (Higgins 3).81 Campos’s association with the nouveau 
roman’s conception of the novel not as a given, stable fictive universe but instead as a 
space for the “constant gestation of… an estar siendo” (qtd in Castillo 173), has been 
proposed as a possible explanation for why her work has been less attended to than that 
of her contemporaries. Critics hypothesize that this tempered reception may be due to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Campos’s book of literary criticism, La imagen en el espejo (1965), sheds light on the new novel’s 
impact on her work in its discussion of Alain Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute, and Claude Simon, among 
others. 
81 Juan Rulfo exemplifies the fraught reception of the nouveau roman in Latin America: “en lo personal, la 
antinovela me desagrada. Escribir antinovela es, precisamente evitar toda acción del pensamiento; ver 
simplemente, y explicar lo que se está viendo.… La antinovela, que creyó en un principio ser un 
movimiento aceptado y fuerte, capaz de crear un nuevo estilo, una nueva forma de desarrollar la conciencia 
humana, acabó siendo simplemente... una antiexpresión y un antitodo para caer en la nada” (405). 
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perception that her work engages more with French than Latin American counterparts, 
the difficulty of her experimental prose (Tompkins 156), or its “non-political, ludic 
quality” (Jehenson 86) whose disinterest in plotting national history thematically 
distances her work from that of her Mexican contemporaries. 
While many critics have commented on the stylistic affinities Campos shares with 
the nouveau roman—notably the opposition to linear plot and narrative cohesion—their 
overlapping critique of humanism has been less remarked. Campos’s wry remark in 
Celina’s prelude that erudition is a delusion echoes Alain Robbe-Grillet’s 
contemporaneous assertion that humanism’s defining trait is the comprehensive ambition 
to sublimate every nonhuman thing into human terms. In “Nature, Humanism and 
Tragedy,” Robbe-Grillet rebuts the foolish projection of unity between the human and 
nonhuman that has characterized humanism. In what can be considered a provocative 
antecedent of post-humanism, Robbe-Grillet’s essay maintains that our desire to 
commune with the nonhuman world has resulted in the tendency to imaginatively inhabit 
the nonhuman point of view by projecting human feelings onto it, an anthropomorphizing 
empathy that “amounts to denying their reality, their opaque presence” (77). In literature, 
this delusion of solidarity is evidenced by the “systematic search for analogical 
relationships” and the use of metaphor to humanize the nonhuman in order to construct a 
fallacious sense of totalizing harmony. To unravel this fantasized reciprocity, Robbe-
Grillet describes the thing’s surface without imagining its (inevitably humanized) inner 
life to “establish [the object’s] exteriority and its independency” so that “the world 
around us once again becomes a smooth surface, with no meaning, no soul and no values, 
on which we have no further hold” (78). The imperative to undo the human grip on the 
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nonhuman world is at the core of Robbe-Grillet’s maxim: “Man looks at the world, but 
the world doesn’t look back at him” (70). While this point is at odds with the animal’s 
returned gaze favored by Jacques Derrida in “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow),” Robbe-Grille’s emphatic claim of nonhuman indifference similarly undermines 
humanist paradigms imagining the human to be more active and knowing than other 
beings and objects.  
Campos’s work analogously attacks humanist projections of human superiority, 
an endeavor that runs parallel to her challenge of the patriarchal circumscription of 
female bodies. The prologue to Celina o los gatos establishes that the compiled stories 
trace the progressive “desdibujamiento” of human characters until all that remains is 
atmosphere, “alojamiento” or abode. This “desdibujamiento” is developed within each 
story, as well as in the structural sequencing of the collection as a whole. Celina o los 
gatos begins with stories that center around human protagonists, such as “Celina” or “El 
bautizo,” and ends with stories like “La casa” and “La ciudad,” in which humans are 
displaced entirely by the nonhuman as protagonist. The environment is narrated as a felt 
and material presence that remains long after the transient human inhabitants are gone 
and, as such, possesses a distinct temporality that resists human conceptions of time. 
Campos’s fiction imbues nonhuman objects and spaces with agential vibrancy without 
dissolving their otherness through anthropomorphic projection. Yet unlike Robbe-Grille’s 
total estrangement of nonhuman-human worlds, Campos inscribes the female human 
body as an object affecting and affected by the environment in which it is imbricated.  
The “desdibujamiento” of the human into nonhuman ecology is made visible in 
“El bautizo,” the second short story in Celina o los gatos. In “El bautizo,” the female 
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body is again brought to rest in a domesticated landscape, the garden, and becomes 
effaced. Like in “Celina,” the domesticated—with its implications of being tamed, 
cultivated, or trained—is a privileged site for unraveling the patriarchal authorship 
implicit in these terms, which signify the feminine or natural loss of freedom or wildness. 
In Bodily Natures, Stacy Alaimo argues that because women have been historically 
defined as “stuck” in Nature and thus unable to access reason, subjectivity and agency, 
feminist theorists have sought to disentangle this relationship and separate women from 
nature: “Feminist theory’s most revolutionary concept—the concept of gender, as distinct 
from biological sex—is predicated upon a sharp opposition between nature and culture” 
(5). However, by turning to the body, Campos addresses the question of biological 
determinism, seeing the body as what feminist theorist Lynda Birke describes as 
“changing and changeable, as transformable” (qtd. in Alaimo 5; emphasis in the 
original). Taking matter seriously, Campos addresses not only the discursive formulation 
of nature, but also how the physicality of the environment signifies and acts upon human 
bodies.  
The adolescent protagonist in “El bautizo,” Natalia, is uncomfortable with her 
maturing body and its legibility to the male gaze:  
A veces, cuando camina sin nada en las manos, como ahora, quisiera quitarse los 
brazos y dejarlos en alguna parte. No sabe qué hacer con ellos. Entonces se pone a 
pensar que tiene estómago y columna vertebral, pero sobre todo que tiene cara. Y 
es tan molesto saber que se tiene una cara y los demás puede reconocerla, 
mientras que ella sólo puede verse, con sus propios ojos, en el espejo. (36-37) 
The trouble, again, is with the female self’s external identification as a singular, coherent 
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entity. Natalia’s disidentification with her body—as if it were not of her—is assuaged 
only once she lies down in the garden amidst the summer light, heat, and sounds. She 
doesn’t transcend her body in order to find relief, which would reinforce a mind-body 
schism. Rather, as her body stops moving, she senses its permeability: “El calor se sube 
con lentitud por las piernas, incorporado ya e igual que si saliera del interior de la piel, 
hasta que el sudo la va humedeciendo y aflojando, hasta que siente las piernas como si no 
fueran suyas” (40). The sun’s warmth and Natalia’s body heat mix indistinguishably, and 
the energy’s uncertain origin scrambles the division between the human-subject and 
nature-object so that both are figured as actants.  
 Like in “Celina” and Tiene los cabellos rojizos, stillness is essential for the 
evacuation of identity in “El bautizo.” The unproductive, motionless body “melts” into 
the environment: “se deja fundir sin ninguna transición con la calidad del ambiente, que 
se ha ido volviendo sonoro, hasta que ella misma parece vibrar y transmitir el sonido” 
(40). Prostrate in the garden, heat and noise act on the embedded body until it vibrates 
and transmits ambient sound. This transformation occurs “without transition,” the body 
always-already a natural object. In the absence of productivity, the girl no longer 
constructs a coherent narrative of identity, but senses herself integrated and embodied. 
The substance of the self is thus understood as interconnected within a broader network 
of ecology, dramatically shifting the sense of self from one of a bounded, coherent 
identity to deindividualized material subjectivity. 
Many critics, including Margo Glantz, have read Campos’s identities-in-
decomposition as a critique of self-destructive narcissism. “Son seres que miran desde un 
encierro, desde la locura, desde la identidad pantanosa en que se confunden […] La 
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identidad no se logra porque la contemplación es malsana e inerte” (74). For Glantz, the 
characters’s “sickly and inert” self-absorption prevents the healthy formation of strong, 
individual identities. Echoing this rejection of counterproductive negativity, much of the 
scholarship on Mexican feminism, from Jean Franco’s canonical Plotting Women to 
Emily Hind’s more recent, insightful Femmenism and the Mexican Woman Intellectual, 
define female liberation as achieved through activity, cultural production, and public 
visibility. However, my argument is that Campos is not interested in critiquing 
malformed individuals, whose excessive self-absorption or passivity prevents the 
development of stable and productive identities. To the contrary, Campos explores the 
pleasure of becoming undone, unraveling the socially constructed trappings of identity, 
and giving in to the Baudelairean “voluptuosidad del aniquilamiento” (Tiene los cabellos 
rojizos 141). Rather than redirect negative feelings into optimistic utility, the annihilation 
of the self—through summer heat, ocean sounds, becoming feral—refuses to transcend 
the impasse and move forward. Rather than focus on identity as a model for political 
subjectivity, Campos’s non-anthropocentric feminism emphasizes the embodied female 
subject’s de-essentialized complexity. The nonhuman surrounds and constitutes the 
human body, modifying it inside and out, decentering the image of the autonomous 
human. Instead the human individual is configured in constitutive relation to nonhuman 
others: “No más déjate flotar, haz el muertito, relájate, descansa, no tengas miedo del 
mar” (Tiene los cabellos rojizos 159).82 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 To avoid drowning, the human body must relax in the water, with fully inflated lungs. But if this fails, 
after drowning, the human body is again propelled to the water’s surface by gas produced by bacteria. This 
process suggests that the nonhuman isn’t just external to the human subject (threatening to envelop it like 
the ocean) but immanent to it. Indeed, of all the cells in the human body, only one in ten is human, while 
the rest are nonhuman organisms, viruses and bacteria. 
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Campos further problematizes the human-nonhuman divide by demonstrating that 
human culture is intimately conceived with nature. Language, like the ocean, is not just a 
visual or sonic object, but tied to rhythm and vibration, felt bodily: 
[dejo] que me invada... un ruido que parece de palabras pero que es el mismo 
ruido que me acecha desde el principio: el ruido monocorde, el ruido incesante, el 
ruido terco, el ruido sibilante, el ruido amenazador, el ruido apaciguante, el ruido 
lejano y familiar, el ruido excitante y letárgico, el ruido que me colma y me deja 
vacía, el ruido persistente y lacerante del mar. (Tiene los cabellos rojizos 178) 
Sound is active: pursuant, charged with multiple affective vectors that surpass and 
mobilize the human body. The ocean’s vibrational forces are monumentalized, waves 
resonate with the woman looking at the ocean, and in this resonance she becomes 
emptied, divested of individuality.  
 An analogous process, reading has the power to subsume the reader in language 
and erase her identity. Yet like the ocean, with reading one has to give up control—“haz 
el muertito”—to successfully float. As one of the anonymous narrators of Tiene los 
cabellos rojizos sardonically remarks: 
En el caso improbable de que [el lector] se haya dejado devorar por la avalancha 
de palabras..., si se ha dejado hipnotizar por las palabras, entonces se encontrará él 
mismo al borde del precipicio, exponiendo su propia identidad y yo diría que aun 
su vida, para compartir en la terraza de un mirador en Acapulco, la dudosa, 
ambigua, indecisa suerte de una mujer que ni siquiera tiene nombre. (121-22) 
Overwhelmed and absorbed, the motionless reader holding the book affects and is 
affected by the text. In this way, literature doesn’t just stage the dissolution of identity, 
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but acts out this dissolution on the reader, who loses sight of herself when overcome by 
the rush of language.83 The hypnotic sensation of giving in to nonhuman and human 
vibrancies pushes the individual toward the precipice of de-individuation: becoming 
nameless and faceless. The encounter with res nullius—ocean, book, and woman—stages 
our desire to claim “no one’s thing” as our own. Yet, the passive, seemingly possessable 
material object frustrates and absorbs us. The apparent passivity of res nullius resists 
productivity and blurs the subject-object relation until it explodes into new, unforeseen 
cartographies. 
 
Cats or the non-unitary, dynamic vision of the subject 
To conclude, I find it helpful to circle back to the figure of the domesticated 
animal that inspires this chapter and the name of Campos’s Celina o los gatos. It is no 
accident that Campos centers cats as Celina’s privileged interlocutors during her 
metamorphosis from coherent identity to deterritorialized becoming. To further examine 
why the nonhuman animal models a way to rethink subjectivity, in the concluding portion 
of the chapter, I look at Campos’ theorization of the metaphysics of the cat.  
The brief preamble opening Celina o los gatos explains that the title, which also 
denominates the first story in the collection, was not chosen at random. Rather, the 
decision to contain the gathered stories under this title highlights the centrality of the 
nonhuman animal to Campos’ larger literary project. The radical alterity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The author too is object: “El pintor, el escritor, no está al margen del mundo, contemplándolo únicamente 
como espectador y con una facultad singular para constituir otros universos dentro de ese mundo. Es un 
objeto más dentro del mundo y puede ser contemplado desde afuera, por un espectador capaz de 
contemplar su obra, de contemplarlo a él creando su obra, de contemplar el mundo que él ha creado dentro 
del mundo” (Campos La imagen 90). 
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domesticated cat, which appears familiar yet remains inaccessible, functions as a figure 
whose obscurity-in-proximity reflects literature itself. Campos explains:  
He querido colocar así a los demás [cuentos] bajo la adveración de esas ambiguas 
criaturas, siempre cercanas a lo secreto y por ende a la poesía. Creo que todos 
comparten, en cierta medida, la turbadora e imprecisa naturaleza de los gatos: hay 
en cada uno la persistencia de un mundo que no se resigna a perecer aunque algo, 
por dentro, lo corroe y lo desintegra sutilmente. (Celina ix) 
The domesticated cat’s proximity to the secret links the nonhuman world with poetic 
language: worlds that are simultaneously manifest and withdrawn. Campos’ self-exegesis 
anticipates a move performed by Jacques Derrida, who similarly links “the secret” with 
the text, and in later work, nonhuman life.84 For Derrida, the secret signals the 
inaccessibility of the other, always in retreat. Echoing Campos’ language describing cat 
and story as “ambiguous,” “troubling,” and “imprecise,” Derrida explains how the 
“undecidability” of alterity distresses classificatory order. When approached by the 
human subject (or reader), both literary text and nonhuman animal appear to be passive, 
possessable objects easily perceived and mastered, yet remain frustratingly external—
other—to the interpellator. The inability to disclose structural recess consigns us to 
repeatedly interpret anew; there is no “end” or arrival at knowledge. 85  
 This subject-object binary operates as a central paradigm for disruption in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Georges Bataille similarly links animal with poetry: “The animal opens before me a depth that attracts 
me and is familiar to me. In a sense, I know this depth, it is my own. It is also that which is farthest 
removed from me, that which deserves the name depth, which means precisely that which is unfathomable 
to me. But this too is poetry” [emphasis in the original] (22). 
85 Anticipating Derrida’s rejection of individualizing the de-individualized animal pack through the name, 
Campos argues the cat eludes denomination. Citing T.S. Eliot, she suggests that no name “será el inefable, 
inescrutable, profundo y singular que el hombre es incapaz de descubrir y que sólo cada uno de los gatos 
vivientes, sumido en honda meditación, conoce” (xxiv). 
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Campos’s work, an opposition established only to be blurred and dismantled to the point 
where the human subject as sovereign actor unravels. This un-becoming disrupts the 
notion that categorical “identity” is fixed, while also conferring agency (traditionally 
deemed particular to the human) to things and nonhuman animals, as actants86 with 
worlds that elude human penetration.  
Campos’ definition of the “imprecisa naturaleza de los gatos” posits cat and text 
are constituted by two juxtaposed properties: “la persistencia de un mundo que no se 
resigna a perecer,” set against an internal force “[que] lo corroe y lo desintegra 
sutilmente” (Celina ix). The first striking element in this formulation is the assertion that 
the cat (like the text) contains “un mundo,” a departure from the Heideggerian position 
that animals are “poor-in-world” (weltarm). In The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, Heidegger posits the key distinction between animal and human life is the 
lack of comprehension with which the animal responds to its environment. Rather than 
capturing the world through knowledge, the animal is captive to its surroundings. 
Absorbed by instinct, the animal is a “being-open in captivation,” revealed to the human 
eye but unable to reveal others: a “not-having of world, if the potentiality for revelation 
of beings as such does indeed belong to the world” (210). This “not-having,” “being-
open” situates the animal as an object with limited agency: “encircled (umringt) […] by 
the reciprocal drivenness of its drives.” Humans, however, are “world-forming” 
(weltbindend), able to disclose entities and recognize ontological difference. Departing 
from Heidegger’s anthropocentric mapping of the subject-object divide, Campos troubles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Bruno Latour’s definition of “actant”? Concept of “actant” resolves the problem of nonhuman 
subjectivity, which is tricky since animal consciousness remains a mystery. 
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this schism by positing that cat and text possess-world, implying that animals and objects 
(even objects of thought) generate and affect their environments, rather than exist 
possessed by them.  
Beyond a simple reversal of the metaphysical negation of the animal as 
possessing-world, Campos formulates the nonhuman animal as a model of non-unitary, 
dynamic subjectivity that can be extended to human animals and to narrative itself. This 
approach deflates human centrality and asserts the nonhuman world of animals and 
objects as proper to the larger ontological picture of subjectivity and agency. In the 
excerpted preamble, Campos articulates this mode of being as springing from the 
interplay between two competing modes: persistence and disintegration. The first of these 
juxtaposed modalities, persistence, invokes a temporal dimension and establishes futurity. 
Extending over time, this entity resists death, persists in being—endures—and is thus 
self-sustaining. However, rather than associating endurance with permanence or 
transcendence, Campos mediates “persistence” with internal corrosion and disintegration. 
This second intensity disarticulates cohesion and integrity, configuring a mobile, in-
process entity constantly coming to pieces, a non-unitary subject that lasts in its 
discontinuity.87 The internal disintegration doesn’t lead toward any specified endpoint 
such as death (it “resists perishing”); it is not teleological, but a dynamic duration that is 
both positive (enduring, futurity) and negative (undoing, corrosion).  
Nearing the threshold where endurance meets disintegration, negativity plays a 
crucial role in troubling fixity and permanence. The reevaluation of negativity as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The text, like human and nonhuman beings, is stable in its singular continuity, but decomposing in its 
deconstructive possibilities. 
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transformative force is central to Campos’ approach to narrative (language 
simultaneously creates and destabilizes meaning) and feminism (empowerment not as 
becoming happy and productive but as disbanding prescribed modes of being). By 
theorizing ontology through the nonhuman (cat, ocean, text), Campos advances an 
interlocking model of subjectivity that is not particular to the human subject, or rooted in 
the “essence” of being, but perceives human, nonhuman and even non-sentient objects as 
interconnected by multiple, impersonal dynamic forces. The human subject doesn’t order 
the world, but rather, the interplay between structure (persistence) and chaos 
(disintegration) is immanent to the universe: 
 [L]a belleza, que es en sí indefinible, supone siempre cierta estructura, cierta 
organización, cierto orden y allí donde surge como un milagro la armonía de la 
forma es seguro que ha habido, en medio de lo desintegrado algo, también 
indefinible, una fuerza lo suficientemente integradora como para introducir el 
orden y la vida dentro del caos y la muerte. (Celina xxvii) 
 The dialectical logic of persistence and disintegration structures the nonhuman 
world as well as that of human culture. Noé Jitrik posits that all of Campos’ works create 
one space—the book—within which to play out the tension between two opposing forces: 
“precisar y difuminar” (147). The tension between these two “sistemas de pulsiones” 
develop and generate “mediante ritmos diferentes” the strength and appeal of Campos’s 
literary project. For Jitrik, each work actualizes these dual forces to differing degrees, one 
subsuming the other depending on the work. Muerte por agua (1965) and Tiene los 
cabellos rojizos y se llama Sabina (1974) privilege the latter, blurring and decomposing 
narrative efforts to erect subjects, direct plot, and give information. In these novels, the 
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solidity of “fixed” notions is undone through expansive language that Jitrik terms 
“arborescente”—continuously branching outward from a point of origin, anchored yet 
unpredictable—which withholds the certainty of classical narration by proliferating 
disjointed fragments (145).88  
In contrast to the “campo de pulsiones” and “vibración prosódica” of these works, 
Jitrik finds Celina and El miedo de perder a Eurídice (1979) as resolving the “precisar y 
difuminar” dialectic in favor of the former. Tending toward the creation of “estructuras” 
(146), these works manifest plot and subject formation and are less driven by ludic 
discourse. Indicative of this narratological pinning down is the rhetorical enumeration 
Jitrik identifies as characteristic of Celina’s opening essay, “De gatos y otros mundos.” 
Preceding the five short stories, the essay develops the preamble’s dedication to cats, 
“esas ambiguas criaturas” (ix). Jitrik explains that in an attempt to “cercar un tema tan 
evasivo, resbalazdizo y esotérico” (xi), the introductory essay takes on the cats’ 
“indescribability” through a series of vignettes that catalog different depictions of the cat. 
Covering historical and literary representations of the cat since the ancient Egyptians to 
H.P. Lovecraft, this traversal of literary history is read by Jitrik as enumerative, 
indicating the book’s proclivity for straightforward communication of information:  
Se enumeran, individualizándolos, gatos que en el texto que da título al libro 
aparecen en montón […] la enumeración hace presión sobre la sintaxis, tiende a 
cortar ramas a la arboresencia, parece querer encaminarse a la “información”; en 
suma, disminuyen las asociaciones de frases y las imágenes en favor de otro tipo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Deleuze contrasts arborescent hierarchy with rhizomatic horizontality: mapping information not rooted or 
truncated but extending indefinitely outward.  
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de discurso, con frases principales y el acento puesto sobre el “sujeto” gramatical; 
el verbo—que antes era central—ahora tiende a explicar y contribuye, por eso, a 
la formación de una identidad. (146)  
Jitrik’s assertion that Celina, in deprioritizing verbal play, demonstrates an affinity for 
identity-formation is a claim worth probing. While “De gatos y otros mundos” asserts 
that it “informatively” reviews the cat’s many representations—which as Jitrik points out, 
effectively parses the pack into identifiable individuals—I argue that Campos’ 
enumeration should not be read as opposing arborescence. Rather, Campos enumerates in 
order to reveal the cacophonous symbolism that branches out from the figure of the cat. 
By erecting a mass of the cat’s contradictory interpretations—alternatively signifying the 
demonic or the familiar, the erotic or the gentle, the passive or the indifferent—Campos 
proves that though rooted in the material feline body, the divergent branches of 
signification reflect more about human nature than the nonhuman signifier.  
 “De gatos y otros mundos” underscores this revelation by subverting the 
breathless succession of feline symbolism through a moment that marks these insights’ 
expiration: 
El gato, espejo donde los hombres han proyectado, como en infinitos prismas, su 
propia imagen, recoge todas las facetas dispersas, las reconstituye y nos devuelve, 
prestigiada por esa belleza sellada e intacta que le es propia, la seguridad de una 
larga supervivencia.  
Ésa es, por lo menos, la ilusión de los hombres. Porque cada gato, depositario de 
un saber que no nos es dado alcanzar, comparte la propiedad que Lewis Carroll 
otorgó al Gato de Cheshire, capaz de desaparecer gradualmente hasta no dejar 
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otra cosa que la sonrisa. Una sonrisa irónica que nos mantendrá siempre a 
prudente distancia, y no nos dejará olvidar la inmensidad de nuestra pequeñez ni 
lo desorbitado de nuestra soberbia. (xxvii) 
Concluding this essay of feline “circumscription” with the image of a disembodied, 
lingering smile undercuts the chimera that enumeration can ever reveal the body of the 
cat itself. The allusion to Carroll’s Cheshire Cat and its phantasmal, humanoid smile 
indexes both how the lingering signified can exist independent of the material body, as 
well as human impotence to decipher the animal before us except through self-referential 
constructions. The spectral feline grin, Campos concludes, establishes the human before 
the animal as immensely small and excessively arrogant.89 The tendency to see the 
animal as an empty mirror that reflects a contradictory set of anthropomorphized 
characteristics, vices and tropes, reveals less about animals than the all-too-human 
“illusion” of securing a narrative capable of deciphering the world. 
Advancing a similar critique, Derrida contests the animal’s figuration as an empty 
receptacle of symbolic projection. Much like the textual compression of the female figure 
into one-dimensional tropes, philosophy has deemed the animal captive to instinct 
(Heidegger) or melancholically mute (Benjamin). These approaches negatively define the 
animal in opposition to the human—by what it lacks or is unable to do—stripping the 
animal of any power of manifestation (Derrida 387). In contrast to the philosophical 
treatment of the animal as theorem, Derrida proposes that poetry is the site that has been 
most able to approach the animal as constituting a “wholly other origin.” Even then, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Deleuze reads the Cheshire cat’s smile as an event that no longer belongs to a specific body but exists 
outside of it. This smile “secures the disappearance of the body” or survives its effacement; the material 
body of the cat disappears, “becoming-imperceptible” (Francis Bacon 28). 
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animal remains inescapably tied up in human projections: “a discourse of man, on man, 
indeed on the animality of man, but for and of man” (405, emphasis in the original). 
Following Derrida, contemporary animal theorists privilege texts that move away from 
the exemplary “figure” of the animal as metaphor or symbol and toward its 
“unsubstitutable singularity” as an “irreplaceable living being” whose existence “refuses 
to be conceptualized” (Derrida 379); addressing the animal as a phenomenological being 
who not only can be gazed upon, but looks back and captures us in its gaze. 
Tempering animal studies’ push toward heuristic empiricism, Barbara Hernstein 
Smith counters, “the sources of our concepts of and responses to animals are not confined 
to what we might think of as our actual, empirical encounters with them” (5). In addition 
to ethology, the “imaginative intimacy of human with animal in myth, totem, fable and 
fantasy” is equally potent in constructing how we relate to other creatures (5). Within this 
debate, Celina straddles the threshold where theorem intersects with the experiential.90 
Rather than dismiss symbolism as abstracted from reality, the enumeration of varied 
mythologies of the cat as angelic or demonic, sweet or orgiastic, registers how textual 
metamorphosis renders the feline topos nomadic, product of human explication and 
limitation. The knowledge gained through literary historiography only goes so far, as the 
prelude humorously notes, “el afán erudito de nuestra época, [...] pretende sustentar a 
veces en viejas razones sus más profundos vacíos” (ix). Subverting her own task of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In her review of Sarah Pomeroy’s analysis of female archetypes from antiquity until present day, Campos 
argues that poetic appraisal is the most powerful form of feminist critique, preferable to political discourse: 
“Un libro como éste es más eficaz que toda la retórica del Women’s Lib para ponernos en la pista del cómo 
y los probables porqués de esos injustos mecanismos que, en las más diversas sociedades, han equiparado 
la suerte de la mujer con la de los niños, los locos y todos los explotados” (“Diosas”). Later in her career 
this view shifts: Campos stops writing fiction altogether to pursue political activism, writing nonfiction 
texts addressing class and race, including Qué hacemos con los pobres and Tabasco. 
156 
	  
making the cat legible, Campos observes that the urge to make sense of the world is a 
delusion; we yearn for a theorem where only an epistemic abyss opens up between 
human knowledge and the opacity of the other.  
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CHAPTER 3: Becoming-Monkey: Bodily Vulnerability in Revolutionary Central 
America 
 
While traveling through Asia in 1957 as the Guatemalan ambassador to France, 
Miguel Ángel Asturias published a string of short essays commenting on the cultural and 
political particularities of India for the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia. The series, 
titled “Poetas, santones, monos y esqueletos,” detailed for his Spanish readership the 
peculiarities of these four entities and their roles in Indian society. In the final installment 
on “monos y esqueletos,” Asturias wrote in disbelief about India’s recent adoption of 
legislation that prohibited the export of monkeys for medical experimentation. Pointing 
out that India regularly exported human skeletons to the West for scientific research, 
Asturias’ piece sardonically contends that monkeys, not humans, are the subjects 
protected by Indian law. His essay chastises India for defending these “long-tailed 
apocryphal gurus” at the expense of human life: 
De Delhi a Jaipur, se ven alineados, como formando pueblos, miles de monos que 
con sus crías van a saltos por los campos, trepan a los árboles, se cruzan en el 
camino. Nadie les hace nada. Son sagrados. Y a tiempo evitó la India que se 
exportaran para preparar la vacuna contra la parálisis infantil […] y pensamos, sin 
decir nada, en mala hora lo evitó la India, pues así habría salido de todos estos 
santones animales, santones coludos, que devoran gran parte de lo que comerían 
las poblaciones famélicas […] Exportar más monos y menos esqueletos, eso sería 
el ideal, y conformaría un verdadero programa político para el futuro. (15) 
Asturias’ outrage stems from his observation that while India’s impoverished are treated 
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as expendable commodities, monkeys are legally protected, well fed, and proliferate. The 
image of thousands of primates “formando pueblos” and gobbling up crops illustrates that 
monkeys, not humans, are India’s citizens. Asturias’ dismay at this transposition is at its 
core a concern with ontological scrambling: the demotion of the human body to the status 
of a thing and the deification of the animal. Formulating a pragmatic political solution 
that accommodates capitalist logic, Asturias concludes that India ought to reverse its 
stance and export monkeys, not humans, for profit and in order to reestablish the 
sovereignty of human life. 
At the time of Asturias’ visit, India was the world’s leading exporter of human 
bones for scientific study, a status it retained until the government banned their export 
(although not their sale) in 1985 and China took its place as the primary global supplier 
of human remains. The vast majority of exported corpses from India were those of the 
undernourished poor, whose economic precarity and malnutrition not only made this 
practice exploitative, but as Asturias points out, macabrely utilitarian: “poco hay que 
hacer para descarnarlos. Ya cuando mueren son casi esqueletos [...] como no tienen 
mucha carne, músculo ni nada que separarles, mueren tan flacos [que basta] unos cuantos 
hurgamientos de escalpelo para reducirlos a esqueletos y enviarlos al exterior para el 
estudio del cuerpo humano.” Characteristic of Asturias’ persuasive pathos, this 
description of the ease with which the starving body is rendered an exportable good 
highlights the problematic ethicality of biopolitical monetization of mortality. His 
argument against the cadaver trade is grounded in two considerations that continue to 
drive current critiques of the sale of organs: that it is “contrary to human dignity” and 
“violates equity” (Kishore 362). Asturias illustrates both of these concerns through the 
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abject image of a body so stripped of nourishment that its reduction to a commodity is 
relatively seamless, more valued and valuable in death than in life. This blunt image of 
the transformation of the starved body into a natural resource exemplifies the biopolitical 
production of lives that matter detailed by Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer. Life 
deemed “human” (bios) is parsed from residual life, that like the corpse-commodity, is 
reducible to an organic, “biological” status (zoe) that is unidentifiable as an individual or 
citizen. Unlike the “human,” these “natural” bodies are excluded from social protection, 
situated outside of the domain of the political, yet politicized as “life exposed to death” 
(88). This division of the “human” from the “merely biological” is not just discursive but 
spatial: territorialized by the unidirectional transportation of peripheral resource (Indian 
bones) to Western science, but also within a given geographic space (India) through the 
differentiation of the very poor from the rest of society. 
As Asturias points out, starvation is a form of death-in-life, and the transformation 
of the undernourished corpse into exportable scientific specimen confirms its less-than-
human status as thing. Georges Bataille’s proposition that death is “life beyond utility”—
and thus anti-economic sovereignty (Mbembe 15)—is scrambled: the exportable corpse is 
not an emblem of non-utilitarian excess but instead rearticulated as a scientific object 
with an appraised value. The indigent is consequently inscribed as animal or “natural” 
life that upon death becomes a product for human consumption, excluded from the rituals 
of protection such as burial and cremation that prevent the human corpse’s transformation 
into meat, tool, or product. Asturias denounces the loss of dignity that accompanies this 
commodification. However, what troubles the author most is the confusion of kind. The 
poor are not merely less protected than the rich, but debased beneath animals. India’s 
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legal protection of monkeys counter-intuitively figures the monkey as more “human” 
than humans themselves. To right this wrong, Asturias proposes that India reverse its 
policy and export those pesky “santones coludos,” not human remains. 
But of course it is more complicated than that. While Asturias justifiably critiques 
the biopolitical commodification of the poor, his condemnation of India’s statute 
preventing the export of primates for scientific study surprisingly misreads—or willingly 
disregards—the cultural particularity of this phenomenon. His interpretation of the Indian 
export of human skeletons as dehumanizing overlooks the Hindu belief that treating a 
corpse as matter is not degrading. Unlike the Catholic veneration of the dead, Hinduism 
maintains that upon death the soul immediately departs for its karmic destination. The 
defunct body is perceived as pure materiality, entirely detached from the spirit. Asturias’s 
dismissal of Hinduism’s veneration of the monkey is surprising given his commitment to 
the accurate and complex representation of Maya mythology and of indigenous culture as 
legitimate counterpoints to Western metaphysics and capitalist paradigms. Hombres de 
maíz (1949), for instance, intricately figures Maya nonhuman-human imbrication and 
seriously accounts for the animal’s spiritual centrality in that cosmology (Prieto 141). 
This discrepancy between Asturias’ literary reverence for autochthonous cultural 
particularity and political disdain for State codification of difference in India unearths a 
problematic specter of Eurocentric humanism at work. 
At the root of Asturias’s argument is the suspicion that consideration for the 
nonhuman animal is elaborated at the human’s expense. If a government cannot 
sufficiently care for its citizens—particularly the poor, sick, and marginalized—how is 
that not more ethically urgent than the protection of nonhuman life? The growing field of 
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animal studies in the humanities—which examines the political and cultural ramifications 
of animal representations, prompting us to consider what happens when we include other 
species in our understandings of subjectivity—similarly confronts the problematic of why 
we might attend to animal life when the claims of minorities have yet to be sufficiently 
addressed. As W.J.T. Mitchell queries, is the concern for animal rights “nothing but the 
ultimate form of liberal guilt, the kind of self-indulgent breast-beating that encourages 
moralistic, sentimental posturing”? Does looking at the animal divert our attention from 
pressing issues of global, racial and gendered inequity to more abstract, universalizing 
concerns for life?  
Mitchell answers these questions with a resounding yes, arguing that there is 
indeed merit to considering the animal in contemporary polemics of subjectivity and 
ethics. Thinking about (or attempting to imaginatively think with) animal life is an 
important line of inquiry because it pushes us to reckon with utter alterity and irreducible 
plurality, and to brush up against phenomena that are beyond human understanding. 
Derrida contends that the animal is a presence that circumscribes the illusion of the 
human’s privileged evolutionary and intellectual position. However, when thinking about 
the relationship between humans and animals, it is crucial to consider the anxieties that 
surface in tandem with this relationship, anxieties manifest in Asturias’ outrage at India’s 
commodification of human bones and veneration of monkey deities. While it is important 
to push back against the reductive formulation of an unalterable species hierarchy, 
Asturias’s attention to the role of biopolitics in the treatment of precarious human 
bodies—particularly those colonized, racialized, and indigent human others—signals the 
imperative of rethinking ethics not just in human or animal terms, but through ontological 
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uncertainty.91 
This chapter engages with a number of these questions. What does it mean to be 
human and what does it mean to be animal? How do these taxonomical categorizations 
overlap with other inequities in Latin America? And second, how have assertions of 
human animality problematized the supposed stability and universality of the “human” as 
an ontological category? This chapter examines how representations of human animality 
in Central American literature, specifically those of bodily vulnerability during the 
revolutionary period, anticipate current conversations in the humanities that urge scholars 
to think beyond the human. 
 
Revisiting the Revolution 
This chapter argues that literature written in the revolutionary period in Central 
America illustrates the balancing act between economic, social and ecological reform that 
Asturias problematizes in his essay. Specifically, I examine how literature produced 
during the Somoza dictatorship that preceded the Sandinista Revolution reflects anxiety 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Animal studies pushes us to recognize that the “human” has always been predicated on the nonhuman. 
Man has long deemed himself the “rational animal,” whose reason demarcates him from his others, 
differentiating lives that matter from those that don’t. Yet, as critical studies of race, feminism, and 
postcolonialism have demonstrated, this universal “human” is not universal at all, but rather a specific 
paradigm blind to its own specificity: the man of the Enlightenment, linked to the history of Western 
imperialism. As scholars such as Zakiyya Jackson and Mel Chen have pointed out, much of the current 
work in animal studies has tended to be Eurocentric in scope, and sidesteps crucial questions of race and 
geopolitics. That is, in its ambition to move past the human, posthumanism tends towards a new universal 
that is inattentive to racism and postcolonial power dynamics. This absence of race in posthumanist theory 
is particularly surprising given that the nonhuman has long been discussed in gendered racializations, and 
vice-versa, race has long been talked about through animality. Thus my project joins others in working to 
fill this gap by bringing the animal into conversation with these other traditions of critique—specifically, 
critical studies of gender and race as they pertain to Latin America—in order to further our understanding 
of how the separation of the “human” from its others is not an intuitive split, but a constantly produced 
boundary separating life that is protected from life that is deemed expendable. 
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about dehumanizing biopolitical practices. While some literary works propose that 
revolution will reinstate the humanity of Central American subjects, others take an 
opposite tactic, arguing that human animality is not something that ought to be detached 
from the Latin American subject, but a trope that facilitates a deeper understanding of 
bodily vulnerability.92 
Revisiting the revolutionary moment today is a complicated gesture. The 
revolutionary period, as defined by Arturo Arias, began with the unsuccessful 
insurrection of left-wing officers in Guatemala in November 1960 and ended with the 
electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in February 1990, three 
months after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Arias 2015).93 This thirty-year period is 
indisputably foundational for Central American culture, particularly because of its 
prolific and innovative literary production—what Arias terms a “mini-boom”—that 
grounded revolutionary political praxis. Yet in spite of this centrality, Central American 
literature published during the height of this period, the 1960s and 70s, has largely 
receded from scholarly attention. Such is the extent of this phenomenon that a 2015 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 This chapter proceeds by examining three modes articulating human-nonhuman vulnerability in relation 
to revolution. First, the discourse of toxicity (Cardenal and Ramirez), which demonstrates the fragility of 
the human body in relation to the environment, but also the desire for cultural, national and ontological 
purity. Second, the use of animality in revolutionary discourse (Cabezas, echoing Fernández Retamar) as a 
way to index virility as a site of contestation that speaks back to the colonizer. Third, the use of the animal 
as a pedagogical tool (Chávez Alfaro) that teaches the revolutionary subject how to care for the precarious 
other, but also indexes human animality as a way to rewrite animal life (zoe) as a position of power.  
93 Claudia Gilman alternatively dates the Latin American “época revolucionaria” as beginning with the 
Cuban Revolution and ending with Pinochet’s coup in 1973. When contrasted with Arias’ regional 
perspective, Gilman’s continental approach highlights that in Central America the revolutionary moment 
extended long past that of the rest of Latin America. The protracted revolutionary struggle in Central 
America throughout the seventies and eighties thus crafted the isthmus as the space of idealistic promise for 
revolutionary success, or as the prolonged continuation of a model that had been abandoned by the rest of 
the continent decades prior (thus cementing the commonplace that Central American suffered from 
“desarrollo tardío” or “desparejo desarrollo” that that Ángel Rama erroneously diagnoses in Novísimos 
narradores hispanoamericanos en marcha (Perkowksa 2)).  
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special issue of the leading journal dedicated to Central American literary studies, Istmo, 
pointedly asks whether these fictions are “narrativas agotadas o recuperables.” In the 
issue’s introduction, Magdalena Perkowska discusses the current invisibility of works 
published during the 60s and 70s, noting that their decline in critical interest is 
particularly striking given their experimental aesthetics and substantial impact on 
political process. The essays proffer that perhaps these texts have receded from view 
precisely because the revolutions came and went without delivering their promised 
changes, as the title of Edelberto Torres-Rivas’ scholarly book, Revoluciones sin cambios 
revolucionarios, underscores.  
This disappointing lack of social transformation has made it difficult to regard the 
utopian optimism that characterized the revolutionary moment without a heavy dose of 
cynicism, as Beatriz Cortez suggests in her analysis of the “estética del cinismo” that 
unifies literature of the posguerra. The radicalism of the sixties, Rafael Lemus observes, 
has been increasingly perceived in the 21st century as naive or simply foolish. 
Exemplifying this sentiment, Horacio Castellanos Moya, perhaps the most internationally 
visible Central American author today, indicts the revolutionary period in La 
metamórfosis del sabueso for its empty ideological promises and lack of aesthetic 
innovation. Overall, the current reigning paradigm is one of disenchantment with the 
overt deployment of literature as a political tool. This shift, in conjunction with a 
publishing market whose uneven distribution of Central American texts has made them 
difficult to obtain outside of their countries of origin, has since the 1990s dramatically 
reduced the attention given to the highly political fiction inspired by or written in 
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response to the revolution.94 
Nonetheless, it is important, as Stephen Henighan points out, “to guard against 
revisionist accounts that would deny the idealistic, liberating qualities of this experience” 
(687). The essays collected in Istmo’s special issue make a similar case for the continued 
relevance of revolutionary texts, arguing that the “estallido cognitivo [y] creativo” 
produced by the civil wars “evidenció discursos y formas retóricas que bajo condiciones 
globalizadas revelan ahora tanto la continuidad como la fragmentación de los imaginarios 
sociales centroamericanos” (Arias 2015, 15). A case is being made that texts produced in 
Central America during the 60s and 70s have thus far only be read in political or national 
terms—that is, in relation to their impact on political projects—a reading that, although 
perhaps inevitable given these works’ socio-historical contexts, is reductive. To the 
contrary, I ascribe to the current trend in Central American scholarship that approaches 
these texts not just as ideological documents, but as complex, polyvalent works that 
surface multiple and contradictory readings. Thus, the aim of revisiting this period today 
is to read revolutionary literature in terms of both its problematic aspects, such as its 
homogenizing, masculinist discourse, as well as for moments of slippage that point 
toward multivalent subjectivities.  
Within this context of reassessment, this chapter explores how this idealistic 
moment grappled with the relationship with the nonhuman world, and revised the idea of 
nature from a backdrop against which culture is shaped, to a space integral to social and 
economic success. The revolution promoted thinking about the human in relation to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Most scholarship on revolutionary cultural production was written during the 90s, including Acevedo, 
Arias, Beverley and Zimmerman, Craft, Cuevas, Kelly, Leyva, Mondragón, and Zavala (Perkowska 9).   
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environment in ways that modified prevalent constructs of ethical (or humane) interaction 
with the ecosystem. The idealism that brokered this thinking about human embeddedness 
in nature and interspecies biological fragility was innovative, but also checkered with 
blind spots.95 Capitalism was talked about as toxic and dehumanizing; terms that invoke a 
body altered from its original purity. I argue that notions of “purity,” with its ethical, 
racial and ontological implications, and bodily vulnerability underpin revolutionary 
discourse that insists on a static, homogenous ideal. But I also remain attentive to how the 
revolutionary ethos of idealism reworks the intersection between human and nonhuman 
in order to escape the binary choice formulated by Asturias—that a nation can either 
protect its human or its nonhuman life—to articulate a third path that sees these 
categories not as separate but inextricable. Rather than choose whether to monetize 
animals or humans, certain revolutionary writers question this hierarchical ethics in an 
attempt to problematize capitalist commodification of vulnerable life. 
The basic question that this chapter engages is: why does species emerge as a vital 
concept during the Sandinista revolution? First, I will discuss notions of natural/national 
purity in revolutionary discourse, at a time when the degradation of both nature and 
culture was seen as a consequence of the exploitative implementation of capitalism and 
neocolonialism. Second, I will discuss why revolutionary writers like Omar Cabezas used 
the animal as a figure through which to access and rehabilitate the instinctual masculine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 While the Sandinista insurrection from 1972-1979 and the subsequent period the FSLN governed 
Nicaragua from 1979-1990 are now retrospectively viewed with either nostalgia or cynicism, the revolution 
ultimately eludes reductionist accounts. It was a deeply contradictory event, characterized by both idealism 
and missteps. The Sandinista experiment ultimately failed, a failure that was cemented in the FSLN’s 
electoral loss of power in 1990 three months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but presaged by ideological 
compromise and the failure to think beyond patriarchal, homogenous national ideals.  
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vitality that had been lost by bourgeois domestication. And finally, I will turn to Lizandro 
Chávez Alfaro’s ludic play with the collapse of race and animality in order to situate 
bodily vulnerability as a source of strength for the new revolutionary ethics. 
 
Toxicity, fragility and desire for purity 
By the advent of the revolution, the environment in Nicaragua had reached a 
critical state of degradation. From 1936 until 1979, the successive Somoza dictatorships 
promoted disarticulated export-based growth, an unbalanced approach to development 
that overly relied on natural resources and pushed raw materials to precarious levels of 
sustainability. The rapid expansion of the export sector drove peasants to relocate into 
previously unpopulated spaces, resulting in large-scale environmental destruction. 
Deforestation of tropical rainforests outpaced the rest of the region: 386 square miles per 
year by the late 1970s (Faber 62). Such practices also impacted human health. 
Particularly problematic was the rampant unregulated use of insecticides to protect crops 
on plantations throughout the country. These chemicals leached into the soil and water 
table, making Nicaragua the world leader in pesticide poisonings and causing millions of 
dollars in damage.96 In 1977, a study found that mothers living in León, Nicaragua 
contained 45 times the amount of DDT deemed safe by the World Health Organization in 
their breast milk (Faber 66). The byproducts of capitalism were literally soaking into 
Nicaraguan bodies. This alarming proof of human vulnerability pointed to the failure of 
the prevailing developmentalist model that figured humans as separate from nature, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In all, the social and economic damage produced by insecticides in Nicaragua was estimated to amount to 
$200 million each year (Faber 49). 
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nature as static and elastic enough to always bounce back from human manipulation.  
When the Sandinistas seized power in 1979, the FSLN advocated environmental 
revitalization as a platform that was not separate from economic and social reform, but 
integral to total social transformation. Ernesto Cardenal’s famous poem “Ecología” 
condensed this sentiment in its concluding stanza: “La liberación no sólo la ansiaban los 
humanos. / Toda la ecología gemía. La revolución / es también de los lagos, ríos, árboles, 
animales.” As Cardenal puts it, “la liberación del medio ambiente” was not a minor 
revolutionary initiative, but thought of as essential to its success.97 By reclaiming natural 
resources and promoting sustainable agricultural practices, the government would gain 
autonomy from foreign business interests and market pressures. The FSLN’s aggressive 
pursuit of ecological reform in the early years of the revolution was unprecedented. 
Environmental historian Daniel Faber later characterized it as the “single most important 
national experiment in radical ecology the world has ever seen” (46). However, the 
trajectory of this experiment from its initial success to ultimate failure—abandoned in the 
mid-1980s by a government strapped for cash, struggling under economic embargo and at 
war against the contras—echoes Asturias’ pragmatic belief that the State is ultimately 
forced to choose between human or environmental welfare, unable to juggle both. 
Although the FSLN’s pursuit of ecologically minded reform eventually collapsed, 
reverting after just a few years to the classic developmentalist model that favored 
economic over environmental health, it is still useful to examine revolutionary 
environmentalist discourse. Revisiting this moment is particularly timely because it has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Analisa DeGrave argues that in Cardenal’s utopian poetics, nature does not occupy a secondary, 
referential role in the construction of a new society, but that revitalizing the “topos” is essential to 
restructuring society itself (93). 
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recently resurfaced in debates around Daniel Ortega’s planned construction of a 
transoceanic Nicaraguan canal, which in the name of economic growth threatens both the 
ecosystem and indigenous communities in its path.98 I attend to this moment not in a 
nostalgic gesture of longing for the promise of the revolutionary past, but to unravel the 
way in which the revolution conceptually brought the nonhuman to the fore of ideology, 
engaging it as a model of universal vulnerability that anticipates arguments made today 
by theorists such as Judith Butler. The careful consideration of the construction of the 
nonhuman in revolutionary thought also unearths discursive specters that I suggest 
foretell the ultimate failure of this utopian gesture. I examine how the discourse of 
capitalist dehumanization and the revolutionary promise to restore the integrity of 
national ecology/body coexisted with attempts to deconstruct the problematic notions of 
purity and ontological stability that accompanied these revolutionary claims.  
Whereas the telluric novel of the early twentieth century enacted anxieties about 
how Central America’s tropical climate was altering the bodies that settled there—
eroding morality and stimulating instinctual violence—by the mid-twentieth century, 
anxieties about bodily transformation were increasingly linked not to climate, but to 
capitalism. Toxicity provided a particularly apt metaphor for capitalism’s biopolitical 
effects. The horrific detection in breast milk of high amounts of DDT that had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Current polemics around Sandinista president Daniel Ortega’s plans to move forward with the 
construction of the Nicaraguan canal in collaboration with Chinese business interests, a project that will 
likely wreak havoc on the ecological integrity of the ecosystem as well as displace indigenous communities 
that subsist off the land, provides an ironic postscript to Cardenal’s poetic imagining of a revolution 
committed to environmental rejuvenation. Sergio Ramírez, among others, has commented that Ortega’s 
revolutionary rhetoric no longer matches his policies (Kane 270). The Nicaraguan Canal is a contemporary 
example of how human wellbeing (economic development and national financial growth) continues to be 
articulated as more pressing than ecological health. The oppositional deployment of human versus 
nonhuman considerations contributes to the widespread notion that these are competing interests that do not 
overlap. As the Nicaraguan canal case suggests, wildlife destruction runs parallel to the destruction of 
indigenous communities; these are concomitant threats, not competing ones.  
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liberally sprayed across banana plantations drove home the realization that the nation 
under Somoza had become both figuratively and literally toxic.99  
Proof of agribusiness’s deleterious unseen effects, pesticide was a common trope 
in revolutionary discourse. Ernesto Cardenal’s iconic poem “Luces” invoked the 
chemical in the description of his triumphant return from exile after Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle’s defeat in July 1979:  
 Y ahora ya la playa de Poneloya, 
y el avión entrando en tierra. 
El cordón de espuma de la costa 
radiante bajo la luna. 
El avión bajando. Un olor a insecticida. 
Y me dice Sergio: “El olor de Nicaragua!” 
Rather than repurpose toxicity into a heavy-handed metaphor, Cardenal’s poetics of 
“exteriorismo”—defined as the “objective,” anecdotal observation of the surrounding 
world—gesture toward pesticide’s symbolic resonance through revolutionary author 
Sergio Ramírez’s interpolated comment. Set alongside distinctive national landmarks, the 
toxic “smell of Nicaragua” signals not only the saturation of pesticides in the national 
body, but their naturalization as a distinguishing sensory quality of the landscape. The 
association of toxicity with the madre patria drolly juxtaposes the sentimental idealism 
that usually accompanies narratives of homecoming with a tongue-in-cheek critique of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 By contrast, a decade earlier Franz Fanon used DDT as “an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial 
violence” in the Wretched of the Earth (1961) when “he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as 
a weapon against the “parasites” spread by the colonials’ Christian church” (Nixon 6-7). Rob Nixon’s 
reading of this passage argues that Fanon’s “temporal vision of violence” was justifiably more concerned 
with land as property, and didn’t have access to the science that we do today that informs us about how 
“environmentally embedded violence,” once set in motion, is difficult to reverse (7). 
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capitalist corruption. 
By sardonically refashioning pesticide into the national scent, “Luces” creates a 
totalizing representation of the nation inherited by the revolution as one without refuge 
from capitalism’s toxic penetration. This image of total toxic diffusion is democratizing: 
not just certain social groups are vulnerable to ecological fallout, but the entire country is 
put at risk. This appeal to the democratic inescapability of chemical toxicity recalls 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), which successfully brought environmental 
destruction to national consciousness in the United States in the sixties. It did so not by 
highlighting the unequal impact of ecological degradation on the poor, but by shocking 
middle-American suburbia into realizing that it too was in danger. Similarly, Cardenal 
frames the toxic threat as a common cause around which an array of disparate interest 
groups could be mobilized and brought into the Sandinista fold. 
Toxicity, or the degree to which a substance can harm an organism, is evocative 
of invasion. As Mel Chen explains, toxicity “is understood as an unnaturally external 
force that violates (rather than informs) an integral and bounded self” (194, original 
emphasis). In Nicaragua, where DDT slowly seeped into the water table, pesticide was a 
literal and symbolic manifestation of neocolonial agribusiness’s invasive, unnatural 
degradation of national integrity. The byproducts of foreign capital investment were 
altering national bodies, transforming them into distorted, toxic iterations of themselves. 
This loss of bodily and national purity was a central concern of revolutionary thought that 
often dovetailed with critiques of colonialism and capitalism’s erosion of indigenous 
practices and traditional ways of life, which were frequently represented with nostalgic 
idealism, rather than in their existing cultural specificity.  
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Sergio Ramírez, the interpolated voice in Cardenal’s “Luces,” later penned an op-
ed for the newspaper Nación in 2001 that developed the critique hinted at by Cardenal’s 
poem. In “El paraíso envenenado,” Ramírez describes the enduring impact of insecticides 
in Nicaragua at the turn of the twenty-first century. His op-ed illustrates its irreparable 
damage through a series of portraits of people affected by chemical exposure. He 
explains that Standard Fruit plantation workers who were subjected to frequent sprayings 
in the sixties and seventies, now, over forty years later, continue to suffer from related 
ailments such as infertility, stunted development and bodily defects. By contrast, the 
transnational companies responsible for these harms have felt no such consequences. 
Anticipating Rob Nixon’s observation that environmental destruction is a slow violence, 
with “disasters that are slow moving and long in the making” (3), Ramírez underscores 
that although the moment of contamination may have appeared ephemeral—the spray 
swiftly absorbed into the atmosphere—in reality the toxins linger in the soil long after 
their original application.100 This toxicity, Ramírez argues, is inherited. The legacy of 
inherited ecological violence mirrors colonialism’s long-lasting imprint. One of the 
victims of this slow violence that Ramírez profiles is Juan José, a child who never 
worked on the plantations but grew up in the affected area, and had to stop attending 
school because of unbearable headaches, nosebleeds, and painful, bloody urination. 
Steeped in moral indignation, Ramírez’s outraged op-ed conforms to Lawrence Buell’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ramírez anticipates Nixon’s observation that these forms of slow violence do not receive as much 
attention as they deserve, since they are overshadowed in this era of spectacle-driven media. Nixon 
explains, “In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special 
effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is 
driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutation that—particularly in the bodies of the poor—
remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, 
mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the 
visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat” (6). 
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observation that the discourse of toxicity is one “of allegation rather than of proof,” 
whose “moralism and intensity proceeds in good part precisely from the awareness that 
its charges have not yet been proven, at least to the satisfaction of the requisite 
authorities” (659). 
While Ramírez’s moral critique of capitalist toxicity is powerful, it is worth 
noting that it also is contingent upon essentialist notions of originary purity, evidenced by 
its very title, “El paraíso envenenado.” Elaborating this image of a “poisoned paradise,” 
Ramírez begins his piece by describing the exquisite smells that Thomas Gage recorded 
while traveling across the isthmus in the 17th century: “vainilla, corozo y […] eucalipto.” 
This bucolic setting is juxtaposed against the trauma of toxic disruption: “Tres siglos 
después aquel paisaje idílico había desaparecido, y el aire olía a insecticidas clorinados 
que las avionetas regaban sobre los plantíos de algodón y a los venenos residuales con 
que se rociaban las plantaciones de banano.” Ramírez’s moral outrage is expressed 
through the mode of pastoral nostalgia, which recurs to the simplistic opposition between 
a paradisiacal pre-colonial past (of natural, untouched purity) and a present-day toxic 
wasteland marred by the disruptive energy of capitalist and colonial change. No longer a 
place of timeless harmony, capitalism’s depersonalizing forces have eroded Nicaragua’s 
distinctive botanical aroma, making it an uninhabitable, no-longer-specific space. This 
dramatic distinction between a pure past and contaminated present effectively mobilizes 
the reader’s indignation, but sidesteps the complexity of ecological change and the actors 
responsible for it.  
This is not to say that Ramírez’s argument is without merit. Indeed, the essay 
heightens awareness about the long afterlife of toxins and the cyclical harm they inflict. 
174 
	  
However, it also depicts change, specifically that which alters originary purity, with 
suspicion. Ramírez instead yearns for the pastoral ideal, which imagines nature to be 
static and ahistorical.101 Equally problematic, his representation of the victims of toxicity 
is elaborated through the Virgilian gothic mode, which as Buell points out, advocates 
“social regeneration by reinscribing the polarization of saved versus the damned, the 
guide being so much wiser, so much more like us, than the hapless, hardly human 
victims” (655). A detached observer, Ramírez speaks for the victims of pesticide’s slow 
violence; he contrasts their deformed, wretched bodies with an imagined pre-colonial 
autochthonous wholesomeness, as well as against the healthful vitality of his own body.  
In sum, the recurrent trope of toxicity in revolutionary literature identifies 
neoimperialism’s invisible material harm. The toxin exemplifies the scope of the 
capitalist threat: a gradual and unseen inheritance of violence. It also discloses the 
porosity—and fragility—of the human body in relation to the environment. Yet the 
discourse of toxicity is often co-constituent with a discourse of purity. The condemnation 
of toxicity is expressed as the desire to protect the nation from an external threat, or 
safeguard the integrity of the human body from alien substances, a separation that insists 
on maintaining the separation (rather than the permeability) of the human body from the 
environment. Such an invocation of purity presumes that the nation, human body, and 
environment are stable and cohesive entities in the first place, and possess some 
primordial “essence” that is proper to them, rather than created in relation to other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ernesto Cardenal triumphantly declared after the success of the Sandinista Revolution in the poem 
“Nueva Ecología” that the Revolution had repaired the natural world and dialed back the clock to a time 
before development and exploitation, when the natural world was held by man as sacred. Instantly, the 
natural fecundity of the land was revitalized and even “The armadillos go around very happy with this 
government” (177). 
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cultures, bodies and natures. 
The discourse of toxicity’s reliance on notions of corrupted bodily purity 
commingled with ideas about cultural purity. The Sandinista ambition to restore 
Nicaragua’s cultural integrity was not unprecedented; rather, it continued a vein of 
ultranationalist thought promoted by right-leaning avant-garde intellectuals like Pablo 
Antonio Cuadra since the 1930s that was wary of North American influence in the region 
(Gordon 147). Similarly, the revolution promised not only to stop, but to reverse 
processes of cultural adulteration. One of the primary groups thought to most benefit 
from cultural cleansing was the Miskitu, an ethnic group living along the Atlantic coast. 
Descendants of indigenous Caribs and escaped slaves, the Miskitu immigrated to 
Nicaragua during the colonial period after being exiled from the Caribbean. Their distinct 
appearance, dialect, and cultural practices, differentiated them from the rest of the 
country. Because their dialect is inflected with English, many in the FSLN felt that the 
Miskitu aligned more organically with the Anglophone Empire than with autochthonous 
culture, and by proxy, the revolution (Gordon 146). In an attempt to integrate the Miskitu 
into the revolutionary imaginary, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega argued that the peoples 
living along the Caribbean coast suffered from “cultural disintegration” and needed the 
revolution to rescue their lost cultural patrimony. Along similar lines, Ernesto Cardenal 
claimed that their authentic culture had been “forgotten for centuries.” The paternalist 
desire to “restore” the Miskitu culture overlooked existing Miskito peoples and viewed 
their cultural practices as diluted and degenerated versions of the original (Gordon 147). 
Such desires to restore cultural and environmental purity played into the revolution’s 
Messianic vision, but also doubled-down on nature and culture as static, uninterrupted 
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entities.  
In her analysis of revolutionary subjectivity in Central America, Josefina Saldaña-
Portillo explains that indigenous identity was repeatedly constructed in revolutionary 
discourse as anterior, not concurrent with, revolutionary history. The effect of this 
representation of anteriority was one of deracination; ethnic identification was thought to 
yield to the more “superior,” fundamental identification of class (99). We can see this at 
work in Cardenal and Ortega’s discussion of the Miskitu’s lost cultural patrimony, which 
situates the group’s cultural essence in the past, prior to the revolution. Following this 
line of reasoning, it is the revolutionary subject, not the Miskitu peoples, who has the 
moral authority to intervene to correct this lack by informing them of this “corruption,” 
and subsequently bring them into the revolutionary fold. 
Saldaña-Portillo furthers that this representation of the revolutionary subject as 
the restorer of cultural purity extended to the natural world as well. After the FSLN 
successfully seized power, Cardenal jubilantly wrote in the aforementioned poem 
“Ecología” that the revolution would dial back the clock to a time before development 
and exploitation, when the natural world was held by man as sacred. Enumerating the 
environmental destruction wreaked by Somoza, Cardenal uses the discourse of toxicity to 
underscore capitalist destruction, describing the Ochomogo River as fouled by “desechos 
químicos capitalistas”. By contrast, the revolution promises to restore its original 
fecundity. In the poem, the nonhuman world immediately senses and supports the change 
in environmental politics; even “The armadillos go around very happy with this 
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government” (177).102 As Adrian Kane concludes in his analysis of “Ecología”, 
Cardenal’s poem “renders environmentalism inseparable from the Sandinista revolution” 
(271). This equation between environmental destruction and capitalism’s lack of 
distributive justice is powerful in that it formulates environmental and human 
exploitation as innately enmeshed, struggles that are both connected to broader 
sociopolitical systems. And yet, the environmentalism envisioned by Cardenal’s poem is 
also problematic: it idealizes and sentimentalizes a lost, past purity while simultaneously 
depicting the revolutionary subject as primary contemporary agent who acts upon this 
materia prima. The revolutionary man molds the static “natural” bodies of land and 
indigenous alike, to restore them to their ideal, originary state. 
 
Becoming Animal, Becoming Man 
Within this framework that imagined the purity of nature as diametrically opposed 
to the corruption of capitalist production, the wilderness was constructed as a space of 
refuge, where the revolutionary could escape the polluting properties of totalitarianism 
and foreign influence. Not only were Nicaragua’s jungles and forests places of refuge 
whose inaccessibility and thick canopies provided shelter from authoritarian reach, but 
their imagined untarnished integrity also made them ideal locales for fashioning 
egalitarian utopias. These were places where one could start from scratch, and to borrow 
upon Marx’s terminology, erect a “great laboratory” for the revolutionary experiment 
(qtd. in Saldaña-Portillo 94). Throughout literary history, the discursive framing of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Adrian Kane notes that animals in “Nueva ecología” are named as victims of the Somoza regime, but 
also inscribed to mark “nature’s revival after decades of destruction” (271). 
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wilderness as a vast blank slate has consolidated its lure: untouched by humans and thus 
possessing a vitality that the city and fields lack. Leaning heavily into the antipodal 
opposition of nature and culture, revolutionary texts narrated the flight from the city to 
the wilderness as a return to organic authenticity, autochthonous essence, and visceral 
masculine instinct, which cumulatively catalyze ideological awakening. Because the 
wilderness crystalized the fantasy of a place unscathed by colonial and neocolonial 
modernity, in these texts it took on a tutelary role. It taught the guerrillas how to confront 
their own mortality and strip themselves of false bourgeois identifications.103 
This configuration of the wilderness as a tabula rasa for the revolutionary 
experiment troublingly reenacted a trope that has long dogged descriptions of landscapes: 
the total erasure of human presence. In revolutionary narratives, the wilderness was 
inscribed as an empty yet hostile space where the guerrilla could experience solitude and 
put his masculinity to the test. Such depictions expunged the presence of indigenous 
campesinos that inhabited and intimately knew these (supposedly blank) landscapes, and 
who acted as guides that taught the revolutionaries how to traverse them. Instead, the 
guerrillas penned themselves as self-determining discoverers and intrepid survivalists. 
Josefina Saldaña-Portillo points out that in this way, revolutionary depictions of the 
wilderness paradoxically replicated the “liberal and imperial discourse of development, 
[by] coupling scientific mastery and colonial quest: The guerrillas invent things, and in 
the process of inventing these things, they remake themselves and the terrain around 
them” (96). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 For more on the wilderness’s “lure” and tutelary role in literary history, see Leo Mellor. Also see Ileana 
Rodríguez’s article “Montañas con aroma de mujer” for more on how Che Guevara constructed the 
mountain as a space for men to prove their self-control and become guerrilleros. 
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One such example from the Sandinista revolution that goes unmentioned by 
Saldaña-Portillo is Omar Cabezas’s revolutionary bildungsroman, La montaña es algo 
más que una inmensa estepa verde (1982). A commander in the guerrilla offensive 
against Somoza and later a FSLN party official, Cabezas is perhaps best known for this 
memoir about his time as a guerrilla. The title, La montaña es algo más que una inmensa 
estepa verde, situates nature as central to his ideological coming-of-age. Strangely, as 
Monique Sarfati-Arnaud has pointed out, the title couples two distinct types of terrain—
mountain and steppe—a discordant pairing because a mountain is not a steppe, nor can a 
steppe be considered a mountain (260).104 The dissonance caused by this juxtaposition is 
largely defused by the adjectival phrase “algo más que”, which differentiates the 
mountain as “something more” than the steppe’s green expanse. Yet notably, this 
“something more than” goes undefined. Its lack of specification functions as an ellipsis 
that indexes an opaque excess. The text later settles the vagaries of this allusion, 
explaining that what makes the mountain more than just an inert landscape is the 
revolution fomenting within it. In this sense, revolution and mountain activate each other. 
The mountain’s thick green canopy conceals the dissidents. Conversely, revolutionary 
activity endows it with more (human) meaning, making the mountain no longer a hostile, 
indistinct green space, but something more. 
Initially, Cabezas constructs the mountain as a fixed symbol of revolutionary 
promise, disconnected from its material physicality: “pues la montaña en la ciudad era un 
mito, la montaña era un símbolo” (89). From the comfortable remove of the city, it was 
easy to romanticize both nature and the revolution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The confusion of this pairing is sidestepped by the English translation of the title, Fire on the Mountain. 
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Cuando me fui a la montaña, subí con la idea de que la montaña era un poder, 
pues estaba el mito de los compañeros de la montaña, lo misterioso, lo 
desconocido, modesto, por allá, arriba... hablábamos de la montaña como algo 
mítico, donde estaba la fuerza e incluso las armas, los mejores hombres, la 
indestructibilidad, la garantía del futuro, la balsa para no hundirse en lo más 
profundo de la dominación de la dictadura, la determinación de no resignarse. 
(28)  
From a distance, the mountain is apprehended through the sublime: as an awe-inspiring, 
unknowable mystery. In service of this glamorized ideal, revolutionary activity in the city 
was performed “en función de esa montaña, en función del FSLN, de ese misterio” (89). 
This equivalency of the mountain with the FSLN as analogous obscurities initially 
appears to be metaphoric; the mountain serves as the revolution’s central guiding 
metaphor. However, I suggest that it is more precise to say that Cabezas erects a 
metonymic relationship between mountain and revolution. This subtle rhetorical shift 
articulates a distinct conception of the environment’s role in the revolution: not just as a 
fixed symbol that stands in for revolutionary promise, but as historically contingent. 
Cabezas’s preference for metonymy over metaphor is important because the former 
articulates the relationship between nature and society as contiguous and mutually 
agential, rather than as separate, albeit related, abstractions.  
The most productive distinction between metaphor and metonymy can be found 
in Roman Jakobson’s 1956 article “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbances.” Prior to Jakobson’s intervention, metonymy was often thought of as 
metaphor’s lesser counterpart. Parsing apart the collapse of this pair as mere synonyms, 
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Jakobson argues that what differentiates the two “linguistic predilections” is that 
metaphor articulates similarity, whereas metonymy expresses contiguity. While metaphor 
is preferred by the romantic and symbolist tradition, metonymy “underlies and actually 
predetermines the so-called “realist” trend.” Jakobson’s mention of realism is particularly 
relevant to ecocritical readings because scholars invested in rescuing the materiality that 
has been eschewed by the linguistic turn are disconcerted by how metaphor abstracts and 
displaces materiality (though one might object, as Donna Haraway does in Staying with 
the Trouble, good luck escaping the metaphor! (102)). By contrast, metonymy “defies 
interpretation.” Accordingly, if metaphor is similarity and metonymy is contiguity, then a 
metaphorical relating of human processes with natural ones creates a comparison in 
which entities are analogous, but totally separate. By contrast, metonymy operates 
through contiguity. This proximity can be physical, as the definition of contiguity 
suggests (“actual contact” or “touching along a boundary”), or temporal. Metonymy 
figures a relationship that is based on contexture and imbrication; two distinct entities are 
placed not just in abstract relation, but also in physical correspondence.105 
In other words, while La montaña es algo más initially establishes the mountain 
as a static metaphor that indexes the revolutionary effort, it later complicates the 
comparison. Metaphor is replaced by metonymy, which underscores physical proximity 
and suggests that contiguity with mountainous terrain is what incites revolutionary 
transformation. Ideological awakening is formulated as the result of shedding civilized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Many scholars have pointed out that the distinction between metaphor and metonymy is not always so 
straightforward. Barbara Johnson argues that there is “the tendency of contiguity to become overlaid by 
similarity,” that is, metonymy often slips into metaphor, and vice versa. For example, the White House is 
not just metonymic for the presidential palace, but is also “metaphorically connected to the whiteness of its 
inhabitants” (157). 
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comforts and testing one’s manhood in nature: all to emerge rehabilitated with the mature 
status of hombre nuevo.  
Cabezas’s tale of masculine self-fulfillment is effective precisely because it 
contrasts the author’s current, untroubled masculinity against his previous feebleness. 
Describing his first few days struggling through uneven muck, he explains that he was 
woefully unprepared for the trials of the wilderness/revolution. This inadequacy 
manifests itself on his body as painful lesions and cuts, but also psychically, through the 
revelation of his bourgeois effeminacy. Cabezas explains that the struggle with nature 
shattered his false sense of security, a necessary deconstruction to emerge rebuilt as self-
sufficient and finally “authentically” masculine. “Hay momentos en que te reduce a unos 
niveles extraordinarios de impotencia ya cuando vos sentís que te van saliendo las 
primeras ampollas en los pies, las llagas en los pies, y chimones” (90). The return to 
nature is narrated as a confrontation with the body’s fragile materiality. Recognizing 
one’s bodily weakness is as humbling as impotence: both unravel the masculine fantasy 
of supremacy. “Abrumado por mis debilidades físicas… viendo lo inútil que me iba 
sintiendo en la caminata”, Cabezas realized that he wasn’t, as he had thought, “el héroe 
para las muchachas” but simply “un desgraciado caminando, un miserable” (35).  
Unlike other revolutionary narratives that paint the guerrilla fighter as heroic 
throughout, La montaña es algo más plots Cabezas’s transformation from bourgeois 
effeminate into hombre nuevo as a redemptive bildungsroman. Significantly, it is the 
harsh conditions of the wilderness that enact his metamorphosis. Diverging from the 
revolutionary model analyzed by Saldaña-Portillo in which the revolutionary man 
conquers the natural space and fashions it to his liking, Cabezas insists on his initial 
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inability to “dominar el medio” (90). Proximity with nature is not described as 
harmonious, but as difficult, awkward and uncomfortable. The bourgeois penitent does 
not transform nature, but rather nature acts upon him, punishing him for his civilized 
effeminacy. It enacts an organic penance: the atonement manifest in the “ampollas... 
llagas... y chimones” that forcefully surface through this bodily contact. As Cabezas puts 
it, it is only through this difficult proximity with Nature that “entonces las ideas las sentía 
intimamente” (90). That is, the body and mind’s contexture in the unsympathetic terrain 
is what allows the individual to internalize and intimately feel ideas in ways that weren’t 
possible from the sanitized urbanity of the city. Rather than a metaphorical relationship in 
which nature reflects the state of the mind, in Cabezas’s memoir, the associative relation 
between mind and natural surroundings articulates a metonymical correspondence in 
which the relationship between human body and natural body, ideology and matter, is 
dynamic and imbricated. Ideology, then, is contingent upon the contiguous association 
with space.  
Repeating the trope of the return to nature as a rite of purification that strengthens 
body and mind, La montaña es algo más depicts nature’s conversion of urbane men into 
more masculine revolutionaries.  “Como que la montaña y el lodo, el lodo y la lluvia 
también, la soledad, como que nos fueron lavando un montón de taras de la sociedad 
burguesa” (119). Unlike the city’s domesticated rain and mud (whose natural vitality is 
marred by civilization), the wilderness’s more “natural” elements cleanse and transform 
the men they touch. After the initiates’ blisters and welts subside, a harder, cracked skin 
covers their bodies like armored scales. This metamorphic conversion is articulated 
through interlocking discourses of maturation, masculinity, and species: 
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Pero cada vez vas dominando el medio… aprendiendo a caminar… se te 
fortalecen las piernas, aprendés a manejar el machete… y ya con el tiempo el pelo 
te va creciendo. A mí me salieron los bigotes en la montaña… el poco baño te 
curte la piel… entonces, como que poco a poco ese montón de hombres se van 
convirtiendo en otro elemento más, en otras criaturas más de la montaña, con 
inteligencia, pero como los animales, y peor, porque somos animales reprimidos. 
(116)  
Reinforcing the romantic notion that manhood can only be fully actualized once it is put 
to the test, the environment alters the bodies that inhabit it: making them stronger, 
hardened, hairy, and virile.106 Becoming-man is described as a process of becoming more 
“natural,” tapping into an innate, primordial masculinity located at the human animal’s 
essence. This passage underscores the hombre nuevo’s exceptionalism—singularly strong 
and hairy—but simultaneously undermines it by situating these qualities within the 
context of the mountain as not exceptional at all; the men now merely emulate the 
“natural” properties of the elements and critters.  
 The discourse of animality in this passage unfolds in two directions. On the one 
hand, Cabezas invokes the wild animal’s affirmative signification of untamed masculine 
instinct and organic strength. On the other, to discover oneself animal signifies 
dehumanization. The biopolitics of authoritarianism relegates those that live under it to a 
state of senseless matter—animality—forcing the subject to leave the comforts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 When Cabezas reflects back upon his reason for joining the fight, he confesses that it was prompted 
more by his desire to appear masculine than his ideological conviction: “Porque ahí había una cuestión casi 
de hombría” (13). 
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civilization and heterosexual love for the punitive desolation of natural space.107 
Nonetheless, this forced revelation of one’s animality is empowering. By getting back in 
touch with his primordial animality, the hombre nuevo becomes strong enough to fight 
back against repression. 
En alguna medida esto fue lo que ayudó a forjar en cada uno de nosotros el acero 
para derrocar a la dictadura. Se nos fue curtiendo la piel, la mirada, se nos fue 
curtiendo el paladar, se nos fue agudizando la vista, se nos fue perfeccionando el 
olfato… los reflejos… nos movíamos como animales. El pensamiento se nos fue 
curtiendo, puliendo el oído, es decir, nos íbamos revistiendo de la misma dureza 
del monte, de dureza de los animales… nos fuimos revistiendo de una corteza de 
hombres-animales como hombres sin alma…. Éramos palo, culebra, jabalíes, 
veloces como los venados, y tan peligrosos como las serpientes, tan fieros como 
un tigre en celo. Así se fue forjando en nosotros un empleo que nos hacía soportar 
el sufrimiento psíquico y físico, fuimos desarrollando una voluntad de granito 
frente al medio… Porque nosotros, como dicen los cristianos, nos negamos a 
nosotros mismos ahí. (116-117) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 And yet, the while dehumanization is a product of the violence of the dictatorship, heteronormative 
masculinity itself carries with it a code of conduct that dehumanizes. “Ese aislamiento, esa soledad es lo 
más terrible, es lo más duro, es lo que más golpea. La soledad de no poder dar un beso… lo que para un ser 
humano es no poder acariciar algo… la soledad de no recibir una sonrisa, de que no te acaricien, si hasta 
los animales se acarician… una culebra ponzoñosa acaricia al macho…. Un jabalí… un pajarito… los 
peces de los ríos se acarician. Nosotros no podíamos acariciarnos, éramos puros hombres, no podíamos 
recibir palabras dulces” (114). While the return to nature is often narrated as an encounter with the self, a 
journey in solitude where a man might “find himself,” in this passage Cabezas describes how 
heteronormative masculinity produces a logic of self-containment and deprivation. To reach out to another, 
to smile, is to violate the purity of a contained masculinity that only directs desire and communion toward 
the feminine. The caress, Cabezas writes, is a mode of interaction that transcends species. So, to be 
deprived of the caress or the smile is to be reduced beneath the animal itself, to be rendered “puros 
hombres”, a constructed state of being that, while declaring itself a collective, is, in essence, insular, 
inanimate and insentient. 
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Recurring to Judeo-Christian discourses of abnegation, the rebirth of the hombre nuevo is 
articulated as an expurgation of the self, and with it, weakness. Juxtaposed against the 
metaphoric castration enacted by neoimperial authoritarianism, metonymic contact with 
the wilderness rehabilitates this mislaid masculinity.108 Mark Allister’s observation in 
Eco-man: New Perspectives on Masculinity and Nature aptly applies: “nature is for self-
congratulation... masculinity is created through and in nature” (5). The collective too is 
made through and in nature, by adopting the defining characteristics of each woodland 
creature. The celebratory bestiary that the revolutionaries emulate—slithering snakes, 
ferocious tigers—endows the embryonic collective with the innate instinctual superiority 
of animals, so that it, newly revitalized, might deploy this metonymically absorbed 
strength to defeat dictatorship.  
 For Cabezas, the recognition of man’s interconnectedness with “hongos” and 
“zancudos” is a becoming-animal that makes a new, embodied ethics possible. Yet this 
revelation of inter-species connectedness remains reliant on problematic constructs of 
gender and class. The transformation that the “new man” experiences in the woods is not 
a total deconstruction of the individual, but rather is a revelation that is only possible 
because of the education afforded by the city. In one episode, Cabezas is tickled by a 
campesina’s “ignorant” suspicion of his explanation that the Earth is round.109 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Ileana Rodriguez beautifully articulates that for Cabezas the New Man of the Revolution is one who 
must be “resilent and strong,” and that he who fails to rise to the occasion has “no place in the future 
(utopia)” (Women, Guerrillas, and Love 45). Nonetheless, feminine signs are also attributed to this figure: 
“freshness, candor, surrender, sacrifice, suffering” (47). 
109 When women are invoked in the text it is often in reference to how their absence affects revolutionary 
men. The absence of women is articulated as a lack that functions to further harden the guerrilla and 
prepare him for the strife of war. This “toughening” is correlated with being less easily moved, less 
emotive, attributes that are gendered: the hardened revolutionary body is impenetrable, less feminine. It is 
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Immediately afterward, he describes how he feels in the wilderness. “Nunca me sentí más 
animal que ahí, como un animal contemplativo, que ve la naturaleza y todo su círculo” 
(137). The hombre nuevo has a privileged perspective: he apprehends and understands 
Nature in a way that surpasses the autochthonous animals and humans who remain 
captured by instinct and ignorance. The “contemplative animal” is able to move in and 
out of animality, in and out of the wilderness, buoyed by masculinity and education. 
 This complex web of gender, class and species intersects in a telling passage 
detailing Cabezas’s first time eating monkey. It was his first night on the mountain, and 
the mood was celebratory; the men finally felt that they were operating as real 
revolutionaries. “Todos nos sentíamos guerrilleros allí. Nos sentíamos hombres 
guerrilleros” (95). The self-congratulatory atmosphere was quickly dampened by the 
arrival of the evening meal: a black howler monkey trapped by the campesino guides. 
Cabezas recounts that the guides explained that “el mono congo es un mono hijueputa, 
feo, hediondo, la carne es dura ¡mano! y hiede, pero con hambre es riquísima” (93). 
Gazing at the slain primate, Cabezas recognizes it as an old man, and then as a child: “le 
miro la cara como de viejito al hijueputa, una cara de viejito, un cuerpo de chavalito con 
cara de viejito” (94). Having never eaten monkey before, he wonders how they will skin 
and condiment it. Watching the campesinos skillfully remove the monkey’s hide, 
Cabezas recoils at its palpable humanity.  
El mono es como el hombre... el mono pelado parecía un chavalillo que le habían 
quitado la piel, con la cabeza cortada y la cola cortada, las manos se las cortás, el 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the hardened, animalistic man who is able to transform loneliness and isolation into the masculine “acero” 
necessary to take down the dictatorship.  
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mono es un niño. Nosotros en el fondo mirábamos que parecía un niño pero no 
decíamos nada para no parecer mujeres, que les da miedo, o asco. Agarra los 
pedazos de las manos, de las patas, de las piernas, de la rabadilla del chavalito, 
pero era mono. (95) 
Swallowing his disgust at the recognition of the monkey’s humanity, so as to not “parecer 
mujeres”, Cabezas eats the soup. In spite of its unappetizing appearance, Cabezas is 
surprised to find out that it tastes fantastic; “una comida de mono búfala... no jodás... de a 
verga” (98).  
 This episode uncovers several intersecting dynamics. In contrast with the capable 
campesino hunters, Cabezas represents himself as overly sentimental in his reaction to 
the dead primate.110  His account of its skinned body muddles species, describing it as 
looking like a child, and then affirming that it is a child: the dismembered body of a 
“chavalito.” This affect-driven confusion is corrected by the episode’s conclusion 
through the expletive-laced affirmation of the soup’s deliciousness. Appetite and 
profanity—its assertive irreverence and masculine bravado—together obscure the body’s 
human similarities. This narrative juxtaposition between the initial effeminate sentimental 
response versus the profane celebration of masculine mastery over nature functions as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Cabezas describes the inability to tough it out as shameful, and tied to class: “creo que más que todo es 
un profundo sentido de la vergüenza que teníamos todos nosotros y del que me valía cuando iba 
caminando, cuando yo sentía que estaba cansado... abrumado por mis debilidades físicas, porque recordá de 
dónde venía: bebiendo, desvelándome, fumando, mal comido, sin hacer ejercicios, de repente, pum, a esas 
cuestiones que eran para hombres, ¡no jodás!, ¿para hombres?, ¡Para campesinos!” (90). This final moment 
of self-reflexive correction is interesting. By replacing the category of “men” with “peasants,” Cabezas 
implies that authentic masculinity is that of the peasant, who is able to traverse the difficult landscape with 
ease. This suggests that to become the “new man” is to become-peasant. However, other textual moments 
contradict this message and reveal the irascibility of class divisions: “a veces a los campesinos no les podes 
hablar todo lo que vos querés, tenés que hablar al nivel de ellos... Porque los urbanos somos más 
complejos, somos más abstractos, más sofisticados, más complicados; los sentimientos, los afectos, la 
interpretación de las cosas” (105-6). 
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microcosm of the memoir’s arc. The episode neatly maps onto the overarching narrative 
of urban bourgeois effeminacy giving way to revolutionary grit through trials by nature.  
 Nonetheless, the bourgeois discomfort with eating monkey, in contrast with the 
campesino mastery of the practice, also points in a different direction: unveiling the class 
and cultural differences separating the revolutionary initiates from their guides. Many 
indigenous cultures have long eaten monkey as part of their regular diet. Loretta Cormier 
notes that some Amazonian indigenous groups, such as the Bororo, Kalapalo and Suyá, 
value eating monkeys precisely because it is a symbolic act of the consumption of kin. 
For others, like the Parintintín and Westernized Barí, the biological and behavioral 
similarities between the two species have led them to avoid eating primates for this very 
reason (145). Thus Cabezas’s initial disgust with the practice can be read as a rejection 
inflected by class and ethnicity. Just as eating squirrel or pigeon is often framed as a 
practice of poverty, connoting dirtiness and disease, this episode leads the reader to 
question why certain animals are deemed appropriate to eat, and others exempt.111 
Cabezas’ recognition of the primate face as that of a vulnerable human child or elder 
underscores our reliance on self-recognition to tell us what is meat, and who is subject. 
 
Man or monkey? Lizandro Chávez Alfaro’s defense of vulnerability 
While many Sandinista thinkers, including Cabezas, who lived in the epicenters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 This episode echoes other anxieties about cannibalistic eating during the revolutionary period in Central 
America. Roque Dalton, for instance, quoted an anonymous popular voice in “Vox populi” that explained: 
"Nadie comía carne de cerdo. En primer lugar porque de seguro esos animales se habían encargado, junto a 
los zopilotes y los insectos, de devorar los cadáveres de los campesinos que habían caído entre los 
matorrales y en segundo lugar porque más de alguna persona aseguró que vendedores inescrupulosos 
habían llegado a vender carne humana en las zonas de occidente especialmente azotadas por el hambre, 
haciéndola pasar por carne de cerdo." 
190 
	  
of national cultural production (such as Granada and Managua) were preoccupied with 
reinstating the Nicaraguan subject’s natural masculine purity, eroded by authoritarianism 
and foreign intervention, one author, Lizandro Chávez Alfaro, writing from the ex-centric 
Atlantic Coast, played with the very concept of ontological fixity as a divergent route for 
imagining a revolutionary model that does not aspire to contained purity, but is based on 
the relational quality of shared bodily vulnerability. 
Chávez Alfaro’s collection of short stories Los monos de San Telmo (1963) 
contributed to the constellation of texts making the case for revolution in the sixties ⁠. Like 
other authors affiliated with the FSLN, his literature challenged existing structures of 
governance by demonstrating that the Somoza dynasty, in collusion with North American 
business interests, deployed the discourse of development in order to justify economic 
and physical exploitation. However, as I will argue through a reading of the collection’s 
titular story, what differentiates Chávez Alfaro’s understanding of Latin American 
exploitation from similar Marxist formulations is his assertion that this domination is 
consolidated through the repeated operation of discursively sliding the human subject 
down the hierarchical scale of subjectivity, reducing him to an animal—a beast of 
burden—or worse, rendering him a thing, a commodity or natural resource. In other 
words, Chávez Alfaro identifies the discourse of species at the heart of capitalist and 
authoritarian oppression. However, his solution is not to reject the association of the 
Nicaraguan subject with the animal, but to reclaim it as a site of ontological ambiguity 
from which to contest humanism’s sacrificial regime. 
Beginning in 1968, the FSLN increasingly emphasized the importance of cultural 
work for the construction of a broad revolutionary bloc. As John Beverley and Marc 
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Zimmerman explain, this approach directly involved artists in revolutionary activism and 
encouraged the production of literature that represented its cause and could be used to 
recruit sympathetic readers (75). New recruits read writers like Cardenal, Ramírez, 
Chávez Alfaro, Carlos Fonseca, and Leonel Rugama as part of their ideological 
formation. Unlike the majority of these intellectuals who grew up in cities like León, 
Managua and Granada that were central to Nicaraguan intellectual and political life, 
Chávez Alfaro was from the Atlantic Coast. The Atlantic, with its strong Afro-Caribbean 
roots, had long been marginalized from the national imaginary because of its racial, 
cultural, and linguistic difference. Along with other intellectuals from Bluefields such as 
David McField and Carlos Rigby, Chávez Alfaro was among the first to make the 
Caribbean visible within national literary culture in ways that did justice to its cultural 
specificity, rather than gestured vaguely toward it as an opaque presence.  
Most scholarship on Chávez Alfaro’s literary production has focused on his novel 
Trágame tierra, which he published in 1969 while exiled in Mexico. Appearing at a 
moment when the FSLN had suffered several setbacks and needed ideological 
rejiggering, Trágame tierra was the first Nicaraguan novel to receive international critical 
recognition (Henighan 192), as well as the “first explicitly Sandinista novel” (Beverley 
and Zimmerman 182). Celebrated as a work that foresaw what the revolution would and 
could be (Rodríguez 79), Trágame tierra relates Nicaraguan history through the story of 
one family, and is narrated in the polyphonic, panoramic style characteristic of many 
Boom writers. The generational disparities between the father and the son in the novel 
metonymically account for the failed liberal-conservative project of national development 
and situate Sandinismo as the key hope for future change. While most critics have argued 
192 
	  
that Trágame tierra is the national revolutionary novel par excellence, Leonel Delgado 
clarifies that it is more than a totalizing ideological tract. Delgado identifies sexual, racial 
and regional dissonances within the novel that problematize the homogenous image of 
the nation proffered by the FSLN. 
Before Trágame tierra, Chávez Alfaro published a book of short stories, Los 
monos de San Telmo, which won the Casa de las Américas prize in 1963. 
Contemporaneous with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the creation of the 
FSLN, Los monos was published in Havana to avoid censorship by the Somocista regime, 
which it virulently critiques. The short stories include themes central to Chávez Alfaro’s 
later novelistic work, including the oppressive climate of authoritarianism, modes of 
popular resistance, and Augusto Sandino as an inspirational historical figure. A highly 
accessible work, for the last thirty years Los monos de San Telmo has been required 
reading for Nicaraguan high school students (Delgado 13). Yet in spite of its canonical 
status, the collection has been scarcely studied by critics, perhaps because it appears at 
first glance to be a straightforward, didactic read. Following Delgado’s against-the-grain 
approach to Chávez Alfaro’s work, I read Los monos not just as an anti-imperialist 
manifesto, but for how it unfolds a complex articulation of bodily vulnerability and 
revolutionary consciousness. 
Many of the stories included in Los monos draw upon zoological tropes 
commonplace to the dictator genre like Miguel Ángel Asturias’ Señor Presidente (1942) 
that describe the dehumanization of marginal subjects at the hands of the authoritarian 
State⁠. These works use the discourse of animality to emphasize the brutality of dictatorial 
regimes, under which the population is not treated as citizens deserving due process, but 
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systematically slaughtered like animals. In Señor Presidente, Asturias characterizes the 
violent treatment of political prisoners by the authoritarian State as debasing. 
“Lagrimeaban como animales con moquillo […] les infundía pavor que los fueran a hacer 
jabón de coche, como a los chuchos, o a degollarlos para darle de comer a la policía” 
(121). The prisoners are animals: not subjects, but flesh on the brink of consumption by 
cannibalistic police. Similarly, Chávez Alfaro’s story, “El zoológico de papa,” obliquely 
narrates Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza García’s habit of torturing dissidents by 
caging them with starving animals in his personal zoo. The caged animals devour 
Somoza’s opposition, a perverse analog for how he solidifies power. The text reveals that 
while the dissidents are stripped of their humanity—literally transformed into prey—the 
real “beastly” actor is the authoritarian state, which metaphorically acts as (and through) 
the wild animal, external to humanist categories of ethics or justice. In her analysis of 
modernity’s constitutive violence, Jean Franco articulates the question that such texts 
unearth: “is “bestiality” proper to the beast, or is it human, all too human? The scenes of 
atrocity […] in a barracks or a police station have no parallels in the animal world” (94⁠).  
If humans act with a cruelty unimaginable in the animal world, how is such 
violence justified, and why is it confused with animality? In the titular story of Los monos 
de San Telmo, Chávez Alfaro tackles this question. He condemns the violent 
commodification of human and nonhuman life by authoritarian and capitalist regimes. 
Yet he also complicates the rejection of the animalization of the Nicaraguan subject by 
figuring the threshold experience of becoming-animal as awakening consciousness to the 
shared vulnerability of all species. 
 “Los monos de San Telmo” narrates the efforts of Rock, a North American 
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businessman, and his translator/lackey Doroteo to capture monkeys for export to the 
United States, where their urine will be used for science and their skins will be fashioned 
into coats. When several monkeys escape, Rock and Doroteo attempt to bribe the 
indigenous community of San Telmo into selling them the ones they keep as pets. After 
the community refuses, the duo traps two indigenous children, mistaking them for “rare” 
monkeys. When it is revealed that the captured creatures are humans, the macheteros that 
work at the airport try to prevent their export. However, the State intervenes on Rock’s 
behalf, and the children are sold off as monkeys. The story obliquely critiques Somoza’s 
collusion with the United States to exploit Nicaragua’s human and natural resources, and 
figures the indigenous population and the proletariat as sources of resistance. 
Expanding upon Agamben and Derrida, Cary Wolfe argues that the discourse of 
animality is crucial to humanism’s efforts to distinguish between “criminal” and 
“noncriminal” violence. Humanism legally and ethically permits the killing of animals, 
but not the killing of humans; and yet, of course, humans also kill humans, an act that is 
only recognized as “noncriminal” through the legal erasure of their humanity. Wolfe 
elaborates that the supposedly stable, “pure,” binary categories of human and animal are 
“ideological fictions” that must be reinforced by constantly revisiting the sites where 
these two “pure” poles cannot be discerned.”112 The “animal” is divided into the 
animalized animal, whose sacrificial and violent consumption is taken for granted, and 
the humanized animal, such as pets, which we exempt “from the sacrificial regime by 
endowing them with ostensibly human features” (Animal 101). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Here Wolfe follows Latour, who contends that humans and animals can never be separated; the drive for 
purification produces hybrids because “they were created together. They reinforce each other” (31). 
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In “Los monos de San Telmo” these dual categories are evoked and brought into 
contact, representing two competing interpretations of the same life. In the business 
practice of the vilified Philadelphian imperialist, the monkeys are “animalized animals.” 
Treated as a natural resource mined for export, they are hunted, caged, and shipped off to 
become luxury goods. While this figuration of monkey as animalized is both legally and 
ethically sound within the discourse of development, which does not question the killing 
of animals for human consumption or economic gain, the text simultaneously puts this 
ethicality into doubt by undermining the “purity” of the monkey’s categorical 
“animality.” Anthropomorphizing the caged monkeys’ emotive facial expressions by 
comparing their tears and pleading to those of beggars and children—precarious human 
others—the text figures the monkeys as “humanized animals,” subjects undeserving of 
sacrificial extermination. By describing the scene of humanized animal distress as “nada 
anormal” (8), the story didactically underlines the normalization of human and animal 
suffering as part and parcel of capitalist society. While the monkeys in “Los monos” 
primarily serve as comparative markers that index the “inhumane” treatment of human 
others by humans—reflecting literary anthropomorphism’s tendency to erase animal 
agency in order to employ “the animal” as a floating signifier that permits reflection upon 
human subjectivity—the text also emphasizes the shared material condition of all life 
regardless of species: vulnerability ⁠.113 
By representing the monkey’s vulnerability and suffering, “Los monos” undoes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Vulnerability or the “non power at the heart of power” is key for Derrida’s configuration of the animal 
(2002, 396), echoing Bentham’s observation that the question is not whether the animal can think, reason or 
talk, but whether it can suffer. 
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the categorical otherness of the animal, “humanizing” it as a creature warranting 
protection. The indigenous community of San Telmo does just that by refusing to tell 
Rock where the monkeys are hidden—a scene that enacts the dynamics of secrecy, 
loyalty and allegiance iconic of the revolutionary period. In the metonymical place of 
human guerrillas ⁠,114 the community in “Los monos” protects actual primates, forging an 
interspecies alliance of resistance to protect life from violent commodification. This 
interspecies partnership allegorically prefigures the possibility of a cross-class alliance 
based on a new, revolutionary ethicality. Given a name, kept on a leash, and domesticated 
to care for the hens, the monkeys in San Telmo represent an alternative, idealized—and 
humanized—relationship between species that exists outside of capital and resists the 
“ideological fiction” of species difference that justifies cruelty and commodification.   
The conflicting depictions of monkeys in “Los monos” as “animalized” and 
“humanized” acts as a mirror that reflects a similar bifurcation in the treatment of human 
subjects under capitalist modernity. In the species grid proposed by Wolfe, the 
“animalized human” is the target of culturally prescribed violence that highlights her 
“mammalian, or even merely bodily, organic existence,” whereas the “humanized 
human” is constructed as “sovereign and untroubled” (Animal 101). This categorical 
difference is figured in the text on the grounds of nationality: it is Rock, the North 
American businessman who is granted sovereignty by the Central American State, and it 
is his “untroubled” eye that classifies and determines the animality of the two children. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 This ludical association between guerrilla/gorilla as representative of a creaturely compassion is made 
explicit in Chávez Alfaro’s story “En tinieblas.” Describing the monkeys’ attempt to close up the wound of 
a shot monkey, the narrator says in an aside, “(Algo semejante habían hecho Julián y Rodrigo al caer bajo 
el fuego de los morteros)” (26). Here, the “animal” is not associated with beastliness, but an idealized 
model for the instinctual care of one’s community. 
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Like a parodically inept colonial cronista, Rock scans the physical features of the “pareja 
de simios”, attempting to determine their status: “Las proporciones encuadraban dentro 
de las características del simio, pero la piel no estaba descrita en ninguno de los manuales 
de zoología […] Los ojos hundidos y la cara huesosa parecía de Langur; la voluminosa 
panza, a punto de estallar, recordaba los Monos Araña” (17).  
Unable to recognize the humanity of the indigenous children, Rock, embodying 
the logic of capitalism, can only see the Other as a thing to be classified and sold. The 
animalized human is only valuable under capitalism as a commodity: reduced not only to 
a biological body, but to its most basic materiality, the skin. The human subject is thus 
fragmented ⁠; broken into parts the body becomes a thing, an object to be worn or 
traded.115 Through commodification, the market erases species distinction, transforming 
both human and nonhuman into equivalent and interchangeable products, despite their 
particularities. The skinning of monkeys and children for profit illustrates Derrida’s 
conclusion that “carnivorous sacrifice is essential to the structure of subjectivity […] at 
the basis of our culture and our law” (“Force” 953). The slippage between children, 
animals, and objects suggests that these figures mediate the ontological space between 
subject and object, establishing “the boundaries along which the human subject formation 
in distinction from nature becomes possible” (Boggs 535). 
The cultural acceptance of carnivorous sacrifice is interrogated by Chávez Alfaro, 
who points out the irony in the human’s indexing his “humanity” through clothing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Lukacs explains that capitalism entails the “reduction of all social systems to their elements,” including 
the fragmentation of both subject and object. Lukacs concludes that the “transformation of a human 
function into a commodity reveals in all its starkness the dehumanized and dehumanizing function of the 
commodity relation” (92). 
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Unlike animals, humans wear clothes, and yet “Los monos” reveals that far from a 
“civilized” practice, the creation of clothing is quite barbaric: involving the literal 
skinning of another being, rendering it useless and devoid of life. If the wearer of the fur 
coat “‘plays” at animality by symbolizing it from a safe distance” (Wolfe Animal 103), 
Chávez Alfaro collapses the safety of species distinction that separates the wearer from 
the wearable. Misidentifying human skin for that of an animal, the North American 
consumer is unaware of her own cannibalism, literally donning a coat fashioned from the 
backs of children. Allegorically, the author thus addresses the perils of commodity 
fetishism: isolated producers incognizant of the social nature of their productive activity 
ignorantly exploit those that produce the goods they consume. In “Los monos,” the fur 
coat wearer or luxury consumer dresses himself in the human other’s skin, proving that 
commodity fetishism hides the producer’s body in the thing.116  
Interestingly, Chávez Alfaro’s solution to the ontological confusion between 
indigenous child and monkey enacted by commodification is not to reify the Latin 
American’s humanity by reestablishing the limit separating what can be done to a human 
versus a nonhuman body. Instead, he articulates the common precarity of both human and 
nonhuman life as the foundation of a new, revolutionary social consciousness. 
 
Teaching Empathy: The Animal as Pedagogical Tool 
 Unlike Julieta Campos’ defamiliarization of the pet discussed in Chapter Two, in 
“Los monos de San Telmo” the point is to confront the reader with the familiarity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 “Despite Somoza having signed the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
in 1973, Nicaragua was Central America’s worst offender, exporting tropical birds, turtle meat and big cat 
pelts to consumers worldwide” (Miller 208). 
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simian face and register its all-too-recognizable emotions. To shore up compassion for 
the monkeys’ plight, Chávez Alfaro introduces the reader to the trapped animals by 
bringing us face-to-face with them:  
En la parte alta del cargamento, la que recibía el sol de lleno, un Capuchino tenía 
el pelo blanco de la cara mojado de lágrimas. Acurrucado en un rincón movía la 
cabeza de un hombro al otro, queriendo protegerse con las delgadas sombras 
proyectadas por las varas de la jaula […] Ensangrentado de la nariz a la barriga, 
[otro] carablanca tosía, se golpeaba el pecho y miraba al tratante con una 
expresión de viejo limosnero. Y ahora este otro lloraba. (8-9) 
Zooming in on the monkey’s tear-streaked face, the animal’s anguish is immediately 
registered by the reader as an intimately familiar and legible human emotion. To 
problematize the exclusion of primates from ethical consideration, Chávez Alfaro 
articulates the face as a feature shared across species, a screen that can be read as a 
receptacle that registers and projects internal thoughts and feelings. Echoing Levinas’ 
articulation of the face-to-face encounter with the other as compelling ethical respect for 
alterity, Chávez Alfaro revises and pushes past Levinas’ uncertainty regarding the 
legibility of the animal’s “biological” face, and instead narrates the face’s repository of 
affective impressions as a terrain that opens humans and monkeys up to each other.117 
This reciprocal identification of animal pain with human suffering is further consolidated 
through a series of analogies that set the weeping monkey alongside humans considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117Terada in Feeling in Theory argues that even though emotion has often been cast “as proof of the human 
subject”, emotion should also be rethought of as “non-subjective”. That is because “Emotions emerge only 
through acts of interpretation and identification by means of which we feel for others…” others which are 
not necessarily human. 
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“precarious.” The sad monkey is “like” a beggar or lost child, and Rock’s inability to 
discern this suffering—made highly legible in the text—indexes the epistemological 
failure of imperialism and crystalizes its moral condemnation in the text.  
 This is hardly a novel technique. Scenes of animal suffering are often used to tell 
the reader more about the human subject than the animal itself, testing whether one is 
affected by the animal’s vulnerability and appropriately moved, responding, for instance, 
with empathy, pity, or outrage. As Colleen Boggs explains, the encounter with a suffering 
animal has long been framed as a pedagogical tool for “building character” and to 
educate the young liberal subject in proper ethical behavior. John Locke’s Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education (1693) was among the first to use the animal as a mediating 
device for producing male subjects that were feeling, but not overly sentimental. In 
response to a friend’s inquiry about how to properly rear his son, Locke rejected the 
prevailing practice of establishing rules and enforcing them through the threat of 
punishment. Instead, he argued that children should learn experientially through 
“occasions,” specifically, through the experience of caring for an animal. By eschewing 
rote memorization of an abstract code of conduct in favor of an encounter with a 
vulnerable other, Locke established ethical formation as dynamic, participatory and 
agential, but also intimately linked to emotion. The child would learn how to treat the 
animal by first feeling empathy for its vulnerable state, and then assuming responsibility 
for its care. In this way, Locke foregrounds the pedagogical utility of the affective 
relationship with animals, which as Boggs explains, “forms the nexus between the body 
and mind that is requisite for liberal subject formation” (138). This is because the liberal 
subject is constructed as an individual who, because of his position of privilege 
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(“superior” in race, gender, class, education, able-bodiedness etc; a position of privilege 
that is codified as neutral or normal), must “protect” the less fortunate. This ethical 
obligation is not just grounded in morality but in pathos: the bodily sensation of pity 
prompts humane treatment of the vulnerable (human or nonhuman) other. Locke argues 
that the child’s compassionate treatment of animals directly transfers through metaphoric 
substitution to sympathy for other humans, creating a chain of creaturely hierarchy that 
squarely places the male liberal subject as custodian, and the animal as the training 
ground upon which he rehearses his magnanimity. 
 The legacy of Locke’s model in Latin America is evident in Rubén Darío’s 
moralizing tale “El perro del ciego: Cuento para niños”, first published in La Libertad 
Electoral in August 1888. Addressing his young readers directly, Darío tells them about 
Paco, a cruel classmate who killed a blind beggar’s dog by feeding it glass. Consumed by 
sadness, the blind man no longer sang or told stories to the children. Paco, of course, 
swiftly suffered the fate of all naughty children: God struck him down with smallpox, and 
he died. As critics have noted, this moralizing tale constructs the “odioso niño” Paco as 
an “anti-modelo” of ethical behavior (Tedesco 245). His actions are those of a failed 
liberal subject who doesn’t protect the vulnerable: “a los menores les pellizcaba […] se 
burlaba de los cojos, de los tuertos, de los jorobados, de los limosneros” (141-142). 
Paco’s wickedness is explicitly tied to his lack of remorse, guilt or pity—“cuando el 
profesor le castigaba, no lloraba nunca”—sentiments that define and constitute the liberal 
subject. His inability to emote indicates his externality to the two ontological categories 
established by Darío: Paco is neither the liberal subject who pities, nor the vulnerable 
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subject deserving of pity, and as such, his death (unlike the death of the dog) is not 
affectively charged. We do not feel for Paco; we feel afraid to be Paco.  
Darío’s tale concludes with a charge to young readers: “sed buenos” to the 
defenseless. Darío continues, “El perro del ciego—ese melancólico desterrado del día, 
nostálgico del país de la luz—es manso, es triste, es humilde; amadle, ninos. No le 
procuréis nunca mal, y cuando pase por la puerta de vuestra casa, dadle algo de comer” 
(145). This phrasing is interesting because it exemplifies the slippage between animal and 
disabled subject that collapse both within a logic of vulnerability and inferiority. Within 
the dashes, Darío parenthetically describes the blind man as “melancólico,” “desterrado” 
and “nostálgico”, an aside that is immediately followed with another series of adjectives 
that describe his dog as “manso,” “triste” and “humilde.” The concatenation of these 
analogous descriptors creates a discursive coalescence of dog and blind man, such that 
when the poet exhorts his readers to “amadle,” he refers not just to the dog but 
metonymically to the blind man. The result is the construction of vulnerability as a 
quality that is not universal, but situated within specific bodies. Both dog and blind man 
are presented as passive victims in need of protection by the young liberal letrados, who 
are implicitly imagined as fully functioning, cooperative and active. The animalistic 
bodies of both dog and blind man are vulnerable because they are dependent—as Darío 
underscores with the concluding maxim that the readers “love them”—on the good will 
of society: the able-bodied and the normal.118 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls posits the liberal subject occupies an “original” or neutral position: 
cooperative, active and healthy. 
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To return to “Los monos de San Telmo,” which was written over seventy years 
after Darío’s tale, we might note that Chávez Alfaro echoes Darío’s model in notable 
ways. Both stories use the animal as a pedagogical tool in the formation of the new 
subject—the liberal subject in Darío’s case, and the revolutionary subject in the case of 
Chávez Alfaro. As in “El perro del ciego,” “Los monos” appeals to the pathos of 
vulnerability to gain the reader’s sympathy for the revolutionary project. However, 
Chávez Alfaro significantly departs from Dario’s model in ways that not only 
demonstrate the changing perception of animality, but also question the model of the 
able-bodied, normative human that Darío shores up.  
Briefly doubling back to the passage of “Los monos” that described the caged 
monkeys, the comparison of the carablanca’s melancholic expression with that of a 
“viejo limosnero” demonstrates continuity with Darío’s appeal to pathos toward the 
vulnerable other. Like Darío’s emphasis of the dog’s singularity and irreplaceability—
“[el ciego] no quiso otro guía que su León, su animal querido, su compañero a quien 
siempre lloró”—Chávez Alfaro similarly humanizes the vulnerable animal. The image of 
the tear-streaked Capuchin compels the reader to emotionally identify with the animal, 
intensifying our rejection of its fated transformation into faceless commodity. However, 
although monkeys emit vocalizations that index distress, they do not, in fact, shed tears 
like humans do.119 So whereas ethology backs away from anthropomorphic projection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119Because it is impossible to discern animal feelings without indulging in anthropomorphism, the question 
of animal emotions remains taboo within the field of ethology. The shift away from ascribing human 
emotions to animals is evident in the legacy of Darwin’s seminal text The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals (1872), which argued that although monkeys do not shed tears, they do weep 
emotionally. Current scientific thought contests this claim by recognizing that while primates whimper and 
cry, it is impossible to ascertain whether these similar vocal aspects are rooted in homologous expressions 
(Chevalier-Skolnikoff 82). 
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human feelings onto animal bodies because of the impossibility of corroborating such 
claims, Chávez Alfaro’s literary text appeals to pathos through the melancholic face, 
humanizing the animal and its emotions to compel readers to include it within their moral 
universe. 
Rather than reject anthropomorphism as nonviable, Chávez Alfaro puts human 
biological signaling to work in the service of interspecies empathy. 120 The monkey’s 
impossible tears figure a supplement in the Derridean sense—an aid to the “natural”—
that reinforce human recognition of the animal’s presence and vulnerability within 
anthropocentric paradigms. The need to imaginatively include tears implies that without 
them, the animal’s pain is deficient, lacking in human expression and as such ethically 
excluded. By emphasizing humanized excretions (tears and blood) emanating from the 
captured primates, the text frames the face as a privileged site of interspecies recognition. 
This narrative close-up of the face allows the difference of the non-human body to recede 
from view. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari critique this sort of privileged 
situating of the face as the plane that consolidates and communicates an individual’s 
expressive interiority and subjectivity. To the contrary, they argue that this notion of the 
face as a repository that unifies somatic perception and sensation obscures embodiment, 
overshadows the rest of the body, and reterritorializes meaning: “The face is produced 
only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the 
body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the 
body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120A recent study concluded that when human subjects viewed pictures of human faces emoting with and 
without tears, sadness was more easily identified in the images that included tears (Provine, Krosnowski, 
Brocato). Thus, tears function as a biological signal that provide information or cues about state of mind.  
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call the Face” (170). This regime of “faciality” promotes an illusion of the subject’s 
coherence and communicability, short-circuiting becomings and deterritorialization. 
Thinking with this critique, Chávez Alfaro’s accentuation and magnification of shared 
physiognomy eclipses bodily difference in order to construct an ethical alliance based on 
recognition that is crystallized in the facial release of signifying signs.  
However, although Chávez Alfaro leads with the face when promoting 
interspecies ethics, which problematically privileges beings in whom we recognize 
ourselves, the text proceeds to make an interesting move in which not only is the 
monkey’s face recognizably human, but the human body is recognizably primate. This 
cross-species recognition is developed as a playful becoming-animal. After Rock and 
Doroteo fail to recognize that the indigenous children are humans, the narrative doesn’t 
reify Latin American humanity by reestablishing that the humans are in fact humans and 
should be treated differently than monkeys. Instead, Chávez Alfaro articulates, through 
the figure of Doroteo, the shared precarity of both human and nonhuman life as the 
foundation of a new, revolutionary social consciousness.  
Crucially complicit in Rock’s business of exporting monkeys, Doroteo is initially 
figured as the archetypical “native informant” who facilitates the exploitation of his 
country. However, by the conclusion Doroteo has become mindful of his complicity 
through an experience of bodily metamorphosis. When Rock threatens to cage Doroteo if 
he doesn’t increase his productivity—comparing his use value to his exchange value—
Doroteo checks that he is, in fact, a human. Examining his “naked hairless, black arms,” 
and the racially inflected physical features of his face, “the prominent jaw, the flat nose, 
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the wide wrinkly forehead, and small ears,” Doroteo laughs off Rock’s comparison of 
him with the monkey because “a él le faltaban pelos y era hombre” (10).  
This affirmation of humanhood is undone as Doroteo sheds his false 
consciousness and discovers his animality: his externality to the “humanity” constructed 
as universal under postcolonial imperialism. Realizing in a drunken stupor that he too is 
treated as a commodity, Doroteo bursts into performative song, declaring that he is a 
“Mono Aullador” or howler monkey. Alternately naming different primate genera and 
Latin American nationalities as part of “una sola manada” or “one tribe,” Doroteo’s 
inebriated declaration angrily constructs an alliance of the oppressed: “Arañas, los López, 
Hondureños, Saimiríes, Uácaris, Mexicanos, Colombianos, Carasblancas, Zaguíes, los 
Montoya, Brasileños, Nicaraguenses, Titíes, ¡somos una sola manada! ¡Pendejo el que se 
esconda!” (20). By affirming his belonging to “una sola manada”, Doroteo strips his false 
consciousness as “human” and becomes-animal by affirming his corporal 
precariousness.121 While there is often a legitimate worry that in shifting our attention to 
the figure of the animal, we will overlook human difference—specifically racial and 
geopolitical inequity—Chávez Alfaro’s drunken animal pack, or “troop,” gestures to a 
new way of thinking about kinship: a singular assemblage that is internally heterogeneous 
but maintains multiplicity within a loosely unified mass. This sort of kinship is both 
beyond national and familial ties, but doesn’t necessarily erase the particularity of these 
situated groups, instead unifying them. The taunt with which Doroteo ends his rant, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Martha Albert Fineman argues that vulnerability is “a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the 
human condition” that cuts across social, geographic and species boundaries because all bodies are fragile 
and contain the potential to become dependent (8). Vulnerability is not just situated in the body but also 
produced by economic and institutional factors, which augment the vulnerability of specific groups. 
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“pendejo el que se esconda,” uses the word “pendejo” which doesn’t just mean coward, 
but also idiot or asshole, is a provocation or challenge that inverts the racist hierarchy of 
species and dares us to not see the fragility of our own humanity, our own precarious 
place within this category of power.122 
Rather than figure revolutionary consciousness as a transcendental moment of 
choice—as it is often framed in revolutionary tracts123—Doroteo’s revolutionary 
consciousness emerges from the threshold experience of drunkenness.124 This drunken 
experience is like a Benjaminian “profane illumination” in which the “energies of 
intoxication” are what permit revolutionary thought (208). Doroteo’s revolutionary 
metamorphosis is corporeal: inebriated, loud, and capacious. While this performative 
declaration of an incipient collectivity opposed to the commodification of neoimperialism 
ultimately fails, as Doroteo is unable to prevent the monkeys’ export, Chávez Alfaro 
situates the recognition of the self as Other as key to revolutionary subjectivity. The 
posthumanist “manada” demonstrates that the humanist doctrine affirming the a priori 
human right to set humans above nature or humans above other humans is a slippery 
endeavor that ends up creating new hierarchies where they did not previously exist. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 In what way does this use of profanity signal something different or similar to Cabezas’s use of it when 
describing eating monkey soup? 
123 Saldaña-Portillo observes that revolutionary leaders Mario Payeras and Che Guevara articulated 
revolutionary consciousness as a “transcendental moment of choice” between binary modes of being, 
echoing Kantian logic in which the “heathen” Other must be brought into the family of Christian humanity, 
the pre-industrious made industrious, the prodigal turned into prolific (65). 
124 Drunkenness in Trágame tierra, according to Leonel Delgado, articulates that which national history has 
repressed. In his state of drunkenness, César is “borracho y por ello, para ello, pletórico de conciencia; 
flotaba en el mundo extirpado de orden natural” (63). Delgado explains that “al hacerse evidente el lugar 
degradado la novela se refiere a un sitio que la narrativa nacional dominante no puede clausurar” (11). 
Similarly, I am arguing that the world isn’t transformed by Doroteo’s drunken realization, but this 
intoxicated becoming-animal unearths something that can’t be neatly resolved: the common vulnerability 
and animality of all beings (rather than his assumed externality to the precarious order of life). 
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Acknowledging one’s animality—the shared susceptibility of material life—not 
transcending it, is what Chávez Alfaro identifies as revolutionary. Unlike Cabezas’s 
reclaiming of animality because of its gendered connotation—the masculine virility of 
animal instincts—, Chávez Alfaro reorients the “animal inside” to signify a coming-
together around the universal material condition of vulnerability. While we might be 
swayed to think that Doroteo’s becoming-animal and embrace of bodily vulnerability is 
another form of deracination, that is, a situation in which his ethnic identification yields 
to the more important identification of class and species, in reality, because he moves 
toward being-monkey, a figure that has long been associated with blackness and tied to a 
specific idea of ethnic affiliation, this is a move toward both universality (of the fragile 
body) but also toward the specificity of the colored body, that is, it maintains an 
awareness of ethnicity while also positing that that position allows one to see beyond 
oneself. 
This discursive human animality constructs a shared consciousness that is based 
on the precarious mortality of all life, a vulnerability that Derrida describes as the “non 
power at the heart of power” (“The Animal” 396). “Los monos de San Telmo” condemns 
neoimperialism’s commodification of life, but also figures the threshold experience of 
intoxication (or becoming-monkey) as revelatory of the shared vulnerability across 
species, or at least those that share a similar face. Rather than seek admission to the 
normative category of the “human,” or push for indigenous, Afro-Latino or Latin 
Americans to be admitted to the fraternity of Man, Chávez Alfaro instead transforms the 
category of the “human” from within to create a posthuman “tribe” that retains its internal 
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difference, key to bringing Afro-Caribbean subjects into the revolutionary movement 
without losing the particularity of the black experience in Central America. 
 “Los monos de San Telmo” reconstitutes the species grid into a new 
constellation: the humanized human is revealed to be a cannibal, while the human that is 
animalized, the Caliban, points toward a new, “humane” ethicality. Acknowledging one’s 
animality—the shared susceptibility of material life—not transcending it, is what Chávez 
Alfaro identifies as revolutionary. The animal—both the discursive limit and biological 
foundation of the human—is deployed in “Los monos de San Telmo” to establish a new 
universal (human) subjectivity capable of transcending class, race, and place. The 
animal’s externality to humanist reason and the logic of modernity made it an ideal 
discursive place from which revolutionary texts could interrogate imperialism and 
imagine alternate configurations between man and nature. 
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EPILOGUE: The nahual 
 
“Every child is born with a nahual. The nahual is like a shadow, his protective spirit who will go through 
life with him. The nahual is the representative of the earth, the animal world, the sun and water, and in this 
way the child communicates with nature. The nahual is our double, something very important to us. We 
conjure up an image of what our nahual is like. It is usually an animal. The child is taught that if he kills an 
animal, that animal’s human double will be very angry with him because he is killing his nahual. Every 
animal has its human counterpart and if you hurt him, you hurt the animal too.”  
-- Rigoberta Menchú (I, Rigoberta Menchú 18). 
 
In the testimonial text recounting her life story, Maya K’iche’ leader Rigoberta 
Menchú dedicates an entire chapter to the nahual, the indigenous belief that each human 
individual is born connected to an animal counterpart. Menchú’s text, I, Rigoberta 
Menchú (1983), was widely read across the globe and had an enormous impact at home 
in her native Guatemala.125 It denounced the ongoing genocide of Guatemala’s 
indigenous population at the hands of the militarized State. For her leadership in the 
decade-long campaign to end these atrocities, Menchú was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1992. Yet while Menchú’s political legacy has rightfully received much 
attention, her cogent articulation of the K’iche’ worldview, and particularly how it 
understands the human relationship with the environment, has been glossed over. As we 
look for sources that model non-hierarchical, non-exploitative ways of relating to the 
nonhuman world, I would like to suggest that nahualism offers a provocative point of 
departure. The nahual instructively conceptualizes human entwinement with nature as 
both immanent and intimate. It challenges Western humanist ideas about personhood, and 
gives shape to a non-anthropocentric ethics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Menchú’s text became embroiled in controversy in the US academy, primarily over the question of the 
veracity of her memoir. For a comprehensive account of this debate, see The Rigoberta Menchú 
Controversy edited by Arturo Arias. 
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As Menchú explains in the epigraph, for the K’iche’, each human is born attached 
to an animal counterpart, or nahual (alternatively spelled nagual). The birthdate 
determines what the nahual is. Each day corresponds with a specific animal, plant, or 
natural formation: like a jaguar, maize, or river. The corresponding entity is the spiritual 
companion or shadow that is linked to that human her entire life. They are the same spirit, 
but inhabit different bodies. That is, the soul occupies two different material forms: one 
human and one nonhuman. These two bodies share the same essence, but there is no 
communication between them. They cannot access each other’s perspective, except with 
the help of a shaman (through the ritualistic consumption of plants like peyote) or upon 
death. Because this pair is the same being (but manifests itself differently), the term 
“nahual” doesn’t just signify the nonhuman alter, but also the human herself. The nahual 
indexes a unity of being that is also a duality, a self that is also an other. 
To non-indigenous peoples this idea that our self does not belong solely to us, but 
also exists in another body (not to mention the body of a different species), is hard to 
wrap our heads around. To elucidate this concept, it is helpful to look to the novel Men of 
Maize (1949) by the Nobel Prize-winning Guatemalan author Miguel Ángel Asturias. 
While Asturias was not himself indigenous, his novel draws from foundational texts of 
Mesoamerican mythology like the Popol Vuh and the Chilam Balam.126 In one chapter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 In spite of the fact that Asturias was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1967, his work has had 
fraught reception in Latin America. Several prominent Maya intellectuals, including the poet Humberto 
Ak’abal, attacked Asturias for presuming to speak for the Maya people, as well as for the racism in his 
undergraduate thesis on the “Indian problem.” Arturo Arias has written extensively on this debate, noting 
that ironically this rejection of Asturias validated essentialist notions of indigenous identities. Menchú, to 
the contrary, revindicated the value of his work, praising its “respect for difference.” Notably, while his 
literature was critiqued for not being authentically indigenous by some, other Latin American intellectuals 
(such as Ángel Rama and Emir Rodriguez Monegal) rejected Asturias’s work because they saw it as simply 
copying indigenous sources (i.e. too indigenous). Arias argues that this uproar revealed Latin American 
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the character Gaudencio Tecún explains the parallel deaths of a deer and a local curer to 
his brother Uperto: 
“The curer and the deer, for your information, were one and the same person. I 
fired at the deer and did in the curer, because they were one and the same, 
identical.” 
 “I don’t get it. See if you can explain it to me. The curer and the deer,” 
Uperto raised his hand and put his two middle fingers together, “they were like 
seeing one fat finger made up of two fingers.” 
 “No, not that. They were the same finger. Not two, one. The curer and the 
deer were like you and your shadow, you and your soul, you and your life breath. 
[…] Like two drops of water in one swig.” (56-57) 
This revelation, that man and deer are one and the same, perplexes Uperto. As he 
grapples with the implications of this ontological shift, he lyrically articulates the 
nahual’s multiplicity of experience: 
To think that the deer and the curer were one single being was so difficult for him 
that at times he held his head, fearful that his own common sense might be turned. 
That dead body had been a deer, and the Deer of the Seven-Fires had been a man. 
As a deer he had loved does and had had fawns, baby deer. His male nostrils in 
the algebra of stars, the bluish coats of the does, soft fur toasted like the summer, 
nervous, shy, susceptible only to fugitive loves. And as a man, when he was 
young, he had loved and pursued females, he’d had little human children full of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cosmopolitan prejudices: racial bias against indigenous subjectivity, geographical bias against Central 
America, and machista prejudice against women and queerness. 
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laughter, whose only defense was their weeping. Which had he loved more, the 
does or the women? (63)  
The curer and the deer outwardly manifest distinct material forms that have unique 
experiences: as a man he loved women, and as a deer he loved does. Yet the apparent 
differences between these two bodies in fact hide the nahual’s ontological 
undifferentiation. There is spiritual unity, with bodily diversity. The deer is not “just an 
animal, but an animal that was a person,” a “deer who [is] not only deer” (68). We can 
see how this framing of man and deer as one and the same deconstructs human 
exceptionalism. Uperto’s lingering question of “which he had loved more” leads the 
reader to realize that human love is no more real than that of the deer. Both experiences 
are equally important to the fabric of the curer/deer’s life. 
What becomes clear after this passage in Men of Maize is that every nonhuman 
creature might actually also be human. Put another way, every animal, plant, or natural 
formation exists in a latent state of possible personhood. The Brazilian anthropologist 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has lucidly studied Amerindian cosmologies. He explains 
that indigenous animist worldviews approach “every object [as] a subject in potentia” 
(“Immanence” 41). Therefore “Every being encountered by a human over the course of 
[…] his or her own life may suddenly allow its “other side” (a common idiom in 
indigenous cosmologies) to eclipse its usual non-human appearance, actualizing its latent 
humanoid condition” (“Immanence” 31). For the K’iche, the nahual is that “other side,” 
that humanoid soul that can dress or disguise itself in different external garbs. The 
external body does not define identity, but rather is a removable costume or envelope that 
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conceals the unchanging essence underneath.127 
If the West has traditionally separated animals from humans based on what they 
supposedly lack—be it reason, soul, or language—Amerindian societies have proceeded 
in the opposite direction. They propose that personhood (typically exclusively attributed 
to humans in the West) is a position that can be occupied by other species as well. If 
humans think about themselves as persons, in the Amerindian tradition, so do animals. As 
Idelber Avelar has put it, “When a jaguar sees you, he is the one who is a person” (13). 
The animal assumes the position of the perceiving subject, and therefore his behavior is 
not thought to be determined by instinct, but the product of culture (just as it is with 
humans). 
The nahual also frames humans and animals as interwoven within a broader 
ecological tableau. Menchú explains, “Man is part of the natural world. There is not one 
world for man and one for animals, they are part of the same one and lead parallel lives” 
(22). Elaborating on this point, Mark Zimmerman clarifies that Mayan cosmology  “sees 
humankind as necessarily internal to other dimensions of nature. Human and other 
elements interpenetrate in a kind of pantheistic ecological whole which patterns of 
conquest, colonialism, and more modern forms of domination have damaged, 
rechanelled, but never fully obliterated at least from the Mayan mind” (34). Rather than a 
mere backdrop against which the human develops culture, the human is conceived as 
entangled with the environment. 
By contrast, Western modes of thought have tended to understand humans as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Whereas Western culture perceives the unity of nature (universality of substance) and the multiplicity of 
culture, Amerindian “multi naturalism” inverts this equation, perceiving spiritual unity and corporeal 
diversity. For more on this, see Viveiros de Castro’s Cosmological Perspectivism. 
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separate from, or superior to, the natural world. This separation, which is at the root of 
Humanism, has led to the subject/object split that defines the West. This understanding of 
the nonhuman as a passive object or resource has been used to justify its exploitation for 
human benefit. Because it is not thought of as a subject, it does not enter into ethical 
consideration.  
To return to Menchú’s testimonial text, it is significant that she chooses not to 
reveal what her nahual is to her readers. Her decision not to disclose this aspect of her 
identity tells us two things. First, that the nahual represents the most intimate and sacred 
expression of one’s self. K’iche’ poet Humberto Ak’abal explains the nahual is an 
intimate energy and “that intimacy should not be shared.” “To tell someone about one’s 
nahual is to remove one’s clothes and allow everyone to see one naked” (Piedra Santa 
33). 
Second, this secrecy is central to Menchú’s broader approach to explaining 
indigenous culture to Western audiences. She chooses to reveal certain aspects, while 
keeping others confidential. Keeping secrets is a key strategy to counteract exploitation 
and appropriation. Menchú states, “We [Indians] often find it hard to talk about ourselves 
because we know we must hide so much in order to preserve our Indian culture and 
prevent it being taken away from us. So I can only tell you a very general things about 
the nahual. I can’t tell you what my nahual is because that is one of our secrets” (22). 
Ak’abal’s poem “Robo” expresses a similar sentiment: “Nos han robado / tierras, árboles 
y agua. / De lo que no han podido / adueñarse es del Nawal. / Ni podrán” (Grito 61). 
Because of the fraught, intertwined histories of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and 
genocide in Guatemala, outsiders have proven themselves to be unreliable recipients of 
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indigenous knowledge. As such, silence is an important tool. Ak’abal’s poem “Stones” 
beautifully condenses this sentiment: “No es que las piedras sea mudas; / solo guardan 
silencio” (Piedra Santa 33). In this interpretation, nature is not deprived of language, but 
instead full of silence. The absence of speech is not a privation, but a plenitude. Although 
people who are not K’iche’ are not meant to know all of the nahual’s intimacies, its 
articulation of human/nonhuman entwinement prompts us to question the 
anthropocentrism that underpins Western ideas about personhood. 
The intimacy between a person and her nonhuman alter also gives shape to a 
different mode of affectively and ethically connecting with animals. Whereas in the West 
one of the most common forms of connecting with animals is through relationships with 
pets or domesticated animals, nahualism is not restricted to the pet economy. Menchú 
explains that in Mayan communities the nahual has a pedagogical function—it teaches 
children to be kind to animals—as well as an ethical and affective function. It fosters 
identification with and love for animals. It validates their status as subjects, and 
subsequently, their ethical consideration. Nahualism informs both ethics and identity. It 
models a human/animal connection that is quotidian and private, ordinary and 
extraordinary. This connection can be playful or melancholic, as is evident in Ak’abal’s 
poem “Nawal Ixim.” “Ixim” is the Maya word for corn or maize, the substance from 
which man himself is created according to Mesoamerican mythology: 
Nawal Ixim 
habla en mi lengua. 
De vez en cuando 
sale a mirar por mis ojos, 
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y se pone triste (Guardián 85)128 
The poet’s reality saddens his protective spirit, but their shared tongue also provides 
solace. 
Rather than shore up a notion of the sovereign human subject, the belief in the 
nahual formulates a vision of transsubjectivity. From birth, each individual is aware of 
his connectivity to nonhuman life. Everything is connected, even if that connection 
cannot be seen. This transsubjectivity is felt and imaginatively embodied. It is an alliance 
that is both material and abstract, that crosses but also maintains boundaries. This 
philosophy, I believe, prefigures and anticipates the move made by contemporary 
posthumanists such as Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, and Rosi Braidotti, who argue in 
favor of a more porous idea of the human subject, in constant becoming with other, 
nonhuman forces. 
It is important to note that the imaginative aspect of nahualism has been twisted to 
fit racist interpretations of indigenous peoples as more “natural” and “irrational” than 
their Western colonizers or ladino counterparts.129 The word “nahual” is derived from the 
Nahuatl word nahualli, which roughly translates as “magician.” Unlike Menchú’s 
identification of the nahual as a universal trait that is possessed by every indigenous 
individual, in this etymology, it is the magician or shaman who has the privilege of 
shapeshifting between human and animal form. In colonial sources, the shaman is 
negatively construed as a “witch” or “wizard” who is therianthropic: part human and part 
animal. The Franciscan Spanish friar Berardino de Sahagún’s pioneering enthnographic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 See Nicole Caso for more on Ak’abal’s poetry. 
129 “Ladino” is a term used to refer to people of mixed European and indigenous descent, synonymous with 
non-indigeneity and whiteness. 
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text of Aztec beliefs, the Florentine Codex, notes “The nauallí, or magician, is he who 
frightens men and sucks the blood of children during the night. He is well skilled in the 
practice of this trade, he knows all the arts of sorcery (nauallotl) and employs them with 
cunning and ability; but for the benefit of men only, not for their injury” (Book X, Ch. 9). 
Sahagún’s interpretation of this magical practitioner leans in two opposing directions. 
The nauallí is both wicked (drinking children’s blood) but also skilled and benevolent. In 
spite of colonist’s attempts to eradicate non-Christian practices, these spiritual guides 
would use the peyotl (peyote) plant to allow others to momentarily see through the eyes 
of their nahual. The consumption of the hallucinogenic plant during spiritual ceremonies 
“was regarded as a method of throwing the individual out of himself and into relation 
with the supernatural” (Brinton 9). While shamanic rites related to nahualism are still 
practiced today by groups in Mexico and Guatemala, as can be seen in Nicolás 
Echeverría’s excellent documentary Echo of the Mountain (2014), Menchú and Ak’abal 
frame the practice not just as spiritual, but as a core part of how the K’iche’ understand 
their identity and place within the broader ecosystem.  
Stacy Alaimo has noted that in Western thought, neither ethics nor politics have 
“allowed space for concern over nonhuman lives” (10). The Mesoamerican practice of 
nahualism offers an important counterpoint, a way of conceiving of the human self as 
inherently connected to nonhuman life. The nahual figures the human perspective as just 
one of many. In this way of thinking, both human and nonhuman lives carry the same 
worth. Indeed, they are entangled such that the death of the animal double means the 
death of oneself. This attention to the value and perspective of nonhuman life propels an 
ethics of care toward the environment, and resists the troublesome notion that human life 
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is all that matters.  
The cogito of indigenous animism is: it exists, therefore it thinks (Viveiros 
Cosmological 41). Because Amerindian thought articulates a paradigm in which every 
nonhuman thing is seen as a human in potentia, it challenges Western solipsism and 
promotes an ethics that is based on the assumption that humans and animals live parallel, 
or even enmeshed, lives. In this way, nahualism coincides with contemporary animal 
studies’s interest in extending personhood to nonhuman animals and problematizing the 
dualistic conception of nature and culture as distinct, isolated phenomena.  
 Menchú’s insistence on maintaining the secrecy of her nahual adds an important 
note of caution as we consider bringing the nahual into conversation with animal studies. 
Her silence is a form of resistance that indexes the continuing struggles of indigenous 
peoples, still as relevant today as ever. Indigenous environmental activists continue to be 
murdered at alarming rates throughout Latin America. Honduras is one such example; 
since 2010, over 120 such activists have been killed for resisting the efforts of corporate 
and state interests to meet the global demand for palm oil, timber, and minerals 
(“Honduras”). Indigenous communities are the front lines of these battles. 
To think with indigenous cosmologies as non-indigenous peoples is to challenge 
ourselves to be like Uperto, the character in Asturias’s novel who holds his head from 
bewilderment as he learns about nahualism.  To push ourselves to stretch our minds 
beyond anthropocentric paradigms of personhood, such that we become uncomfortable, 
or even fear that we might “lose our common sense.” To think with the nahual is to take 
the plunge of considering that the body—whether human or animal—might not 
determine identity, but rather be a removable garment or piece of clothing. It is to think 
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about the coexistence of unity within difference, and difference within the seemingly 
static and singular self. 
 
 
 
221 
	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
	  
Adams, Carol J. The Pornography of Meat. New York: Continuum, 2003. 
---. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory. New York: 
Continuum, 1990. 
Adams, Carol J. and Matthew Calarco. “Derrida and the Sexual Politics of Meat.” Meat 
Culture. Ed. Annie Potts. Leiden: Brill, 2016: 31-53. 
Adams, Carol J. and Josephine Donovan, eds. Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical 
Explorations. Durham: Duke UP, 1995. 
Agamben, Giogio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Tr. Daniel Heller-
Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. 
—. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. 
—. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Trans. Daniel Heller-Rosen. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1999. 
Ahmed, Sara. “Affective Economies.” Social Text, vol. 22, no. 2, 2004, pp. 117-139. 
—. “Happy Objects.” The Affect Theory Reader. Eds. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. 
Seigworth. Durham: Duke UP, 2010: 29-52. 
Ahuja, Neel. Bioinsecurities: Disease Interventions, Empire, and the Government of 
Species. Durham: Duke UP, 2016. 
Ak’abal, Humberto. Chajil Tzaqib’al Ja’ / Guardián de la caída de agua. Guatemala: 
Artemis-Edinter, 1996. 
---. El animal de humo. El Pedregal: Piedra Santa, 2014. 
---. Jaguar dormido / Warinaq’ b’alam. Guatemala: Comunidad de Escritores de 
222 
	  
Guatemala, 2001. 
---. Raqonchi’aj / Grito. Guatemala: Cholsamaj, 2004. 
Alaimo, Stacy. Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self. 
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2010.  
---. Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016. 
---. Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
2000. 
Allister, Mark, ed. Eco-man: New Perspectives on Masculinity and Nature. 
Charlottesville: U of Virginia  P, 2004. 
Alonso, Carlos J. The Spanish American Regional Novel: Modernity and Autochthony. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. 
Anderson, Mark and Zélia M. Bora, eds. Ecological Crisis and Cultural Representation 
in Latin America: Ecocritical Perspectives on Art, Film, and Literature. London: 
Lexington, 2016. 
Antelo, Raul. "as Termitas e a Mediação." Aletria: Revista de Estudos de Literatura, vol. 
21, no. 3, 2011, pp. 23-37 
Arreola, Juan José. Bestiario; Varia invención. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
2002. 
---. Mujeres, animales y fantasias mecánicas. Barcelona: Tusquets, 1972. 
Arévalo, Teresa. Rafael Arévalo Martínez. Biografía de 1884 hasta 1926. Guatemala: 
Tipografía Nacional, 1971. 
Arévalo Martínez, Rafael. Concepción del cosmos. Guatemala: Landivar, 1954. 
223 
	  
---. El mundo de los maharachías. Guatemala: Muñoz Plaza, 1938. 
Arias, Arturo. “Constructing Ethnic Bodies and Identities in Miguel Angel Asturias and 
Rigoberta Menchú.” Postmodern Cultures 906.17 (2006) 
---. “De veras agotadas? Solo en el mercado por su falta de circulación: repensando la 
narrativa centroamericana del mini-boom”. Istmo 27-28 (2015). 
---. Gestos ceremoniales. Narrativa centroamericana 1960-1990. Ciudad de Guatemala, 
Guatemala: Artemis-Edinter, 1990. 
---, ed. The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2001. 
---. Taking Their Word: Literature and the Signs of Central America. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2007. 
Asturias, Miguel Angel. El Señor Presidente. Ed. Gerald Martin. Guatemala: ALLCA 
Colección Archivos, 2000. 
Asturias, Miguel Ángel. Men of Maize. Trans. Gerald Martin. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 
—. “Poetas, santones, monos y esqueletos III.” Originally published in El nacional 
(Caracas, May 1957) (Reproduced in La Vanguardia Española 16 May 1971.) 
---. Sociología Guatemalteca: El problema social del indio. Ed. Julio César Pinto Soria. 
Guatemala: Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 2007. 
Avelar, Idelber. “Amerindian Perspectivism and Non-Human Rights.” Alter/nativas 1 
(2013): 1-21. 
Avilés Fabila, René. Los animales prodigiosos. México: Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana, 1997. 
224 
	  
Azuela, Mariano, and Jorge Ruffinelli. Los de abajo. Paris: ALLCA XX, 1988. 
Baker, Djoymi. “King Kong.” The Encyclopedia of Epic Films. Eds. Constantine Santas, 
James M. Wilson, Maria Colavito and Djoymi Baker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014: 312-315.  
Balibar, Etienne. “Racism and Nationalism.” In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous 
Identities. By Etienne Balibar and Emmanuel Wallerstein. London: Verso, 1991. 
Barbas-Rhoden, Laura. Ecological Imaginations in Latin American Fiction. Gainesville: 
U of Florida P, 2011. 
---. "Greening Central American Literature." Isle: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature 
and Environment, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1-17 
---. "Hacia una ecocrítica transnacional: aportes de la filosofía y crítica cultural 
latinoamericanas a la práctica ecocrítica." Revista de Crítica Literaria 
Latinoamericana, vol. 40, no. 79, 2014, pp. 79-96. 
Bataille, Georges. Theory of Religion. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Zone Books, 
1989. 
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke UP, 2010. 
Berenstein, Rhona J. “White Heroines and Hearts of Darkness: Race, Gender, and 
Disguise in 1930s Jungle Films.” Film History 6.3 (1994): 314-339. 
Berlant, Lauren. “Cruel Optimism.” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 
17.5 (2006): 20-36. 
—. “Starved.” South Atlantic Quarterly 106.3 (2007): 433-444. 
Beverley, John and Marc Zimmerman. Literature and Politics in the Central American 
Revolutions. Austin: U of Texas P, 1990. 
225 
	  
Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Bishop, Rebecca. “‘Several Exceptional Forms of Primates’: Simian Cinema.” Science 
Fiction Studies 35.2 (Jul. 2008): 238-250. 
Boggs, Colleen Glenney. Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical 
Subjectivity. New York: Columbia UP, 2013. 
Bradford, Clare. Unsettling Narratives: Postcolonial Readings of Children’s Literature. 
Canada: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 2007. 
Braidotti, Rosi. “The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible.” Deleuze and Philosophy. Ed. 
Constantin Boundas. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006: 133-159.  
---. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 
2002.  
Brinton, Daniel G. “Nagualism. A Study in Native American Folk-Lore and History.” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 33:144 (1894): 11–73. 
Bruce-Novoa, Juan. “Julieta Campos’ Sabina: In the Labyrinth of Intertextuality.” Third 
Woman 2.2 (1984): 43-63. 
Buell, Lawrence. The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the 
Formation of American Culture. Cambridge: Belknap, 1996. 
---. “Toxic Discourse.” Critical Inquiry 24.3 (1998): 639-665. 
Beusterien, John. Canines in Cervantes and Velázquez: An Animal Studies Reading of 
Early Modern Spain. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. 
Bush, Andrew. “Reintroduction to Fantastic Literature: A Latin American Reply.” 
Papers in Romance 2.1 (1980): 55-63. 
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: 
226 
	  
Routledge, 1990. 
Cabezas, Oscar. La montaña es algo más que una inmensa estepa verde. México: Siglo 
Veintiuno, 1982. 
Cadena, Marisol de la. Earth Beings: Ecologies of Practice Across Andean Worlds. 
Durham: Duke UP, 2015. 
Caillois, Roger. Au Coeur du Fantastique. Paris: 1965. 
Calarco, Matthew. Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. 
New York: Columbia UP, 2008. 
Campos, Julieta. Celina o los gatos. México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1968. 
—. La imagen en el espejo. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1965. 
—. “Mi vocación literaria.” Revista Iberoamericana 51 (1985): 467-70. 
—. Obras Reunidas I. Intro. Fabienne Bradu. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
2005. 
—. Tiene los cabellos rojizos y se llama Sabina. México: Joaquin Mortiz, 1978. 
Cardenal, Ernesto. Pluriverse: New and Selected Poems. Ed. Jonathan Cohen. Trans. by 
Jonathan Cohen et al. New York: New Directions, 2009. 
Casaús Arzú, Marta Elena. “La creación de nuevos espacios públicos a principios del 
siglo XX: la influencia de redes intelectuales teosóficas en la opinión pública 
centroamericana.” Universum 17 (2002): 297-332. 
Caso, Nicole. Practicing Memory in Central American Literature. New York: Palgrave, 
2010. 
Castellanos, Rosario. A Rosario Castellanos Reader. Ed. and Trans. Maureen Ahern. 
Austin: U of Texas P, 1988. 
227 
	  
Castellanos Moya, Horacio. Baile con serpientes. México: Tusquets, 2002. 
---. La metamórfosis del sabueso. Ensayos personales y otros textos. Gorbea, España: 
Ediciones UDP, 2011. 
Castillo, Debra A. Talking Back: Toward a Latin American Feminist Literary Criticism. 
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992. 
Chacón, Enrique. “Para una lectura critic-genética de “El gato” como cuento, novela y 
concepto en la obra de Juan García Ponce.” Revista Iberoamericana LXXX, no. 
246 (Enero-Marzo 2014): 181-190. 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “The Climate of History: Four Theses.” Critical Inquiry 35 (Winter 
2009): 197-222. 
Chávez Alfaro, Lisandro. Los monos de San Telmo. 2nd Edition. Guatemala: EDUCA, 
1971.  
Chen, Mel. Animacies. Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. Durham: Duke 
UP, 2012. 
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, Suzanne. “Facial Expression of Emotion in Nonhuman Primates.” 
In Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. Ed. Paul 
Ekman. Los Altos, CA: Malor, 2006: 11-89. 
Connolly, William E. The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal 
Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Durham: Duke UP, 2013. 
Cormier, Loretta A. Kinship with Monkeys: The Guaj Foragers of Eastern Amazonia. 
New York: Columbia UP, 2003. 
Cortés, Eladio and Mirta Barrea-Marlys, eds. Encyclopedia of Latin American Theater. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood P.  
228 
	  
Cortez, Beatriz. Estética del cinismo. Pasión y desencanto en la literatura 
centroamericana de posguerra. Ciudad de Guatemala, F&G, 2010.  
---. “Racismo, intelectualidad, y la crisis de la modernidad en Centroamérica.” Tensiones 
de la modernidad: Del modernismo al realismo. Eds. Valeria Grinberg Pla and 
Ricardo Roque Baldovinos. Guatemala: F&G, 2009.  
Cvetkovich, Ann. Depression: A Public Feeling. Durham: Duke UP, 2012. 
da Jandra, Leonardo. Zoomorfías. Oaxaca: Almadía, 2009. 
Darío, Rubén. Cuentos completos. Managua: Hispamer, 2007. 
Dávila. Amparo. “El huésped.” Tiempo destrozado. México: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1959. 
DeGrave, Analisa. “Ecoliterature and Dystopia: Gardens and Topos in Modern Latin 
American Poetry.” Confluencia 22.2 (Spring 2007): 89-104. 
De Lauretis, Teresa, Andreas Huyssen, Kathleen M. Woodward, eds. The Technological 
Imagination: Theories and Fictions. Madison: Coda, 1980. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Francis Bacon: A Logic of Sensation. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. London: 
Continuum, 2003. 
---. Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1990. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1980. 
Delgado Aburto, Leonel. “De la ética evanescente del perro: comunidad, temporalidad y 
alegoría en “El trovador colombiano”, de Rafael Arévalo Martínez”. 
Iberoamericana LXXIX.242 (enero-marzo 2013): 43-55. 
229 
	  
---. “El Caribe nicaragüense en textos de la literatura nacional moderna: de la civilización 
protectorista a la mulatidad global.” América Latina Hoy 58 (2011): 63-80. 
---. “La memoria travestida: Caribe, estética e historia en Trágame tierra de Lizandro 
Chávez Alfaro.” Istmo 27-28 (2015). 
Derrida, Jacques. “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” Trans. David 
Wills. Critical Inquiry 28.2 (Winter 2002): 369-418. 
—. ““Eating Well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques 
Derrida.” In Who Comes After the Subject? Eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, 
Jean-Luc Nancy. New York: Routledge, 1991. 96-119. 
---. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: JHU, 1997. 
DeVries, Scott M. A History of Ecology and Environmentalism in Spanish American 
Literature. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2013. 
---. Creature Discomfort: Fauna-criticism, Ethics, and the Representation of Animals in 
Spanish American Fiction and Poetry. Leiden; Boston: Brill, Rodopi, 2016.  
Doane, Mary Ann. The Desire to Desire: The Woman’s Film of the 1940s. Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1987. 
Domecq, Brianda. Bestiario doméstico. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982. 
Doub, Yolanda A. Journeys of Formation: The Spanish American Bildungsroman. New 
York: Peter Lang, 2010. 
Dueñas, Guadalupe. Tiene la noche un árbol. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1985. 
Duncan, Cynthia. Unraveling the Real: The Fantastic in Spanish-American Ficciones. 
Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2010. 
230 
	  
Eco de la montaña. Directed by Nicolás Echeverría, Cuadro Negro and Ithaca, 2014. 
Edmonds, Alexander. Pretty Modern: Beauty, Sex and Plastic Surgery in Brazil. 
Durham: Duke UP, 2010. 
Esquit, Edgar. “El nacionalismo guatemalteco del siglo XX: Asturias y el problema social 
del indio.” Tensiones de la modernidad: Del modernismo al realismo. Eds. 
Valeria Grinberg Pla and Ricardo Roque Baldovinos. Guatemala: F&G, 2009. 
Faber, Daniel. Capitalizing on Environmental Injustice. The Polluter-Industrial Complex 
in the Age of Globalization. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. 
---. “La liberación del medio ambiente: The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Ecology in 
Nicaragua: 1979-1999.” Capitalism Nature Socialism 10.1 (1999): 45-80. 
Fallon, Ann Marie. Global Crusoe: Comparative Literature, Postcolonial Theory and 
Transnational Aesthetics. Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. Print. 
Fellmeth, Aaron X. and Maurice Horwitz. Guide to Latin in International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2009. Print. 
Few, Martha and Zeb Tortorici, eds. Centering Animals in Latin American History. 
Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2013.  
Fineman, Martha Albertson. “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition.” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20.1 (2008): 8-40. 
Finzer, Erin S. Poetisa Chic: Fashioning the Modern Female Poet in Central America, 
1929-1944. Dissertation Pro-Quest.  
Flys Junquera, Carmen. "Dissolving the False Divide: Literary Strategies for Re-Situating 
Humans Ecologically and Non-Humans Ethically." Revista canaria de estudios 
ingleses, vol. 63, no. 63, 2011, pp. 21-38. 
231 
	  
---. "Wild Cosmopolitan Gardens: Some Notes Towards a Cosmopolitan Sense of Place." 
Tamkang Review, vol. 42, no. 1, 2011, pp. 3-26. 
Franco, Jean. Cruel Modernity. Durham: Duke UP, 2013. 
---. Plotting Women: Gender and Representation in Mexico. New York: Columbia UP, 
1989. Print. 
Fontenay, Elisabeth de. “Animality” Inaesthetics 2. 
French, Jennifer. Nature, Neo-Colonialism, and the Spanish American Regional Writers. 
Lebanon, NH: Dartmouth College P, 2005. 
Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents. Trans. Joan Riviere. Mineola, NY: 
Dover Thrift, 1994. 
Garro, Elena. Andamos huyendo Lola. México: Joaquín Mortíz, 1980. 
Gilman, Claudia. Entre la pluma y el fusil: Debates y dilemas del escritor revolucionario 
en América Latina. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2012. 
Giorgi, Gabriel. Formas comunes: animalidad, cultura, biopolítica. Buenos Aires: Eterna 
Cadencia, 2014. 
Glantz, Margo. “Entre lutos y gatos: José Agustín y Julieta Campos.” Repeticiones: 
ensayos sobre literatura mexicana. Xalapa: U Veracruzana, 1979: 70-74. 
Glotfelty, Cheryll. “Introduction: Literary Studies in an Age of Environmental Crisis.” 
The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology. Eds. Cheryll Glotfelty 
and Harold Fromm. Athens: U of Georgia P, 1996. 
Goldman, Jane. The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf. Modernism, Post-
Impressionism, and the Politics of the Visual. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 
González, Aníbal. A Companion to Spanish American Modernismo. Woodbridge: 
232 
	  
Tamesis, 2007.  
---. “Modernismo, Journalism, and the Ethics of Writing: Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera’s “La 
hija del aire.” The Contemporary Mexican Chronicle: Theoretical Persepectives 
on the Liminal Genre. Eds. Ignacio Corona and Beth Jörgensen. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002: 157-180. 
Gordon, Avery F. Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997.  
Gordon, Edmund T. Disparate Diasporas: Identity and Politics in an African-
Nicaraguan Community. Austin: U of Texas P, 1998. 
Graham, Anissa M. “A New Kind of Pandering: Supernatural and the World of 
Fanfiction.” Fan CULTure: Essays on Participatory Fandom in the 21st Century. 
Eds. Kristin M. Barton and Jonathan Malcom Lampley. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2014. 
Grosz, Elizabeth. Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. 
Durham: Duke UP, 2011. 
—. Chaos, Territory, Art. Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth. New York: Columbia 
UP, 2008. 
Grinberg Pla, Valeria and Werner Mackenbach. “Banana novel revis(it)ed: etnia, género 
y espacio en la novela bananera centroamericana. El caso de Mamita Yunai.” 
Iberoamericana 6.23 (Sept 2006): 161-176. 
Gutiérrez Nájera, Manuel. Cuentos frágiles. México: E. Dublan, 1883. Hathi Trust 
Digital Library. 
Halberstam, Judith. The Queer Art of Failure. Durham: Duke UP, 2011. 
233 
	  
Haraway, Donna. The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant 
Otherness. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2003. 
—. Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science. London: 
Routledge, 1989. 
---. Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. Durham: Duke UP, 2016. 
—. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008. 
Hedrick, Tace. Mestizo Modernism: Race, Nation, and Identity in Latin American 
Culture, 1900-1940. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2003. 
Heffes, Gisela. Políticas de la destrucción/poéticas de la preservación. Apuntes para una 
lectura eco-crítica del medioambiente en América Latina. Rosario: Beatriz 
Viterbo, 2013. 
Heidegger, Martin. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana 
UP, 2001. 
Heise, Ursula K. “Lost Dogs, Last Birds, and Listed Species: Cultures of Extinction.” 
Configurations 18.1-2 (Winter 2010): 49-72. 
---. Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2016. 
Henighan, Stephen. Sandino’s Nation: Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez Writing 
Nicaragua, 1940-2012. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2014. 
Henry, O. Cabbages and Kings. New York: McClure, Phillips, and Co, 1904. 
Hernández, Claudia. De fronteras. Guatemala: Piedra Santa, 2007. 
Hernández Quezada, Francisco J. "Bestiaria Vida: The Gaze and the Critic of the 
234 
	  
Animal." Mitologías hoy, vol. 13, 2016, pp. 133 
Hernstein Smith, Barbara. “Animal Relatives, Difficult Relations.” Differences: A 
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 15.1 (2004). 
Herrera, Flavio. El tigre. Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 1989. 
Higgins, Lynn A. New Novel, New Wave, New Politics: Fiction and the Representation of 
History in Postwar France. U of Nebraska P, 1996. 
Hind, Emily. Femmenism and the Mexican Woman Intellectual from Sor Juana to 
Poniatowska. Boob Lit. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print. 
“Honduras: The Deadliest Country in the World for Environmental Activism.” 
GlobalWitness, 31 Jan. 2017, 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/honduras-
deadliest-country-world-environmental-activism 
Irigaray, Luce. Democracy Begins Between Two. Trans. Kirsteen Anderson. New York: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Jackson, Robert H. Race, Caste and Status: Indians in Colonial Mexico. Albuquerque: U 
of New Mexico P, 1999. 
Jackson, Zakkiyah. “Animal: New Directions in the Theorization of Race and 
Posthumanism.” Feminist Studies 19:3 (2013): 669-685. 
Jakobson, Roman. “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances.” 
On Language. Eds. Linda R. Waugh and Monique Monville-Burton. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 1990: 117-133. 
Jehenson, Myriam Yvonne. Latin American Women Writers: Class, Race, Gender. 
Albany: State University of New York P, 1995. 
235 
	  
Jensen, Katharine A., and Miriam L. Wallace. “Facing Emotions.” PMLA. Publications 
of the Modern Language Assocation of America, vol. 130, no. 5, 2015, pp. 1249. 
Jitrik, Noé. “La palpitación de un proyecto. Notas sobre textos de Julieta Campos.” In La 
vibración del presente. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987: 141-155. 
Johnson, Barbara. A World of Difference. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987. 
Johnson, Edward. “Bestiality.” Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia. 
Ed. Alan Soble. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006: 95-103. 
Jrade, Cathy L. Modernismo, Modernity and the Development of Spanish American 
Literature. Austin: U of Texas P, 1998. 
Kane, Adrian. Central American Avant-Garde Narrative: Literary Innovation and 
Cultural Change 1926-1936. Amherst: Cambria, 2014. 
---., ed. The Natural World in Latin American Literatures: Ecocritical Essays on 
Twentieth Century Writings. Jefferson, NC: McFalrand, 2010. 
---. “The Nicaragua Canal and the Shifting Currents of Sandinista Environmental Policy.” 
Ecological Crisis and Cultural Representation in Latin America: Ecocritical 
Perspectives on Art, Film and Literature. Eds. Mark Anderson and Zélia M Bora. 
London: Lexington, 2016: 269-276. 
King Kong. Directed by Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Schoedsack, RKO Radio 
Pictures, 1933.  
Kishore, R.R. “Human Organs, Scarcities, and Sale: Morality Revisited.” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 31.6 (Jun. 2005): 362-365. 
Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New 
York: Columbia UP, 1982. 
236 
	  
Kuzniar, Alice. Melancholia’s Dog: Reflections on Our Animal Kinship. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2006. 
Lagos-Pope, María-Inés. “Cat/Logos: The Narrator’s Confession in Julieta Campos’ 
Celina o los gatos [Celina or the Cats].” Trans. Gabriela Mahn. In Splintering 
Darkness: Latin American Women Writers in Search of Themselves. Ed. Lucía 
Guerra Cunningham. Pittsburgh: Latin American Literary Review P, 1990: 31-42. 
Lámbarry, Alejandro. El otro radical: La voz animal en la literature hispanoamericana 
de la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Puebla: Universidad Iberoamericana Puebla, 
2015. 
Lapolla Swier, Patricia. Hybrid Nations: Gender Troping and the Emergence of 
Bigendered Subjecst in Latin American Narrative. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson 
P, 2009. 
Leys, Ruth. “The Turn to Affect: A Critique.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 3, 2011, pp. 
434-472. 
Lemus, Rafael. “Revolución y disenso: la doble política de Pobrecito poeta que era yo... 
(1976) de Roque Dalton.” Istmo 27-28 (2015). 
Liano, Dante. Visión crítica de la literatura guatemalteca. Guatemala: Universidad de 
San Carlos de Guatemala, 1997. 
Lippit, Akira. Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2008. 
Love, Heather. Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2007. 
Loveman, Mara. National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America. 
237 
	  
New York: Oxford UP, 2014. 
Ludueña Romandini, Fabián. La comunidad de los espectros. Buenos Aires: Mino y 
Davila, 2010. 
Lund, Joshua. The Mestizo State: Reading Race in Modern Mexico. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2012. 
Lundblad, Michael. The Birth of a Jungle: Animality in Progressive Era U.S. Literature 
and Culture. New York: Oxford UP, 2013. 
Maciel, Maria E. "Paisagens zooliterárias. animais na literatura brasileira moderna." 
Revista de Crítica Literaria Latinoamericana, vol. 40, no. 79, 2014, pp. 265-276. 
Magnarelli, Sharon. “Women and Nature in Rómulo Gallegos’ Doña Bárbara.” Revista 
de Estudios Hispánicos, 19.2 (1985): 3-20. 
Marcone, Jorge.	  "De retorno a lo natural: La serpiente de oro, la "novela de la selva" y la 
crítica ecológica." Hispania, vol. 81, no. 2, 1998, pp. 299-308.  
---. "Latin American Literature at the Rise of Environmentalism: Urban Ecological 
Thinking in José María Arguedas's the Foxes." Comparative Literature Studies, 
vol. 50, no. 1, 2013, pp. 64-86 
Martí, José. Lucía Jerez (Amistad funesta). Madrid: Cátedra, 1994. 
Martin, Gerald. “Rafael Arévalo Martínez y la lucha por la vida, o el hombre que parecía 
un ratoncillo.” In El hombre que parecía un caballo y otros cuentos. Rafael 
Arévalo Martínez. Ed. Dante Liano. Madrid: ALLCA XX, 1997: 261-291. 
Martínez, María Elena. Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de sangre, Religion and Gender 
in Colonial Mexico.  
Martinez, Martha. “Julieta Campos o la interiorización de lo cubano”. Revista 
238 
	  
Iberoamericana LI. 132-133 (July-Dec 1985): 793-797.  
Marting, Diane E. The Sexual Woman in Latin American Literature: Dangerous Desires. 
Gainesville: UP of Florida, 2001. 
Massumi, Brian. What Animals Teach Us about Politics. Durham: Duke UP, 2014. 
Mbembe, Achille. “Necropolitics.” Trans. Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15.1 (2003): 
11-40. 
Melero, Pilar. Mythological Constructs of Mexican Femininity. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015. Print. 
Mellor, Leo. “The Lure of Wilderness.” The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the 
Environment. Ed. Louise Wrestling. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013: 104-118. 
Menchú, Rigoberta and Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. I, Rigoberta Menchú. Trans. Ann 
Wright. 2nd Ed. New York: Verso, 2009. 
Mentz, Steve. “After Sustainability.” PMLA 127.3 (2012): 586-592. Print. 
Metzler, Christopher J. The Construction and Rearticulation of Race in a Post-Racial 
America. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2008. 
Miller, Shawn William. An Environmental History of Latin America. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2007. 
Milun, Kathryn. The Political Uncommons: The Cross-Cultural Logic of the Global 
Commons. Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. Print. 
Mitchell, W.J.T. Foreword. Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, 
and Posthumanist Theory. By Cary Wolfe. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. ix-
xiv. 
Monterroso, Augusto. Movimiento perpetuo. México: Joaquín Mortíz, 1972. 
239 
	  
---. La oveja negra y demás fábulas. Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1983. 
Morton, Timothy. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2013. 
Nelson, Diane. A Finger in the Wound. Body Bolitics in Quincentennial Guatemala. 
Berkeley: U of California P, 1999. 
Nervo, Amado. Tres estancias narrativas (1890-1899). Eds. Yólotl Cruz Mendoza, 
Gustavo Jiméndez Aguirre, and Claudia Cabeza de Vaca. México: Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México: Editorial Oceano, 2006. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Geneology of Morality. Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Trans. by 
Carol Diethe. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. 
Nixon, Rob. Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 2011. 
Novo, Salvador. Las aves en la poesía castellana. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1953. 
Nouzeilles, Gabriela, ed. La naturaleza en disputa: Retóricas del cuerpo y el paisaje en 
América Latina. Barcelona: Paidós, 2002. 
Pacheco, José Emilio. Nuevo álbum de zoología. México: Era, 2014. 
Padilla, Ignacio. Las fauces del abismo. México: Océano, 2014. 
Paz, Octavio. “Los hijos de la Malinche.” El laberinto de la soledad. México: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1992: 27-36. Print. 
---. El mono gramático. Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1974. 
Peña, Karen Patricia. Poetry and the Realm of the Public Intellectual: The Alternative 
Destinies of Gabriela Mistral, Cecília Meireles, and Rosario Castellanos. 
240 
	  
London: Legenda, 2007. Print. 
Perkowska, Magdalena. “Introducción: Narrativas agotadas o recuperables? Relecturas 
contemporáneas de las ficciones de los sesenta y setenta.” Istmo 27-28 (2015). 
Piedra Santa, Irene. “Humberto Ak’abal, the Guatemalan Weaver of Words.” Skipping 
Stones (Nov-Dec 2007), 33. 
Pitol, Sergio. “La pantera.” Cuerpo presente. México: Era, 1990:75-78. 
Ponce, Juan García. “El gato.” Encuentros. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1972. 
Prieto, Rene. Miguel Ángel Asturias’s Archeology of Return. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1983. 
Provine, R.R., Krosnowski, K.A. And Brocato N.W. “Tearing: Breakthrough in Human 
Emotional Signaling.” Evolutionary Psychology 7 (2009): 78-81. 
Ramírez, Sergio. “El paraíso envenenado.” Nación. 9 de abril, 2001. San José, Costa 
Rica. 
---. El reino animal. Madrid: Alfaguara, 2006. 
Rawles, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971. 
Revueltas, José. El apando. México: Era, 1969. 
Rey Rosa, Rodrigo. Lo que soñó Sebastián. Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1994. 
---. Otro zoo. Antigua: Edicioines del Pensativo, 2005. 
Reyes, Alfonso. “La garza Greta Garbo.” Obras completas de Alfonso Reyes IX. México: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959: 483-485. 
Rivera, José Eustacio. La vorágine. Ed. Flor María Rodríguez-Arenas. Doral, FL: 
Stockcero, 2013. 
Robbe-Grillet, Alain. “Nature, Humanism and Tragedy.” New Left Review I/31 (May-
241 
	  
June 1965): 65-80. 
Robleto, Hernán. Una mujer en la selva: (Novela americana). Santiago de Chile: 
Ediciones Arcilla, 1936. 
Rodríguez, Ana Patricia. Dividing the Isthmus: Central American Transnational 
Histories, Literatures, and Cultures. Austin: U of Texas P, 2009. 
Rodríguez, Fermín A. "El juguete rabioso. El retorno del animal a la política." Aletria: 
Revista de Estudos de Literatura, vol. 21, no. 3, 2011, pp. 191-200 
Rodríguez, Ileana. “Trágame tierra: una narrativa consistente.” Casa de las Américas 
150 (1985): 79-89. 
---. Women, Guerrillas and Love: Understanding War in Central America. Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 1996. 
---. “Montañas con aroma de mujer: reflexiones postinsurgentes sobre el feminism 
revolucionario.” Narrativa femenina en América Latina: prácticas y perspectivas 
teóricas. Ed. Sara Castro-Klaren. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2003: 143-160. 
Rohman, Carrie. Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal. New York: Columbia 
UP, 2012. 
Rulfo, Juan. Toda la obra. Ed. Claude Fell. Madrid: ALLCA XX, 1992. 
Sahagún, Bernardino de. General History of the Things of New Spain: The Florentine 
Codex. Translated by Charles E. Dibble and Arthur Anderson. Santa Fe: School 
of American Research, 1975. 
Saldaña-Portillo, María Josefina. The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the 
Age of Development. Durham: Duke UP, 2003. 
Sánchez Rolón, Elba. “Escrito sobre el mar: viaje y reflexión en la obra de Julieta 
242 
	  
Campos.” La nueva literatura hispánica 13 (2009): 185-206. Print. 
Schaefer, Eric. “Foreword.” Latsploitation, Exploitation Cinemas, and Latin America. 
Eds. Victoria Ruétalo and Dolores Tierney. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Seshadri, Kalpana Rahita. HumAnimal: Race, Law, Language. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2012. 
Shaw, Donald. “Notes on the Presentation of Sexuality in the Modern Spanish-American 
Novel.” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 59.3 (July 1982): 275-82. 
Soler Frost, Pablo. Oriente de los insectos mexicanos. México: UNAM, 1996. 
Sommer, Doris. Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America. 
Berkeley: U of California P, 1991. 
Spitz, María. “Between Confession and Realism: Lack, Vision, and the Construction of 
Identity in Rafael Arévalo Martínez’s Una vida and Manuel Aldano.” Hispanic 
Review 82.2 (Spring 2015): 211-229. 
Spivak, Gayatri C. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Die Philosophin, vol. 14, no. 27, 2003, 
pp. 42-58. 
Stengers, Isabelle. Cosmopolitics I. Trans. Robert Bononno. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2010. 
Stepan, Nancy Leys. “The Hour of Eugenics”: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin 
America. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991. 
—. Picturing Tropical Nature. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001. 
Taracena Arriola, Arturo. “Arévalo Martínez y la Guatemala de los años diez.” In El 
hombre que parecía un caballo y otros cuentos. Rafael Arévalo Martínez. Ed. 
Dante Liano. Madrid: ALLCA XX, 1997: 235-245 
243 
	  
Tario, Francisco. Obras completas. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2015. 
Tedesco, Italo. Modernismo, americanismo y literatura infantil: América en Martí y 
Darío. Caracas: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 1998 
Terada, Rei. Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the “Death of the Subject.” Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2001. 
Thompson, Carol. “The Contested Meaning and Place of Feral Cats in the Workplace.” 
Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 10. 4 (2012). 
Tompkins, Cynthia M. “Intertextuality as Différance in Julieta Campos’ El miedo de 
perder a Eurídice: A Symptomatic Case of Latin American Postmodernism.” In 
The Postmodern in Latin and Latino American Cultural Narratives. Ed. Claudia 
Ferman. New York: Garland, 1996: 133-180. 
Torres-Rivas. Revoluciones sin cambios revolucionarios. Ciudad de Guatemala, 
Guatemala: F&G, 2011. 
Urbina, Nicasio. “Memoria y ficción en Sangre en el trópico de Hernán Robleto”. Nuevo 
Amanecer Cultural. 18 Aug. 2001: p. 3. 
Unruh, Vicky. Latin American Vanguards: The Art of Contentious Encounters. Berkeley: 
U of California P, 1994. 
Urruela V. De Quezada, Ana María. “Génesis y circunstancia de “El hombre que parecía 
un caballo.” In El hombre que parecía un caballo y otros cuentos. Rafael Arévalo 
Martínez. Ed. Dante Liano. Madrid: ALLCA XX, 1997: 246-260. 
Vasconcelos, José. La raza cósmica. Misión de la raza iberoamericana. México DF: 
Espasa Calpe, 1994. 
---. Ulises criollo. Ed. Claude Fell. Madrid: ALLCA XX, 2000. 
244 
	  
Villalobos, Juan Pablo. Fiesta en la madriguera. Barcelona: Anagrama, 2010. 
Vint, Sherryl. Animal Alterity: Science Fiction and the Question of the Animal. 
Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2010. 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. Cosmological Perspectivism in Amazonia and Elsewhere: 
Four Lectures given in the Department of Social Anthropology, University of 
Cambridge, February-March 1998 (HAU Masterclass Series I). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
—. “Immanence and Fear: Stranger-events and subject in Amazonia.” Trans. David 
Rogers. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2.1 (2012): 27-43. 
Weil, Kari. Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now? New York: Columbia UP, 
2012. 
White, Steven F. Arando el aire: la ecología en la poesía y la música de Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua: 400 Elefantes, 2011. 
Wolfe, Cary. Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and 
Posthumanist Theory. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. 
---. Before the Law: Animals in a Biopolitical Frame. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2013. 
Yelin, Julieta. “Para una teoría literaria posthumanista. La crítica en la trama de debates 
sobre la cuestión animal.” E-misférica 10.1 (2013). 
Zimmerman, Marc. “Testimonio in Guatemala: Payeras, Rigoberta, and Beyond.” Latin 
American Perspectives 18:4 (1991): 22-47. 
